State v. Ray
| Decision Date | 31 August 1873 |
| Citation | 53 Mo. 345 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI Respondent, v. GEORGE W. RAY, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Caldwell Circuit Court.
Hoskinson & McLaughlin, for Appellant.
Crosby Johnson, for Respondent.
The defendant, George W. Ray, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Caldwell County for the attempt to ravish one Jennie Wyatt, (a colored girl) in the year 1868. The defendant was not arrested on the capias issued on the indictment until 1872. A trial was had at the June term of the Caldwell Circuit Court, and shortly after the arrest, resulting in a verdict of guilty. The evidence was amply sufficient to sustain the charge, and no just ground of complaint can be urged against the instructions, for they, as a whole, presented the case very fairly to the jury. A motion for a new trial was filed, based on these alleged grounds: First--That the defendant was not allowed to challenge twelve jurors in accordance with law: Second--That the jury did not specify the offense or degree of offense of which defendant was found guilty: Third--That the indictment did not warrant the finding of the jury: Fourth--That the defendant was not arraigned: Fifth--That no list of jurors was delivered to the defendant forty-eight hours prior to the trial: Sixth--That defendant was not personally present during the whole of the trial: Seventh--That the court erred in giving instructions on the part of the State, and in refusing to give certain instructions on the part of defendant: Eighth--That defendant had discovered new evidence since the trial, material to his defense, of which he was unaware at the time of such trial: Ninth--That “defendant was unconscious of what he was doing at the time he announced himself ready for trial in said cause:” Tenth--That the court admitted illegal, and excluded proper, testimony at the trial.
The position is not tenable that the defendant was entitled to a peremptory challenge of twelve jurors, as the offense charged was not punishable by imprisonment for life, nor for more than a specified number of years, and a limit to the duration of the imprisonment, with which the offense may be punished, is declared. (W. S., 449, 450, § 32; 1102, § 4.)
Besides no objection was raised on this point nor exception saved, and therefore, even if defendant's position was correct, there is no evidence before us of that fact, as the motion containing such recital does not establish it.
There is nothing in the point, that the verdict did not specify the offense or degree of offense of which the defendant was convicted. The indictment contains but one charge, the one heretofore mentioned, and the verdict which was in this form:
“We, the Jury, find the defendant guilty, and assess his punishment at a fine of three hundred dollars,
P. S. WILSON, Foreman,”
could, by no reasonable intendment or inference, refer to any other thing but the charge the indictment contained,and that is all that is necessary.
What is meant by saying, that “the indictment did not warrant the finding of the jury,” is not exactly perceived, unless it be intended thereby, that the verdict is not responsive to the indictment, or that the latter is legally insufficient. As above seen, there was but one charge set forth in the indictment, and the verdict could therefore, by no possibility, refer to any other than that charge.
But if it be meant to question the sufficiency of the indictment, it is enough to observe, that it plainly and concisely charges an offense recognized both by the common law and by the statute; and that in its form and recitals is not obnoxious to criticism.
The fourth and sixth grounds of the motion, that the defendant was not arraigned, and was not personally present during the whole trial, are contradicted by the record itself, affirmatively showing both the arraignment (although informal) and continuous personal presence of the defendant during the whole trial. (See State vs. Braunschweig, 36 Mo., 397.)
The defendant was not entitled to a list of jurors, forty-eight hours prior to the trial, but only before the jury was sworn; and then only if such list were required. (W. S., 1102, §§ 4, 8; State vs. Klinger, 46 Mo., 224.)
The propriety as to the giving or refusal of instructions has been already considered, and that matter will not be further discussed.
If the court admitted illegal, or excluded proper testimony, no exceptions were saved as to its rulings; nor does the bill of exceptions show any erroneous rulings of that sort. Matters of mere exception occupy the same footing and are governed by the same rules, in criminal as in civil cases. (W. S., 1105, § 26; State vs. Marshall, 36 Mo., 400.)
The remaining grounds of the motion, that of newly discovered evidence, and the state of defendant at the time of the announcement of “ready for trial” was made, will now be considered in connection with the affidavits which were filed in support of the motion. And it is to be borne in mind that in criminal cases verdicts are set aside and new trials granted, for like causes, and...
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State v. Anderson
...to which no objection was made in the progress of the trial, although attention is called to them in the motion for a new trial. State v. Ray, 53 Mo. 345; State v. Pints, 64 Mo. 318; State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310; State v. McDonald, 85 Mo. 539. When it clearly appears that other instruction......
- The State v. Douglas
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State v. Douglas
...incorporating them into a bill of exceptions. State v. De Mosse, 98 Mo. loc. cit. 344, 11 S. W. 731; State v. Marshall, 36 Mo. 400; State v. Ray, 53 Mo. 345; State v. Pints, 64 Mo. 317; State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310; State v. McDonald, 85 Mo. 543; State v. West, 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. W. 1071; ......
- State v. Anderson