State v. Reardon
| Decision Date | 25 November 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 36539,36539 |
| Citation | 245 Minn. 509,73 N.W.2d 192 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. A. E. REARDON, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where defendant had entered plea of guilty which was withdrawn on order of court, it was prejudicial error for prosecuting attorney to state in argument to the jury in trial on new indictment that there was a time when the plaintiff had entered a plea of guilty.
2. Court will not pass upon question of whether prejudicial argument was corrected by retraction or explanation where the record as to what occurred is in conflict.
3. Where the impact of an improper argument on minds of the jury may create substantial prejudice, it cannot be expected that court's cautionary instruction will operate to remove the effects of such prejudicial statement from the minds of the jury.
4. Due process, as guaranteed by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, and U.S.Const. Amends. V and XIV, § 1, includes the right to a fair trial.
Hoffmann, Donahue & Graff, St. Paul, James J. Courtney & Sons, Duluth, for appellant.
Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., James F. Lynch, County Atty., John P. Frank, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.
The defendant was indicted for first degree grand larceny under M.S.A. §§ 622.01(2) and 622.05(3). Following conviction and imposition of sentence, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. From this order the defendant has appealed.
Since the one question for consideration is whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial, the facts are briefly set forth only to place the issue in context. The defendant, a realtor doing business in the city of St. Paul as the Reardon Service Bureau, sold a house for the complainant, Alva P. Broeker. The sale was consummated April 9, 1953, and on May 12, after several unsuccessful attempts to get the balance of the proceeds of the sale, Broeker and his attorney made demands therefor at the defendant's office. The defendant gave Broeker a check for the balance due on that date, the check being dishonored because of insufficient funds. The following day, May 13, 1953, Broeker and his attorney confronted the defendant with the dishonored check and again demanded the balance due. At that time defendant admitted he did not have the money, stating that he had used it to pay his own bills. The defendant offered in effect to either 'go * * * to the County Attorney's office' or make restitution. Defendant agreed to make restitution and Broeker consented to accept payment in weekly installments. Thereafter the defendant made intermittent weekly payments in varying amounts until September 1953, at which time there was and still is the sum of $2,142.48 owing to Mr. Broeker.
On March 17, 1954, an information was filed in Ramsey County District Court charging the defendant with second degree grand larceny, to which information the defendant entered a plea of guilty. Thereafter on April 23, 1954, upon motion of the defendant, the Ramsey County District Court ordered the withdrawal of such plea. The present action is based on an indictment returned April 30, 1954, charging the defendant with first degree grand larceny. There has never been any plea other than a plea of not guilty to this indictment.
1. The sole point upon which the defendant predicates this appeal is that the county attorney's closing argument, by referring to a former plea of guilty, was so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial and due process of law. 1 The proscribed remarks as they appear in the record of the state's closing argument are as follows:
'Mr. Reardon at the time he went to trial here, by going to trial entered a plea of not guilty to every essential element of the crime he was charged with, but there was one time when he entered a plea of guilty and he entered that plea on the morning of May 13th, 1953.'
The appellant contends the foregoing statement was prejudicial and resulted in the denial of a fair trial because it informed the jury of a plea of guilty which had been withdrawn. The state contends the argument merely characterizes the evidence growing out of the negotiations on May 13, 1953, when the defendant admitted he did not have the money and would, if complainant desired, go to the county attorney's office. But in view of the vast difference between an admission and a plea of guilty it is not reasonable that an attorney would use those terms synonymously. 2 The statement of the prosecuting attorney could have no other meaning to the jury except that at one time the defendant had admitted his guilt by entering a plea of guilty. In a comparable situation in State v. Hook, 174 Minn. 590, 592, 219 N.W. 926, 927, Mr. Justice Dibell observed:
'* * * it can be said that no one familiar with court rooms could believe that the jury did not understand that a plea of guilty had been entered.'
Not only is a withdrawn plea of guilty inadmissible, 3 but it is also improper to attempt to inform the jury of such a plea in argument 4 or even by innuendo. 5
2. The county attorney's argument was interrupted immediately following the statement in issue at which time the defendant moved for a mistrial. The record is not clear as to whether the prosecuting attorney retracted or explained the erroneous statement in the presence of the jury. The reporter's transcript does not show that he did.
After sentence the state moved to correct the record of the state's final argument to have it include the explanation that the plea of guilty mentioned by the prosecuting attorney actually referred to the defendant's admission on May 13, 1953. It was contended by the defendant, however, that this explanation was given at the bench, directed to the judge, and not in the hearing of the jury. In making his order the trial court said:
'* * * The Court does recall that such a remark, or a similar remark, was made by counsel for the State, but does not recollect whether the remark was made at the bench without the hearing of the jury or from the court room floor directed to the Court but within the hearing of the jury.'
Because the record does not establish what actually happened with reference to a retraction or explanation by the prosecuting attorney, we do not pass upon the question of whether such action would have had the effect of correcting the prejudicial nature of the statement.
3. The motion for mistrial was argued in chambers and after denying it the trial court returned to the bench and informed the jury that the prosecuting attorney's reference to a plea of guilty applied to the conversation of May 13 and added:
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State v. Gary
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...that although he was innocent, he pleaded guilty because his lawyer promised him a suspended sentence). Finally, State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1955), squarely holds that the admission into evidence of a withdrawn guilty plea violates the due process protected by both ......
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...could have prevented the jury from reaching conclusions that were unduly prejudicial to appellant. We noted in State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192 (1955) that where "the impact of the prejudicial remark may be such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evi......
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