State v. Reidhead, 1
Decision Date | 30 December 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 1,CA-CR,1 |
Citation | 731 P.2d 126,152 Ariz. 231 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Brent Lyneer REIDHEAD, Appellant. 9805. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Chief Counsel, Crim. Div. and John B. Barkley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
Ross P. Lee, Maricopa Co. Public Defender by Stephen R. Collins, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.
Does the state's failure to comply with a probation revocation agreement invalidate an admission to violation of probation? This is the issue presented by this appeal.
In 1983, the defendant, Brent Lyneer Reidhead, pled guilty to one count of burglary, and one count of theft, and was placed on five years probation on the theft count and three years probation on the burglary count. The defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,500.00, in regular monthly payments of $100. On March 13, 1984, the first petition to revoke the defendant's probation was filed alleging that he had failed to report to his probation officer, failed to pay monthly probation service fees, failed to pay restitution, failed to participate in a mental health counseling program, and changed his residence without permission. The defendant admitted all but one of these violations, and the remaining violation was dismissed. The defendant was reinstated on probation with an additional term of five months incarceration in the Maricopa County Jail.
On November 26, 1985, a second petition to revoke the defendant's probation was filed alleging that he had failed to report to his probation officer and had failed to make restitution payments. At the violation admission hearing, the defendant was represented by counsel. As a preliminary to the hearing, defendant's counsel stated, "[t]here will be an admission Your Honor, pursuant to an agreement with the state with a recommendation to be forthcoming from the probation officer." The trial court then asked the defendant his name and advised him of his rights as provided by Rule 27.8, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. After admitting the violations of his probation, defendant's counsel added:
The defendant then admitted the violation of his probation. The matter was set for a disposition hearing and a probation violation report was prepared. In the probation violation report, the probation officer made no mention of any agreement to recommend termination of probation and, in fact, recommended that the defendant be sentenced to the presumptive term. The probation violation report does not note any contact by the probation officer with any of the attorneys.
At the disposition hearing, the trial judge heard comments from both counsel and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of five years and three years imprisonment on both counts. Restitution of $5,500 was also imposed to be paid six months after release from prison. Both the defendant and the state were represented by different attorneys than those who appeared at the violation hearing. The probation officer, who was present at the disposition hearing, had not been present at the violation hearing. Contrary to the earlier agreement, the defendant was sentenced to the presumptive term on both counts and not given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal raising one issue:
(1) Did the state's failure to comply with its agreement as to probation disposition invalidate the defendant's admission of violation of probation?
Counsel should be appointed before the hearing to provide time to prepare and to participate in plea-bargaining.
In referring to the collateral consequences of an admission under former Rule 27.7(c), the comment noted,
The warning in paragraph (i) is to inform the probationer that, barring an agreement to the contrary, the revocation hearing does not prevent his prosecution on any charges arising out of the actions on which the revocation is based.
(emphasis added.) While the official comment was deleted in 1975 at the time Rule 27 was amended to its present form, there is no indication the deletion was intended to disapprove the practice of entering into a probation revocation agreement. Moreover, simply because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a particular procedure does not mean the procedure cannot exist. One example is the motion in limine which is not specifically provided for by the Rules of Criminal Procedure but is a common practice. See State v. Rodriquez, 126 Ariz. 28, 612 P.2d 484 (1980). It must also be noted that the use of agreements in probation violation situations is a common and useful practice, accepted in Arizona, see State v. Fallon, 151 Ariz. 192, 726 P.2d 608 (1986), and in other jurisdictions. See Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 604 P.2d 335 (1979), People v. Calloway, 29 Cal.3d 666, 175 Cal.Rptr. 596, 631 P.2d 30 (1981). We therefore hold that under Rule 17.4(a) authorizing the negotiation of any aspect of a criminal case, agreements concerning probation violation are permissible.
However, it must be recognized that probation violation agreements are not the equivalent of plea agreements under Rule 17, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is clear from Arizona case law that in a probation violation situation, the strict requirements of Rule 17 in accepting guilty pleas do not apply. State v. Jones, 128 Ariz. 378, 625 P.2d 967 (App.1981). This is not to say that such agreements are entirely free from judicial scrutiny or...
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