State v. Reid

• Decision Date: 09 October 1888
• Citation: 39 Minn. 277
• Parties: STATE OF MINNESOTA <I>vs.</I> J. HAL REID.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

39 Minn. 277

STATE OF MINNESOTA vs. J. HAL REID.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 9, 1888.

The defendant was tried and convicted in the district court for Ramsey county, before Kelly, J., on an indictment for rape. A motion for a new trial was made and denied, and defendant was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment in the state prison, from which judgment he appeals.

C. D. O'Brien and F. B. Hart, for appellant.

Moses E. Clapp, Attorney General, and J. J. Egan, for the State.

VANDERBURGH, J.

Upon the record in this case, which presents the evidence and all the proceedings in full, we discover no sufficient ground for the objection that the evidence on the part of the prosecution failed to make a case for the jury, or that the testimony of the prosecuting witness was inconsistent and improbable in itself, and so entirely unsupported as to have made it the duty of the trial court to set aside the verdict for this cause. No instructions embracing these propositions were asked by counsel, and no exceptions were taken to the charge of the court, in which the case was clearly and impartially presented to the jury. And after a careful examination of the evidence it seems to us, as it must have appeared to the counsel as well as the court on the trial, that, if the jury believed the testimony of the prosecuting witness, embracing the facts upon which the charge was founded, it would be sufficient to support a verdict of guilty, and that the question of her credibility and of the weight and value of the corroborating evidence was for the jury. So that, especially after the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, witnessed the whole trial, and became practically familiar with the merits of the case as presented by the evidence, is unable, after a careful consideration of it upon the motion for a new trial, to say that the verdict is not justified, the appellate court, from its stand-point, cannot affirm that there was error in his refusal to grant a new trial on that ground.

1. In support of the charge, the evidence of the prosecuting witness tended to prove that the parties were alone in her room engaged in conversation, when she was surprised and suddenly overcome, her mouth stopped, her arms and person so held down by superior strength as to prevent her struggles and resistance; that she was shocked by the assault, and temporarily lost consciousness; that her person was lacerated and greatly injured; and that, upon returning to consciousness, he suppressed her attempted outcries and resistance, and persisted in completing the offence. That she received grievous personal injuries of the character complained of by her is corroborated by the evidence of the medical witnesses who were called to attend her, as to her physical condition, and the nervous prostration and muscular soreness which, according to their testimony, supervened. And whether her explanation of the reasons why she made no such outcry as to attract the attention of inmates in the lower part of the house during or immediately subsequent to the occurrence was reasonable and credible, was certainly for the jury. It appears that her sister, who occupied the same room, returned within a brief period after the defendant left, when the prosecutrix immediately complained to her of the nature of the assault, and her physical injuries; and from the evidence on the part of the state it appears that she soon after went out and met the defendant at his boarding-place, and charged him with the offence, when he excused himself on the ground that he was intoxicated; and he very soon afterwards left for another boarding-place in the city, upon the opposite side of the river. This was on Friday night. On Sunday morning he left the state, taking the train at a suburban station.

2. The defendant, in his testimony, presents an entirely different account of the affair from that given by the prosecutrix. He swears that she was not unconscious at all, and his counsel makes the point that, assuming her evidence to be true, the case of the state is fatally defective in that it does not appear that he knew that fact. But the case of the state must rest upon the testimony of the prosecutrix, if found worthy of credit by the jury; and if her testimony as to the assault and conduct of the defendant is true, it does not fall under subdivision 5, § 235, of the Penal Code, but under subdivision 2; that is, the case was one where resistance is "forcibly overcome." And in the latter class of cases, if the non-resistance proceeds from the fact that the prosecutrix was overpowered by superior force, or from her not being able, from lack of strength, to resist longer, the offence is complete. 1 Russ. Crimes, *677. And it would be none the less so if unconsciousness should result from an assault and the violence and misconduct of the accused.

3. She had no medical attendance until, after two days, the Monday following the occurrence, when a physician was called, and made examination as to her physical condition, to whom she made a statement or complaint of what she had suffered, similar to that before made to her sister; and, in giving his testimony as to the nature and results of his examination, he stated that fact against the defendant's objection. This is also assigned as error. Nothing is better settled than that, in prosecutions for rape, the fact that the injured party made complaint to suitable persons soon after the event, is competent evidence to corroborate her testimony as to the assault and outrage committed upon her. From the nature of the case, such statements are not generally part of the res gestæ. It is not on that ground that such evidence is received. If it were, then the particulars of the complaint would be admitted in evidence, which the accepted rule forbids. It is received because, in case of such an outrage, the unexplained silence of the prosecutrix for a considerable time is calculated to cast suspicion upon her testimony, and seriously affect her credibility. State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148. The doctrine is peculiar to this offence, and is very carefully and correctly stated by Mr. Bishop, as gathered from all the authorities, as follows: "The law not only permits the ordinary tests to be applied to the complaining witness in these cases, but it has also adopted some special ones not permissible in other classes of cases. On ordinary grounds anything which the woman said or did, of the res gestæ of the ravishment, will be admissible in evidence. But aside from and beyond this, it is competent to show by her that, after the alleged rape, especially recently after, she complained of it to suitable persons, and exhibited, if such was the fact, marks of violence and other like indications as confirmatory of her sworn testimony. It is of special practical importance that the complaint was recent, and explanations of any delay are competent. But the doctrine, in strict law, appears to be that delays, especially if not great, only weaken the effect of her evidence with the jury." 2 Bish. Crim. Proc. (3d Ed.) § 963. The inference derived from the conduct of the prosecutrix is one of fact for the jury, and not of law for the court. It is laid down very generally that if the complaint is not made without any inconsistent delay, it is a strong, but not conclusive, presumption against the truth of the charge. Hence delay is subject to be explained on the same ground that evidence to account for one's silence, which would otherwise operate against him, is received. 4 Cooley, Bl. *213, note; State v. Ivins, 36 N. J. Law, 233; State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148, 155; State v. Niles, 47 Vt. 82; Turner v. People, 33 Mich. 363, 383; People v. Brown, 53 Mich. 531, (19 N. W. Rep. 172;) State v. Shettleworth, 18 Minn. 191, (208, 213, 214;) State v. Peter, 8 Jones, (N. C.) 19; State v. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93, (20 Am. Dec. 90;) Smith v. State, 80 Am. Dec. 372, notes; Baccio v. People, 41 N. Y. 265, 271. There is no inflexible rule in regard to this matter; and we think the reasonableness of the conduct of the prosecuting witness, and the sufficiency of her explanations as bearing upon the question of her credibility, were for the jury, in connection with all the other circumstances presented by the evidence, particularly in view of her alleged physical condition. The defendant's counsel had previously inquired of her in respect to the delay in making a public complaint till Tuesday, which was made by others without her knowledge at the time, and her failure to complain to the housekeeper the next day; and upon her re-examination her evidence tended to show that she was not aware that the matter had got into the papers in the mean time, and that she had been enjoined to avoid the scandal of publicity, and the shock which might result therefrom to the health of her mother, who was feeble. If she was suffering from such an assault, it would be reasonably expected that she would state the cause of her injuries to her physician, and it would undoubtedly have been made a matter...