State v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 23 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. CR–11–0157–AP.,CR–11–0157–AP.
• Citation: 233 Ariz. 182,672 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4,310 P.3d 970
• Parties: The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Stephen Douglas REEVES, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

233 Ariz. 182

310 P.3d 970

672 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4

The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Stephen Douglas REEVES, Appellant.

No. CR–11–0157–AP.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Oct. 23, 2013.

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Zick, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation, Matthew H. Binford (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for State of Arizona.

Bruce F. Peterson, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Consuelo M. Ohanesian (argued), Deputy Legal Advocate, Phoenix, for Stephen Douglas Reeves.

Vice Chief Justice BALES, opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This automatic appeal arises from Stephen Douglas Reeves's conviction and death sentence for the murder of Norma Gabriella Contreras. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 13–4031 and 13–4033(A)(1).

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 One Saturday morning in June 2007, Reeves entered an office where eighteen-year-old Contreras was working alone. Reeves asked if the office was hiring; she said no, and he left. About five minutes later, Reeves returned carrying a piece of concrete and demanded her car keys and cell phone. Contreras attempted to push an alarm button. Reeves, who was much larger than Contreras, forced her to the floor and straddled her. For about eight minutes, while Contreras screamed and struggled, Reeves beat her, hit her with the concrete, wrenched her neck, and attempted to strangle her with his hands and a piece of wood. Finally, he retrieved a box cutter from another room and slit her throat. He turned off the lights and dragged her body into a back room. Meanwhile, people at another office who had heard Contreras scream called 911. Police arrested Reeves shortly after he drove away in Contreras's car. He had her cell phone in his pocket.

¶ 3 Reeves was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, first degree burglary, kidnapping, and theft of a means of transportation. The jury found three aggravating circumstances: Reeves had previously been convicted of a serious offense; the murder was especially cruel, heinous, or depraved; and Reeves was on release at the time of the offense. A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(2), (F)(6), (F)(7)(a). The jury could not reach a verdict on a fourth alleged aggravator—that Reeves murdered Contreras for pecuniary gain. Id. § 13–751(F)(5). The jury also could not reach a verdict on the appropriate sentence, and the trial judge declared a mistrial as to the penalty phase. A second jury found the pecuniary gain aggravator and determined that Reeves should be sentenced to death for the murder. In addition to the death sentence, the trial court imposed prison sentences totaling forty-two years for the other convictions.

DISCUSSION

A. Declaration of Mistrial and Denial of Motion to Dismiss

¶ 4 Reeves contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial and later denying his motion to dismiss the State's allegation that he should be sentenced to death.

¶ 5 We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial. See State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 564 ¶ 6, 242 P.3d 159, 163 (2010); State v. Ramirez, 111 Ariz. 504, 506, 533 P.2d 671, 673 (1975). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution protects a defendant's “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,” United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)), it does not prevent the declaration of a mistrial when a jury cannot reach a verdict, see Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 118, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009) (“[A] jury's inability to reach a decision is the kind of ‘manifest necessity’ that permits the declaration of a mistrial”).

¶ 6 Here, at the end of the first penalty phase trial, the jury deliberated about forty minutes and then asked the court what would happen if it could not unanimously agree on the sentence. The court referred the jury to its instructions. The next morning, the jury stated that it was still divided and that “each juror [was] firm in their decision,” and asked, “What do we do now?” The court gave an impasse instruction. About an hour later, the jurors sent the judge a “statement” declaring that they had exhausted all discussions, could not be unanimous, and had “nothing further to discuss.” The judge recalled the jury, read the statement into the record, and asked the foreperson to confirm its accuracy. The trial court then declared a mistrial without objection.

¶ 7 Reeves does not dispute that the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the appropriate sentence. By declaring a mistrial under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate double jeopardy principles. See Ramirez, 111 Ariz. at 505–06, 533 P.2d at 672–73.

¶ 8 Nor did the trial court err by denying Reeves's motion to dismiss the death penalty allegation. Reeves argues that retrying the penalty phase violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Eighth Amendment.

¶ 9 Reeves's arguments are foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48 (2013). There, we noted that “the touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has been an acquittal.” Id. at 400 ¶ 20, 306 P.3d at 57 (quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because a jury's inability to agree on a sentence does not constitute an acquittal, a penalty phase retrial does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 400–01 ¶¶ 20–23, 306 P.3d at 57–58. In Medina, we also rejected the argument that retrial of the penalty phase was disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 401–02 ¶¶ 24–28, 306 P.3d at 58–59. Reeves does not identify any persuasive reason for us to reconsider or distinguish Medina.

¶ 10 Reeves further asserts that Arizona's capital sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they permit two retrials after a guilty verdict. SeeA.R.S. § 13–752(J)–(K). We need not reach this argument because Reeves was subject to only one retrial. See State v. Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, 32 ¶ 5, 977 P.2d 131, 132 (1999) (noting that, subject to First Amendment exceptions, “a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied does not have standing to challenge that statute simply because it conceivably could be applied unconstitutionally in other cases”). We also decline to address Reeves's undeveloped argument that the denial of his motion to dismiss violated the double jeopardy provision in Article 2, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution. See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 486 ¶ 41 n. 9, 189 P.3d 403, 413 n. 9 (2008).

B. Vagueness Challenge to Death Penalty Statutes

¶ 11 Reeves contends that Arizona's death penalty statutes are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to provide sufficient guidance on the presentation, at retrial, of evidence of the aggravating circumstances found by the first penalty phase jury. Capital sentencing laws that do not adequately limit a sentencer's discretion violate due process and the Eighth Amendment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 475 ¶ 15, 65 P.3d 420, 424 (2003).

¶ 12 Under Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, “[a]t the penalty phase, the defendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” A.R.S. § 13–752(G). When a single factfinder is involved in sequential phases of a capital trial, “any evidence that was presented at any prior phase of the trial shall be deemed admitted as evidence at any subsequent phase of the trial.” Id. § 13–752(I).

¶ 13 “Although no provision ... addresses the admissibility of aggravation-phase evidence during a second penalty phase,” we recently held that “during a second penalty phase, the state and the defendant may introduce evidence pertaining to the aggravating circumstances previously found, subject to § 13–752(G)'s general relevance standard.” State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 526 ¶¶ 15, 18, 250 P.3d 1145, 1155 (2011). We thus concluded that the “the statutes governing the second penalty phase provide sufficient guidance” to withstand a vagueness challenge. Id. at 527 ¶ 20, 250 P.3d at 1156. We accordingly reject Reeves's argument.

C. Exclusion of Evidence of Likelihood of Release

¶ 14 Before retrial of the penalty phase, Reeves moved to preclude the State from presenting any evidence of his future dangerousness or, alternatively, to permit him to present evidence that he likely would not be released if he received a life sentence. Denying Reeves's motion, the trial court instead granted the State's motion to preclude evidence about the likelihood of release. (The State notes that it did not present evidence at the retrial regarding Reeves's future dangerousness.)

¶ 15 Reeves's arguments are foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Benson, which held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding “evidence of the current mechanism for obtaining parole and past actions by the Board of Executive Clemency as a means of predicting what might happen ... in twenty-five years.” 232 Ariz. 452, 466 ¶ 59, 307 P.3d 19, 33 (2013).

D. No “Presumption of Death” in Death Penalty Statutes

¶ 16 Reeves argues that A.R.S. §§ 13–751(C) and (F) create an unconstitutional presumption of death. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer in a capital case be allowed to consider any relevant mitigating evidence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Further, the Eighth Amendment protects a defendant's right to an individualized sentencing...