State v. Reed

• Decision Date: 01 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 232PA01.,232PA01.
• Citation: 558 S.E.2d 167
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Michael Eugene REED, II.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

558 S.E.2d 167

STATE of North Carolina v. Michael Eugene REED, II.

No. 232PA01.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February 1, 2002.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Buren R. Shields, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Mark L. Killian, Hickory, for defendant-appellee.

LAKE, Chief Justice.

Defendant, Michael Eugene Reed, II, was indicted on 7 July 1997 for two counts of first-degree murder and was tried capitally before a jury at the 1 March 1999 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Catawba County. The jury found defendant guilty of one count of first-degree murder by lying in wait and one count of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation. After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended life imprisonment on both counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right. On 17 April 2001, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court's failure to allow defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror was prejudicial error and ordered a new trial. On 3 May 2001, the State filed with this Court a petition for discretionary review, which the Court granted on 7 June 2001. The sole issue allowed for review by this Court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror.

A review of the record reflects that following the trial court's initial questioning of all prospective jurors and the State's voir dire, the defense attorney began voir dire of the twelve prospective jurors passed by the State to the defense. At the start of questions to prospective juror Michael, the defense attorney asked, "[A]re there any particular concerns about any of the questions or statements that have been made here?" The following colloquy ensued:

A. Only on the time period that would be a possible problem for me.

Q. Four to five weeks long trial.

A. Yes.

Q. What concerns you about that?

A. Well, financial obligations for my house payment and stuff and bills. I would not be able to pay them if I am here for that period of time. That would be really on my mind a lot of the time.

Q. Do you think that would be in your thoughts to the point that it would be hard for you to pay attention to the testimony at times in the case?

A. Yes, to a certain degree for the sooner I get done the sooner [I'm] able to get back to work and pay my bills and [meet] my obligations.

Q. Do you think then that might be a factor in your listening to the evidence and deciding the case and deciding the circumstances?

A. It may because like I said, sooner we get finished, the sooner I would be back to my regular schedule and my financial matters.

Q. You are saying it might become hard for you to pay attention and listen to the evidence for you might become impatien[t] and that might interfere with you[r] ability to be a fair [juror]?

A. I might not take my time in the whole proceeding. I think it would interfere with that, yes.

Q. Do you think it might ... cause you to come to some quick decision knowing the sooner you do that, the sooner you can leave and go back to work?

A. Actually, you know, sooner [I get] done the sooner I get out. It may pose a problem for me.

Q. Do you think it [would] impair your ability to listen to the evidence in the case [fairly]?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. You do?

A. Yes.

At this point, defense counsel asked the trial court to excuse prospective juror Michael for cause. The trial court denied defendant's motion. After the trial court's ruling, defense counsel continued to question this prospective juror. When questioning Michael about his views on the death penalty, defense counsel asked, "[Do] you think that you can listen to all of the evidence fairly?" Michael responded, "Yes. I don't see anything that would interfere with me doing that in this case." Later, during defense counsel's questioning of prospective juror Michael, counsel returned to the subject of Michael's concern with his financial situation, with the following exchange:

Q. Let me talk about your concern about your financial concern and situation. If you [sit] here for the amount of time and we get to the end of the trial and you were called upon to make the decision, and you have said you don't care what the opinion is of the other jurors, if you were the only one that [was] of the opinion you held and the case could not be over unless you changed your mind, would you then change due [to] the pressure of the financial situation you may have?

A. That puts me in a bad spot. You know what I'm saying. That would really have weight on my mind and I really could not tell you what I would do until I was put in that situation. That is what is hard for me.

Q. Well, what you are telling me, do you think that it might or would have some effect?

A. Yes sir ... madam.

Q. And on your ability to serve?

A. Most definitely, yes.

Q. On your ability to render a decision in accordance with your own beliefs?

A. Right, because like I said, I will not be out there doing my job and I will be on the street and walking because I just cannot pay my bills.

Q. Exactly.

A. I ... that would make a difference to me really, you know.

Q. We are looking for jurors in this case that can make the decision, the biggest decision any juror can ever be called upon to make.

A. [That's a lot] to think about.

Q. And that is one of your concerns, having that weigh on your mind and when you are trying to make that decision?

A. Yes.

Q. You feel that would [affect] you?

A. I would not want my problems to override my decision.

Q. And you think that it could do that if you were forced to be here that long?

A. It may. It would probably do so.

Q. Okay.

At this point, defense counsel renewed her challenge for cause of prospective juror Michael. The trial court denied defendant's second challenge. Defendant then employed a peremptory challenge to excuse Michael. After exhausting his peremptory challenges, defendant again renewed the previous challenge for cause of prospective juror Michael. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant requested additional peremptory challenges; and, the trial court also denied this motion.

On appeal, after correctly determining defendant preserved the issue for appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court's failure to allow defendant's challenge for cause to prospective juror Michael was prejudicial error and ordered a new trial. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that Michael's answers regarding his financial concerns indicated he could not render a fair and impartial decision and that defendant's challenge for cause should have been allowed pursuant to the catchall provision of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212, which states in part that "[a] challenge for cause to an individual juror may be made ... on the ground that the juror ... [f]or any other cause is unable to render a fair and impartial verdict." N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(9) (1999). The Court of Appeals also determined the trial court deprived defendant of his right to exercise a peremptory challenge because defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror Michael, exhausted his peremptory challenges and informed the trial court he would have peremptorily challenged a different juror if he had not exhausted his challenges.

The State contends that based on the totality of the voir dire, the trial court's denial of defendant's challenge for cause, because of prospective juror Michael's concern about the potential financial impact of jury service, was not an abuse of discretion. The State further contends the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court and did not correctly apply the abuse of discretion standard. We agree.

The determination of whether excusal for cause is required for a prospective juror is vested in the trial court, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1211(b) (1999), and the standard of review of such determination is abuse of discretion. Such rulings by a trial court will not be overturned on appeal, unless an "abuse of discretion" is established. State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 144, 557 S.E.2d 500, 512 (2001) (citing State v. Hill, 347 N.C. 275, 288, 493 S.E.2d 264, 271 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1142, 118 S.Ct. 1850, 140 L.Ed.2d 1099 (1998)). An "abuse of discretion" occurs where the trial judge's determination is "`manifestly unsupported by reason'" and is "`so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503, 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)). With regard to a challenge for cause and the trial court's ruling thereon, "the question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial court's findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 434, 105 S.Ct. 844, 857, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 858 (1985).

The trial court holds a distinct advantage over appellate courts in determining whether to allow a challenge for cause. In Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court stated:

"`Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth.... How can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses.... To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal.' Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N.Y. 422, 429, 169 N.E. 632, 634 [ (1930) ]."

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 434, 105 S.Ct. at 857, 83 L.Ed.2d at 858 (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S.Ct. 843, 851, 74 L.Ed.2d 646, 659 (1983)).

The standard for determining whether a prospective juror must be excluded for cause is whether the...