State v. Reed

Decision Date12 May 2017
Docket NumberNo. 15-184.,15-184.
Citation169 A.3d 1278
Parties STATE of Vermont v. Jeffrey REED
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Alexander Burke, Bennington County Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Matthew Valerio, Defender General, Rebecca Turner, Appellate Defender, and William Gardella, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, for DefendantAppellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

DOOLEY, J.

¶ 1. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, based on a jury verdict, of knowingly giving false information to a law enforcement officer with the purpose of deflecting an investigation from himself, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a). Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We reverse.

¶ 2. The record evidence may be summarized as follows. A witness testified that he was hunting at Kirby Hollow in Dorset on the morning of November 23, 2013, when he heard a gunshot and saw a deer fall about thirty yards away. He did not see who fired the shot. The witness testified that, shortly thereafter, an individual later identified as defendant came down the "blood trail" and "the first thing he said was, ‘I'm going to have a heck of a time making this into a three pointer.’ " The witness told defendant that the deer was not legal and that he was going to report it, and defendant responded that he would stay with the deer and "[s]ee if the two people that walked by this morning come over to claim the deer." The witness recalled that the deer did not have two points on one side, but "just a little nub." The witness then returned to the check station, called the state police, and waited for the game warden.

¶ 3. A state game warden testified that, on the morning of November 23, 2013, he responded to two telephone calls concerning the killing of a spikehorn deer1 at Kirby Hollow in Dorset. The first call was from the witness who had observed the deer fall, and the second was from defendant, who also later called to report the deer. The warden arrived at a pull-off in Kirby Hollow at about 10:30 a.m. The deer in question was there along with four people: the witness, defendant, and defendant's father and uncle. The warden confirmed that the deer was a spikehorn: it had only two antlers, and no other points. The warden observed that the deer was not yet field dressed and noticed what he believed to be "a clear mark of where someone had cut, or hacked at ... one of the antlers."

¶ 4. The warden spoke first with the witness and then defendant. The warden recalled that he told defendant that he was not under arrest and was free to leave and defendant said he had done nothing wrong and therefore was "fine" talking with the warden. The warden noted that the conversation with defendant lasted no more than five minutes, and that "[i]t was difficult to follow the progression of what [defendant] was saying." The warden asked defendant to return with him to where the deer fell, and defendant continued to recount what had occurred. According to the warden, defendant "kept changing what happened." Defendant said that he saw the deer, walked down to it, and spoke with the witness. Then he said that he heard a shot, sighted the deer through his scope, and had a discussion with the witness. He also said that he had returned to his normal hunting spot—roughly thirty yards uphill from where the deer had fallen—before following the deer and meeting the witness. Defendant also initially mentioned seeing what he believed to be a father and son in camouflage in the woods but said nothing about seeing them again. Later, however, defendant told the officer that, while waiting with the deer after the witness left to call the police, an individual in camouflage walked up, looked at the deer, and walked away.

¶ 5. The warden testified that he asked defendant about the deer's antlers. Defendant at first said he did not know "how they got cut off" but then "maybe even blamed [the witness]." He then indicated that he "would admit to the antler point," explaining that he had "laid [a one-inch knife blade] on the antler point, and the antler point fell off." Defendant did not say where the broken antler tip went, but he walked over to where the deer had been lying and "rustled around in the leaves a little bit" without finding anything. The warden acknowledged that it was not possible for a deer antler to break off "simply by laying a piece of metal against it."

¶ 6. The warden then inspected defendant's gun; he smelled gunpowder and observed gunpowder residue in its chamber. Defendant told the warden that he had fired the gun the night before but not on that day. Defendant also offered one of the bullets he was using that day; it did not match the bullet later recovered from the deer. Back at the pull-off, the deputy game warden inspected the guns belonging to defendant's father and uncle and observed that they had not been fired recently.

¶ 7. After informing defendant that he was free to leave, the warden and his deputy returned to the spot where the deer had fallen and noticed two "brown plastic shopping bag[s]" tied to trees. Just below those bags were salt licks. The first was roughly five to ten yards from the spot where the deer had fallen and the second was roughly thirty yards from defendant's normal hunting spot. In a follow-up conversation with defendant several weeks later, defendant told the warden that the salt lick "wasn't anything to him." The warden also asked defendant how often he hunted in the area. Defendant initially responded that he had hunted there numerous times but later said he had hunted there only on two or three occasions some weeks before the deer was shot. Defendant later mentioned that there had been a lot of deer in Kirby Hollow the day before the deer was shot.

