State v. Reed
| Decision Date | 17 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-0227 |
| Parties | State of West Virginia, Respondent v. Carli Renae Reed, Petitioner |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
State of West Virginia, Respondent
v.
Carli Renae Reed, Petitioner
No. 21-0227
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
October 17, 2022
Barbour County 20-F-28
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Carli Renae Reed ("Petitioner"),[1] appeals the Circuit Court of Barbour County's February 19, 2021, order sentencing her to forty years in prison after a jury found her guilty of second-degree murder. The victim was Petitioner's husband, Marcus Fagons ("Mr. Fagons"). The dispositive issue Petitioner raises in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred by refusing to give a jury instruction on the defense of accident. Petitioner's trial testimony was that she accidentally shot Mr. Fagons. The State vigorously cross-examined her on this issue and argued that she intentionally shot Mr. Fagons because he was having an affair and wanted a divorce. The circuit court refused to give the requested accident instruction, finding that it was "not necessary and if they [the jury] believe it was an accident then there will not be a crime."
Upon review, we conclude that under our well-established caselaw, the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to give Petitioner's requested accident instruction. See State v. Evans, 172 W.Va. 810, 310 S.E.2d 877 (1983). Therefore, we reverse Petitioner's conviction and sentencing order, and remand this case for a new trial. We find that this case satisfies the "limited circumstances" requirement of Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for disposition by a memorandum decision.
Petitioner shot and killed Mr. Fagons on August 15, 2019. They had been married for approximately three years at that time. Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury for first-degree murder on June 15, 2020.
Petitioner's trial began on September 16, 2020, and lasted for seven days. The State's theory of the case was that Petitioner intentionally shot and killed Mr. Fagons because he was having an affair and wanted a divorce. During its opening statement, the State asserted that Petitioner and Mr. Fagons had a "toxic relationship," and that "[t]he truth is going to be that [Petitioner] was angry, that she was frustrated that her husband had found someone else, that her husband was having an affair and wanted to leave her. And for that reason, she took his life."
Conversely, Petitioner testified that she did not intend to kill Mr. Fagons. She stated that on the day of the shooting, she and Mr. Fagons discussed getting a divorce. Petitioner testified that after this discussion, she was having suicidal thoughts and decided to kill herself. She stated that Mr. Fagons's holstered gun was on the nightstand in their bedroom; that she went into the bedroom where Mr. Fagons was lying on the bed; that she grabbed the gun with the intention of killing herself and that the gun went off. Petitioner claimed that after the gun went off, she was disoriented and confused, but that Mr. Fagons was lying on the bed with his eyes shut and that he was breathing. Petitioner and her counsel then had the following exchange:
Q. Did you mean to shoot Marcus
A. No
Q. Was it an accident
A. Yeah.
Q. And what were you hoping when you were in shock that you had missed as far as the gun missed when it went off, that it had missed Marcus?
A. Yeah. And I didn't know how to help him, and I knew that mom would know what to do.
After describing the aftermath of the shooting, including being in shock and seeking help from her mother who lived five minutes away, Petitioner's counsel again asked her whether the shooting was intentional:
Q. And once again I'm going to ask you, did you mean, intend to shoot Marcus?
A. No. I meant to kill myself.
Q. Was it an accident?
A. It was.
During cross-examination, the State repeatedly asked Petitioner whether she intended to shoot Mr. Fagons:
Q. You weren't taking the gun out to kill Marcus, right?
A. No.
Q. So you weren't - - at that time you didn't have - - you weren't overcome by any form of like emotions to kill him, right?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Do you feel that you were relatively calm when you were doing that?
A. I was pretty hysterical actually because I was going to kill myself. You know I was crying and I thought, you know, this was it for me.
Q. So your intent at that point was to commit suicide?
A. Correct.
Q. Your specific intent at that time was to kill yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And you fully remember doing that?
