State v. Redd

• Decision Date: 02 January 1932
• Docket Number: 23479.,23478
• Citation: 6 P.2d 619,166 Wash. 132
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. TAX COMMISSION et al. v. REDD, County Treasurer (two cases.

6 P.2d 619

166 Wash. 132

STATE ex rel. TAX COMMISSION et al. v. REDD, County Treasurer (two cases.

Nos. 23478, 23479.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

January 2, 1932

Appeals from Superior Court, Franklin County; Matt L. Driscoll Judge.

Two actions for writ of mandate by the State, on the relation of the State Tax Commission, and Samuel Chase and others, as members thereof, against E. F. Redd, as County Treasurer of Franklin County. From adverse judgments, defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

C. M O'Brien, of Pasco, for appellant.

John H Dunbar and John A. Homer, both of Olympia, for respondents.

MILLARD J.

Two tracts of land in Franklin county owned by an incompetent person were assessed for the years 1922 and 1927, inclusive, by the local county assessor, and the taxes extended and entered on the rolls in the usual manner. All of the taxes levied against the two tracts were paid under protest by the landowner. Alleging excessive valuation of the lands by the local assessor, the land-owner's guardian instituted two separate actions against Franklin county for the refund of the protested taxes. One of the actions has not yet been brought to trial. The trial of the other cause resulted in judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of that portion of the amount paid which the court found to be excessive. The appeal by the county from that judgment is pending.

Subsequent to the entry of the judgment in the second action, the state tax commission, as prescribed by statute (chapter 106, p. 306, Laws 1931), reassessed for taxation purposes the lands involved in both actions. In accordance with its determination, the commission entered an order and certified a copy thereof to the treasurer-assessor of Franklin county, a county of the class in which the office of county assessor was abolished and the duties of that office were transferred to the county treasurer. Section 4200-4, Rem. 1927 Supp.

The tax commission found the valuation for taxation purposes of the land involved in the action not yet tried in the superior court to be an amount in excess of that claimed by the taxpayer as correct, but less than the figure fixed by the local assessor. The commission determined the assessed valuation of the land involved in the action which went to judgment to be an amount less than that fixed by the county assessor, more than the amount claimed by the taxpayer to be the correct valuation, and in excess of the valuation found by the court.

The treasurer-assessor refused to enter upon the assessment roll the valuation found by tht tax commission, and declined to use that valuation as a basis for the computing and extending of a tax against the lands. Thereupon, the commission commenced two separate actions in the superior court for Franklin county for a writ of mandate requiring the treasurer-assessor of that county to comply with the commission's order. The appeals (the two cases have been consolidated on appeal) are from the judgments directing the issuance of a writ of mandate in each action, rendered upon the treasurer-assessor's refusal to plead further after his demurrer to each application for a writ was overruled.

Appellant insists that the reassessment act, in so far as its provisions affect the assessment and collection of taxes within Franklin county for county purposes, is in violation of the following sections of the state Constitution:

'The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may by general laws vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.' Constitution, art. 11, § 12.

'For all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same.' Constitution, art. 7, § 9.

'The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall provide for the election in the several counties of boards of county commissioners, sheriffs, county clerks, treasurers, prosecuting attorneys, and other county, township, or precinct and district officers, as public convenience may require, and shall prescribe their duties and fix their term of office.' Constitution, art. 11, § 5.

Respondent contends that no legal objection can be advanced to the exercise by the Legislature of the power to authorize the taxing authorities to reassess property for taxation purposes either upon complaint of a taxpayer or upon the taxing official's own initiative; that a statute purporting to prohibit the taxing officials or courts from correcting errors in assessments would be void.

Appellant argues that the constitutional inhibition extends to reassessment of municipal taxes by a state board or authorities other than the local corporate authorities, not to reassessment of state taxes by the state tax commission; that in bestowing upon the tax commission (in the selection of the members of which the people of Franklin county have no voice) the power to revise or reassess taxes imposed for county purposes, the Legislature violated the constitutional provision (Constitution, art. 11, § 5) under which the right of self-government is secured to the counties, cities, and other municipal corporations of the state.

Section 2, c. 106, p. 307, Laws 1931, reading as follows, authorizes the state tax commission to reassess property, not only for state purposes, but also for county, city, and other municipal purposes:

'Whenever it shall appear to the tax commission from any protest accompanying the payment of taxes heretofore or hereafter filed with any county or state board or officer, or petition or complaint heretofore or hereafter served or filed in any court for or on behalf of such taxpayer and an investigation of the facts upon which such protest, petition or complaint is based that any error in taxation has occurred in the assessment or taxation heretofore or hereafter made of any property taxable in this state, and such assessment appears to be excessive or void in whole or in part, such property shall forthwith, in the manner provided in this act, be re-listed, re-valued, re-assessed and re-taxed for the year or years in the assessment and taxation of which such error or errors in taxation was or were made: Provided, however, that there shall not be more than one re-assessment and/or re-taxation proceedings under the provisions of this Act, relating to the same property for the same year's taxes.'

Section 3 of the re-assessment act (page 308) provides that at a time to be fixed in the notice served upon the owner of the land the tax commission will, at its office in Olympia, proceed to reassess and retax 'said property for the particular year or years involved (naming them) and further giving notice that said owner or other interested persons may appear at the time and place set forth in said notice, and show cause, if any there be, why such re-assessment and re-taxation should not be made. * * *'

We agree, as held in Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Omaha, 72 Neb. 518, 101 N.W. 3, 6, that 'in the absence of constitutional restraints, the power of the Legislature over taxation is as unlimited as the subject with which it deals.'

While the legislative branch of the government has the exclusive power of taxation, it may delegate that power to counties, cities, or other municipal corporations. The constitutional provision that the Legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties or upon the inhabitants or property thereof for county purposes, but may by general laws vest in the county authorities the power to assess and collect taxes for county purposes is a limitation of, not a grant of power. When a municipal corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested in such corporation as an essential attribute for all the purposes of its existence unless its exercise be in express terms prohibited.

'The position that the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, no one will controvert. Under our system it is lodged nowhere else. But it is a power that may be delegated by the legislature to municipal corporations, which are merely instrumentalities of the State for the better administration of the government in matters of local concern. When such a corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute, for all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be in express terms prohibited. * * * A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose.' United States ex rel. Ranger v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 392, 25 L.Ed. 225.

The Legislature is divested by section 12, art. 11 of the state Constitution of the power to impose taxes upon counties or upon the inhabitants or property thereof for county purposes. The section further provides that the Legislature 'may by general laws vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such [county and municipal] purposes.' We will agree arguendo, that, in the absence of statutory authority therefor, the local authorities of a county or municipal corporation could not assess and collect taxes for local purposes. Let us next assume the absence of a self-executing provision of the Constitution conferring the power upon counties and municipal corporations to assess and collect taxes for local purposes. Would it not follow that the Legislature could withhold, grant, or...