State v. Reardon

• Decision Date: 31 December 1984
• Citation: 486 A.2d 112
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Dennis REARDON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 112

486 A.2d 112

STATE of Maine v. Dennis REARDON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 11, 1984.

Decided Dec. 31, 1984.

James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Wayne S. Moss, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Augusta, for plaintiff.

Thomas A. Berry (orally), Boothbay Harbor, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN and GLASSMAN, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A.R.J.

DUFRESNE, Active Retired Justice.

After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court (Cumberland County), Dennis Reardon (the defendant) was convicted on each of a two-count indictment charging him respectively with robbery and felony murder, both being Class A crimes under 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 651(1)(C) and 202. His subsequent motion for a new trial pursuant to M.R.Crim.P., Rule 33, was denied and he appeals from the ensuing judgments. We affirm.

In this appeal, Reardon raises three points in support of his claim that the convictions below should be set aside. First, he contends that the evidence at trial, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, cannot constitute as a matter of law sufficient credible evidence from which the trial justice as the fact finder was justified in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Reardon's conduct in fact caused the victim's heart attack and death and that such death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such conduct. Reardon's second argument seeks to discredit completely the testimony of the defendant's alleged accomplice for a multiplicity of reasons, such as his extended criminal record, his mental impairment due to drugs at the time of the incident, his self-interest in throwing the greater blame on the defendant, his actual falling-out with the defendant, the inconsistency of his testimony with prior statements, and in general the vagueness of his assertions surrounding the robbery and other aspects of his activities. All this, Reardon says, precludes a trier of fact rationally finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of robbery and felony murder. Thirdly, Reardon claims that his murder conviction should be set aside, because the statute itself incorporating as it does the felony murder rule operates unfairly, in that it serves to punish a person for unintended conduct, here an unlawful homicide, in violation of the fundamental concept in criminal jurisprudence of individual accountability for one's own misconduct. This attack is a vague challenge to the statute on constitutional grounds. ¹ We disagree with the defendant's position on all three issues.

The evidence may be summarized as follows: Sean Ritchie at the end of April, 1980, had moved into the State Street apartment that the defendant Reardon occupied in Portland with his friend, Cathy Richards. After sundown on May 31, 1980, so Ritchie testified, both he and Reardon left together the Dunkin Donuts shop on Congress Street with the purpose of obtaining money to purchase narcotics by stealing something from "anywhere available." Sometime later after the two men reached Park Street, they saw an older man walking towards them on the same side of the street. "Here's one," said Reardon to Ritchie, while directing Ritchie to cross the street and keep watch for pedestrians and oncoming cars. Ritchie then observed Reardon grabbing this elderly gentleman of 67 years of age by the name of George Webb by the lapel of his coat. He stated that Reardon threw Webb to the ground and snatched the man's wallet, tearing the fabric and lining of the coat in the process. As both of them were running away, Ritchie said that Webb had gotten up, was hollering for them to stop and started running after them. Ritchie further testified that, on their way to the apartment, Reardon threw the piece of cloth ripped from Webb's coat to the street and put the wallet in his pocket; once home free, they removed from the wallet the twenty dollars which it contained and with which they later purchased some narcotics.

Officers Robinson and Pierce of the Portland Police Department testified for the State and from their testimony it appears that they were on duty in the evening of May 31, 1980, and that they had stopped in Gill's Handy Store located at 133 Spring Street at the intersection of Spring and Park Streets at 10:30 p.m. This was a regular routine stop for officers on that beat. The officers recounted that shortly after 11:00 p.m. Mr. Webb, walking by the store, peered in and entered, saying "I've been robbed." He was clutching in his left hand heavy-framed black glasses, which were broken. He showed the officers where the lining and fabric of his coat had been torn. The officers exited the store as Mr. Webb was telling them that two male individuals had robbed him and taken his wallet with twenty dollars in it. The three of them were walking on the sidewalk in the direction of the unmarked police vehicle parked directly in front of the store. Mr. Webb said: "I guess I'll go home," as he was taking a step towards the curb. Putting his hand out towards the police car, Webb was falling backwards, but Officer Robinson broke his fall and eased him to the sidewalk. The officers had noticed Mr. Webb's pale and "pasty looking" appearance, but now they observed "an extreme deep blue discoloration about his neck and up through his face" and his eyes "were partially open and like the pupil area was rolling back towards the top, towards his forehead." Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation proved ineffective, and Mr. Webb was pronounced dead at nearby Mercy Hospital around 12:20 a.m. in the morning of June 1st.

I. The robbery as the cause in fact of the death of Webb

Our felony murder statute, 17-A M.R.S.A., § 202, provides in pertinent part that

[a] person is guilty of felony murder if acting ... with one or more other persons in the commission of ... robbery ..., he or another participant in fact causes the death of a human being, and such death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such commission.... (Emphasis supplied).

This statute must be read together with 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(4) respecting proof of a culpable mental state in felony murder. Section 34(4) states that

[u]nless otherwise expressly provided, a culpable mental state need not be proved with respect to:

A. ...; or

B. Any element of the crime as to which it is expressly stated that it must "in fact" exist. (Emphasis added).

Thus, Maine's new criminal code effective May 1, 1976, in introducing its own felony murder rule, provides expressly as basic elements of felony murder under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 202, (1) that the commission of any of the statutorily enumerated felonies in fact causes the death of the human victim involved and (2) that such death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the commission of such felony. In this, the code was merely declaratory of existing law, since, in order to find guilt under the pre-existing felony murder rule, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not merely a causal relationship between the felony committed and the death, but also that the commission of the felony itself in the manner or method of execution presented a reasonably foreseeable perceptibility of risk of death. See State v. Pray, 378 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Me.1977); State v. Wallace, 333 A.2d 72, 80 (Me.1975); State v. Trott, 289 A.2d 414, 418, n. 7 (Me.1972).

Also, by virtue of the express terms of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34, which specifies that a culpable mental state need not be proved with respect to any element of any particular crime as to which the statute expressly states that such element must in fact exist, we must conclude that it was the intention of the Legislature, in enacting section 202, the felony murder provision, to prohibit as felony murder the causing of any unintended death that in fact results as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an intended felony. See State v. Caouette, 462 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Me.1983); 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 145, at 204 (14th ed. 1979).

The defendant, however, argues that the evidence in this case was insufficient as a matter of law to support proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the commission of the robbery upon the person of Mr. Webb in fact caused Mr. Webb's death. He bases his argument on 17-A M.R.S.A. § 33, which says:

Unless otherwise provided, when causing a result is an element of a crime, causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient.

Reardon claims that there existed concurrent causes which alone were clearly sufficient to produce the death of Mr. Webb and that the robbery itself was clearly insufficient. We disagree. As stated in State v. Crocker, 431 A.2d 1323, 1325 (Me.1981):

In every case where causing a result is an element of the crime the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. The State may prove either that the defendant's conduct, operating alone, produced the result or that the defendant's conduct, operating in conjunction with a concurrent causative condition, produced the result. (Emphasis in original).

Dr. Henry Ryan, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maine, testified as a prosecution witness. He stated that Mr. Webb died of a heart attack due to coronary arteriosclerosis precipitated by a stressful incident which he was given to believe was an assault or robbery. In final analysis, he indicated that in his opinion Mr. Webb's fatal heart attack and death were caused by the robbery. As factors supporting his expert conclusion, he cited the fact that coronary arteriosclerotic disease is very common in people of Mr. Webb's age of 67 years and that the disease was unusually severe in Mr. Webb's case, adding that sudden stresses do play a role in...