A. Yes.
Q. So you did not shoot Marcus because of this prior alleged abuse?
A. No.
Q. You shot him because you're saying it was an accident?
A. Correct.
On redirect examination, Petitioner's counsel again asked Petitioner whether the shooting was an accident:
Q. Now Carli, the prosecutor was questioning what happened on the 15th. Were you or were you not trying to commit suicide that day?
A. I was.
Q. Was this an accident?
A. It was.
The circuit court held a brief conference on its proposed jury instructions on the second to last day of the trial. Prior to the trial, Petitioner submitted a number of proposed jury instructions to the circuit court, including an accident instruction. It provided:
The defendant has presented evidence that the death of [Mr. Fagons] was an accident. While it is never the defendant's burden to prove anything, if you find the defendant's evidence of accident to be credible, then the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was not accidental. If the State has not met this burden, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense charged.
During the jury instruction conference, the circuit court invited the parties to note any objections to the instructions it had prepared. Counsel for Petitioner reminded the circuit court that Petitioner had "submitted a charge on accident . . . based on [Petitioner's] testimony that it was an accidental shooting." The circuit court replied:
I saw the instruction on accident and I specifically left it out. The Court considered that and deemed that it was not necessary and if they [the jury] believe it was an accident then there will not be a crime. So accident being something less than involuntary manslaughter they would assume. So a complete accident I don't think there's any real caselaw on what should happen in an accident except for coming in and saying it was an accident and seeing how the jury takes that. So[,] I think that's a common usage much more than a legal usage. And I think that accident would necessarily be included in a not guilty.
Following the circuit court's explanation, Petitioner's counsel objected to the court's ruling.
The parties' closing arguments focused largely on Petitioner's testimony that the shooting was accidental. The State noted that Petitioner claimed that the shooting was an accident and argued that this testimony was not credible.[2] During Petitioner's closing argument, her counsel told the jury that Petitioner was in a "fragile" state of mind due to the divorce discussion, that she grabbed the gun from the nightstand with the intention of committing suicide, and that the gun accidentally went off. Petitioner's counsel told the jury "[y]ou can also find her not guilty if you believe it was an accident."
The jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder.[3] The circuit court entered an order sentencing her to forty years in prison. This appeal followed.
We review a circuit court's refusal to offer a requested jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. In syllabus point one of State v. Hinkle, 200 W.Va. 280, 489 S.E.2d 257 (1996), we held: "As a general rule, the refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. By contrast, the question of whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law, and the review is de novo."[4] Additionally, we have held that "[w]hether facts are sufficient to justify the delivery of a particular instruction is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. In criminal cases where a conviction results, the evidence and any reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Syl. Pt. 12, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994).[5] With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments.
Petitioner has asserted numerous assignments of error.[6] We find that the dispositive issue is Petitioner's contention that the circuit court erred by refusing to give her requested accident instruction. Petitioner asserts that: 1) "sufficient testimony was provided at trial to support a defense of accident;" 2) "without the instruction, the jury is unaware that accident is a recognized defense and the trial court's failure to give the instruction minimized the weight of the testimony;" and 3) "the trial court was mistaken on whether accident was a legal defense to the charge of murder." We agree.
It is well-settled that "in criminal cases a defendant generally is entitled to a jury charge that reflects any defense theory for which there is a foundation in the evidence." State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 308, 470 S.E.2d 613, 627 (1996). This Court has previously considered whether a defendant's testimony that a shooting was accidental is sufficient to support a request for an accident instruction.
In State v. Evans, 172 W.Va. 810, 310 S.E.2d 877, the defendant testified that the victim was handling one of his guns and that he asked the victim to hand the gun
back to him. Id. at 814, 310 S.E.2d at 881. The defendant testified that "[a]s the gun came into [his] hand, it discharged, firing the fatal bullet into [the victim's] face just above the right eyebrow." Id. Based on this testimony, the defendant requested a jury instruction on accident...
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