State v. Reddin
| Docket Number | 2D22-3853 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. MITCHELL WILLIAMS REDDIN, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the County Court for Pasco County; Debra Roberts, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Samuel R Mandelbaum, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.
The State appeals an order dismissing its case against Mitchell Williams Reddin. The trial court dismissed the case midtrial after concluding that the New Port Richey officer who arrested Mr. Reddin lacked authority to stop and arrest Mr Reddin outside of his territorial jurisdiction. Because the officer was in fresh pursuit of Mr. Reddin and was therefore authorized to make an extraterritorial arrest, we reverse the dismissal and remand for a new trial.
The State charged Mr. Reddin with reckless driving under section 316.192(1), Florida Statutes (2021), and resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2021). The State alleged that Mr. Reddin recklessly operated his motorcycle on U.S. Highway 19 in Pasco County and disobeyed commands from law enforcement. The State's complaint filed in November 2021 identified the New Port Richey Police Department as the arresting agency and Port Richey as the location of the arrest.
The case went to trial the following year and the State called the arresting officer as its first witness. The officer testified that while on patrol in New Port Richey, he observed a motorcycle speed by him on U.S. Highway 19. The officer followed the motorcycle north and saw it heavily accelerate, weave around and between cars, and drive over 100 miles per hour-more than twice the speed limit. The officer said that he never lost sight of the motorcycle and that it eventually slowed, which allowed the officer to catch up without jeopardizing the safety of other motorists. After the motorcycle and the officer crossed municipal lines into Port Richey, the officer activated his lights and sirens and pulled the motorcyclist over on the side of U.S. Highway 19.
During the defense's cross-examination and the State's redirect of the officer, the officer testified that he had authority to stop the motorcyclist in Port Richey because he was also a deputy with the Pasco County Sheriff's Office (PCSO). The defense didn't challenge the officer's authority, either before or during trial. But the trial court interrupted the State's redirect of the officer to ask whether he had any documentation to support his testimony regarding his authority to make an arrest outside of New Port Richey. The officer said that he did but that it was in his vehicle. The trial court made the parties take a break so the officer could get his documents, and it told the parties they would need to recall the officer "because he's going to have to testify about this jurisdiction with the Pasco County Sheriff's Office." The trial court then sent the jury out of the room and-without any prompting from the defense-told the State: "I need for you to show me that [the officer] has unbridled discretion as a Pasco County Sheriff's deputy to handle any kind of cases" in Port Richey.
The State was unprepared for this challenge because the defense never raised it. The State responded on the fly and provided the trial court with the officer's PCSO credentials and a mutual aid agreement between New Port Richey and Port Richey. The State also reminded the trial court that the reckless driving charge began in New Port Richey and that an officer in fresh pursuit has authority to make an arrest in another jurisdiction.
The trial court was unconvinced. It found that the officer was not in fresh pursuit, so in its view the issue of the officer's authority turned on the mutual aid agreement. And because the State did not have a witness from the Port Richey Police Department available to testify at trial that day, the trial court found that the State could not prove that the New Port Richey officer complied with the mutual aid agreement when he stopped Mr. Reddin. The trial court then dismissed the State's case sua sponte, before the State rested its case-in-chief. The State timely appealed.
Mr. Reddin moves to dismiss this appeal, contending that it is unauthorized and double jeopardy precludes it. We first address these arguments and conclude that the State's appeal is properly before us. We then address the trial court's error in dismissing the case.
According to Mr. Reddin, the order dismissing the case constitutes a judgment of acquittal that the State cannot appeal. He correctly argues that the State can only appeal a judgment of acquittal if it follows a guilty verdict. See § 924.07(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (2022); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(E); see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (). This limitation on the State's right to appeal was crafted with double jeopardy in mind, and it protects a defendant's right against being tried twice for the same offense. See State v. Lundy, 233 So.3d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); State v. Stone, 42 So.3d 279, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); cf. Hudson v. State, 711 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ().
But a retrial in this case would not offend double jeopardy because the trial court dismissed the case "on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence." See Scott, 437 U.S. at 96. Our supreme court instructs that "a trial court's actions constitute an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' "State v. Gaines, 770 So.2d 1221, 1226 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 97). On the other hand, where "the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence," it's not an acquittal and double jeopardy does not preclude appellate review. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 92, 98-99.
The latter situation presents itself here because the trial court terminated the case on an issue unrelated to Mr. Reddin's guilt or innocence. It dismissed the case because it believed that the arresting officer did not have authority to conduct a traffic stop in Port Richey. This finding focuses solely on the officer, his credentials, and authority and not on Mr. Reddin's actions or the charges against him.
Mr. Reddin nonetheless points to language in the trial court's order that "adjudge[d]" Mr. Reddin not guilty, in addition to "dismiss[ing]" the case. Mr. Reddin submits that this adjudication equates to an acquittal. However, "'the trial judge's characterization of his [or her] own action cannot control the classification of the action' for purposes of double jeopardy." Gaines, 770 So.2d at 1226 (alteration in original) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
Further, while the trial court's characterization is not dispositive, its reasoning here is telling. In discussing its decision to sua sponte dismiss the case, the trial court had the following exchange with the State:
The trial court similarly told the jurors the following after it dismissed the State's case:
THE COURT: This case . . . did not turn on -- on the facts of the case. This was a legal issue that came up, and I make all the legal decisions in the case. This officer was a New Port Richey police officer. He didn't even try to stop this person until he was in a different city, Port Richey. He's not a Port Richey police officer.
The trial court correctly viewed the issue of the officer's authority as distinct from the facts of the case relating to Mr. Reddin's guilt or innocence. What's more, the very basis for the trial court's dismissal- the mutual aid agreement-was not a fact in evidence but a document the trial court had the State produce during a break. "This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful [S]tate relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact." Scott, 437 U.S. at 96. The State was willing and able to continue trial, but the trial court, with support from the defense, abruptly ended it.
Because the trial court terminated the proceedings without any consideration of Mr. Reddin's guilt or innocence "[n]o interest protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause is invaded," id. at 100, and the State's appeal...
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