¶ 8. The State charged defendant with three offenses: (1) a violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a) by knowingly giving false information to a law enforcement officer with the purpose of deflecting an investigation from himself; (2) a violation of 10 V.S.A. § 4747 by taking big game by the aid of a salt lick; and (3) a violation of 10 V.S.A. § 4781 by possessing big game taken by an illegal device, in this case a salt lick. The charging information for the first count contained only the statutory language. The warden's supporting affidavit stated that "defendant kept adding and changing facts" and "changing pieces of the story" but did not otherwise specify which information he gave the officer was false and intended to deflect the investigation from himself.

¶ 9. At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that "as much as the State wants to say that it's three different stories ... it could all be part of the same story [and] ... is not internally inconsistent." The State maintained that defendant "simply gave false information to deflect the investigation, and he gave multiple stories about what had occurred." The court denied the motion. The defense presented no additional evidence. In its closing argument, the State emphasized that defendant "told multiple versions" of what he did immediately after the deer was shot, of what took place after the witness left to call the warden, of how the cut marks appeared on the antlers, and of how frequently he had hunted in the area. The only specific statements that the prosecutor expressly characterized as false, however, were those concerning the antlers, which he also asserted were made "to deflect the investigation because that was an illegal buck."2 The jury found defendant guilty of the first count and not guilty of the other two. The court later sentenced defendant to a $300 fine. This appeal followed.

¶ 10. Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he made a knowingly false statement with the purpose of deflecting the investigation from himself. "We review de novo a motion for judgment of acquittal." State v. Vuley, 2013 VT 9, ¶ 30, 193 Vt. 622, 70 A.3d 940. The question on appeal is whether the State's evidence could fairly and reasonably support a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Because we cannot know which of the three inconsistent statements presented by the State the jury found knowingly false, or whether all jurors found the same statement or statements knowingly false, we can affirm defendant's conviction only if every statement meets each element of the statute. In this case, none of the three inconsistent statements satisfies the last statutory element.

¶ 11. We begin with two preliminary points concerning the statutory wording and the specific theory on which the case against defendant was tried.

¶ 12. First, defendant was convicted of violating 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a), a misdemeanor with a maximum punishment of a year in jail or a $1000 fine or both. The statute provides:

(a) A person who knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another or to deflect an investigation from the person or another person shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.

In this case, defendant was charged with giving false information to a law enforcement officer with the purpose of deflecting an investigation from himself, one of the two alternative mental elements in the statute—the other being an intent to implicate another person. In State v. Albarelli, 2016 VT 119, ¶ 33, ––– Vt. ––––, 159 A.3d 627, we explained that the statute contains three essential elements: (1) knowingly giving false information, (2) to a law enforcement officer, (3) with the purpose to deflect an investigation from the person or another. This case is about the third element.

¶ 13. Application of the statute to the facts of this case begins with the charge. As noted, the information recited only the statutory language, relying upon the supporting affidavit of the warden to provide the necessary factual allegations. See ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Hinkson v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • August 7, 2020
    ...to implement the intent of the Legislature by giving effect to the plain language of the statute." State v. Reed, 2017 VT 28, ¶ 20, 204 Vt. 399, 169 A.3d 1278. However, "the rule of lenity requires that any doubts created by ambiguous legislation be resolved in favor of the defendant." Stat......
  • Athens Sch. Dist. v. Vt. State Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • July 10, 2020
    ...implement the intent of the Legislature by giving effect to the plain language of the statute." State v. Reed, 2017 VT 28, ¶ 20, 204 Vt. 399, 169 A.3d 1278. Only when the meaning of a statute is ambiguous does the Court look elsewhere to determine intent. Id. Here, the language of the statu......
  • State v. Rajda, s. 17-051 & 17-126
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • July 20, 2018
    ...the legislative intent in order to provide a fair and reasonable construction of the statute." State v. Reed, 2017 VT 28, ¶ 20, 204 Vt. 399, 169 A.3d 1278. Further, "[t]estimony given to a committee of the Legislature may provide some clues as to the purpose of [an] amended statute." Id. In......
  • Civetti v. Turner
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • April 3, 2020
    ...analysis." State v. Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 12, n.1, 220 A.3d 759; see also State v. Reed, 2017 VT 28, ¶ 21 n.6, 204 Vt. 399, 408, 169 A.3d 1278, 1285 (2017) (relying on "testimony of the drafter of the bill" in ascertaining legislative intent "because it is likely to be the most relevant"). ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT