State v. Redden
| Decision Date | 27 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 38853,38853 |
| Citation | 426 P.2d 854,71 Wn.2d 147 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John B. REDDEN, Appellant. |
Stubbs, Batali, Combs & Small, H. Frank Stubbs, Tacoma, for appellant.
Joseph D. Mladinov, Sp. Counsel to Pros. Atty. of Pierce County, Tacoma , for the State.
This is an appeal by the defendant (appellant), John B. Redden, from a conviction of robbery and sentence entered thereon. The defendant was one of four people (three men and one woman) involved in the robbery of Paul Dillinger, the proprietor of the Little Park Cafe in Pierce County, on June 10, 1965. The two other men were tried separately and their convictions were affirmed by this court in State v. Jones, 70 Wash.Ded.2d 570, 424 P.2d 665 (1967). The woman, Leanne Jones, pleaded guilty to the charge and after serving five months in jail received a suspended sentence. She testified for the state in the trial of the defendant. The facts of the robbery, insofar as material to this appeal, are as follows:
On the day of the robbery, the four people charged agreed to commit the crime. It was decided that two of the men, Richard Jones and John Ringwood, were to carry the two weapons, although one of the guns, a .22 caliber pistol, was passed back and forth between the defendant and Ringwood prior to the robbery. The four entered the Little Park Cafe at about 8 o'clock that evening; discovered that two state patrolmen were in the cafe, and left after being advised by a waitress that the cafe had no facilities for serving cocktails. They decided to return about an hour later and did so about 9 o'clock. They ordered dinner but didn't pay for it since none of them had any money. After finishing their meal, Leanne Jones and the defendant left the cafe and waited for their companions in the car. The two men remaining robbed Mr. Dillinger and fled in the car with Leanne Jones and the defendant. Remaining together, they drove some distance, stopped, changed clothes and the license plates on the car. Leanne Jones then divided the money (about $280) equally among the men and kept some herself.
From a description of the car, the police were able to apprehend the four about eight miles from the cafe. At the time of arrest, the police searched the suspects and recovered $286 from them; defendant Redden had about $85 on his person. Officers found two guns in the automobile: a sawed-off M--1 carbine and the .22 caliber pistol, both with full clips of ammunition and live shells in the chambers. The police also discovered sixteen .22 caliber cartridges in their search of the defendant.
The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the accomplice, Leanne Jones, to testify that she had been charged with and convicted of the crime of robbery based on her plea of guilty to the charge. He argues that the introduction of this fact, by the state, constituted impeachment of its own witness; and improperly let the jury believe that the witness, having been convicted, must now be telling the truth on the stand.
In State v. Long, 65 Wash.2d 303, 396 P.2d 990 (1964), we held that it was proper for the state to show that a witness for the state, an accomplice in the crime, had pleaded guilty before the trial and had been sentenced, at the time testimony was given. We stated:
In our opinion, the jury, in order to be able to intelligently evaluate Jennings' testimony as an accomplice pursuant to the court's instructions * * * was entitled to be told the true facts regarding his status with respect to the charges. 65 Wash.2d at 311, 396 P.2d at 995.
The reasoning in Long is applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the record discloses no evidence whereby the jury could be misled in any respect by the state's introduction of facts regarding the status of the witness under the law. Defense counsel was allowed to thoroughly cross-examine the witness relative to her previous inconsistent statements, and her possible bias or interest in the case due to the leniency in her sentencing. In addition, the trial court carefully instructed the jury as to the care and caution it should exercise in evaluating the testimony of this witness. Considering these precautionary safeguards, the trial court properly allowed the witness to testify regarding the criminal proceedings taken against her.
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to who could be found to be a principal under the aider and abettor statute, RCW 9.01.030. He argues that the formula instruction, largely phrased in the words of the statute, was too broad and did not apply to the facts in issue; without an additional instruction to the jury that intention alone was not enough and that there must be some overt act shown to have been taken by the defendant. We disagree.
Under the aider and abettor statute a person may be charged as a principal whether present or absent at the commission of the crime, if directly or indirectly he counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or otherwise procures another to commit a crime.
Under the facts of this case, the jury was properly instructed that the defendant might be considered a principal if it found that he directly or indirectly aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. A separate instruction, requiring the finding of an overt act, was unnecessary; since the instruction, as...
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State v. Aiken
...in conformity with the statute, supra, and was properly given. State v. Clark, 26 Wash.2d 160, 173 P.2d 189 (1946). State v. Redden, 71 Wash.Dec.2d 143, 426 P.2d 854 (1967). Wheat contends that the court erred in failing to grant seven of his challenges for cause in his voir dire examinatio......
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...to assist or actually assisting by his presence.” Renneberg, 83 Wash.2d at 739, 522 P.2d 835. The court quoted State v. Redden, 71 Wash.2d 147, 150, 426 P.2d 854 (1967), concluding: A separate instruction, requiring the finding of an overt act, was unnecessary; since the instruction, as giv......
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