State v. Reiner

• Decision Date: 26 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-427., No. 99-239
• Citation: 89 Ohio St.3d 342,731 NE 2d 662
• Parties: THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. REINER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

89 Ohio St.3d 342

731 NE 2d 662

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. REINER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT.

Nos. 99--427.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted January 11, 2000.

Decided July 26, 2000.

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, John J. Weglian and J. Christopher Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Fritz Byers, Robert Z. Kaplan and Samuel Z. Kaplan; Cooper, Walinski & Cramer and Richard S. Walinski, for appellee and cross-appellant.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

The Lucas County Court of Appeals stated the certified conflict as "whether Evid.R. 606(B) permits, under any circumstances, inquiry of a juror as to the effect of extraneous information or improper outside influence upon his or her decision making process." The dissenting judge framed the same issue as follows: "[I]n a case of jury misconduct (statements, conversations or remarks made to a juror), once evidence aliunde of jury misconduct is provided, whether a court may inquire of a juror as to whether or not the juror remained uninfluenced by the misconduct (i.e., impartial) so that the defendant was not denied his substantial rights." Because this latter statement more succinctly states the issue, we shall consider the certified conflict in the terms articulated by the dissenting judge.

The state's discretionary appeal involves the related issues of burden of proof when there are allegations of juror misconduct in a criminal case, and whether an affidavit from an alternate juror constitutes outside evidence sufficient to trigger the application of Evid.R. 606(B), otherwise known as the aliunde rule.

The defendant's cross-appeal challenges the validity of the transactional immunity granted to Susan Batt, the reliability of the opinions rendered by the state's medical witnesses, the trial court's failure to admit Dr. Patrick's grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes, and Dr. Balraj's expression of her medical opinion on causation.

For the reasons more fully set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to juror misconduct and the grant of transactional immunity to Susan Batt, and we affirm the remainder of the court's judgment.

JUROR MISCONDUCT

Because the certified conflict presumes the existence of aliunde evidence, before we may address this issue, we must decide the threshold question of whether Evid.R. 606(B), also known as the aliunde rule, applies to alternate jurors. For the reasons more fully set forth below, we hold that the prohibitions against receiving evidence from a juror in Evid.R. 606(B) apply to alternate jurors. Therefore, evidence received from an alternate juror, without other outside evidence, is insufficient aliunde evidence under Evid.R. 606(B) upon which a court may rely in order to conduct an inquiry of other jurors into the validity of a verdict.

It is a longstanding rule that "the verdict of a jury may not be impeached by the evidence of a member of the jury unless foundation for the introduction of such evidence is first laid by competent evidence aliunde, i.e., by evidence from some other source." State v. Adams (1943), 141 Ohio St. 423, 427, 25 O.O. 570, 572, 48 N.E.2d 861, 863. Ohio has adopted this rule in Evid.R. 606(B), which states:

"Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. A juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror, only after some outside evidence of that act or event has been presented. However a juror may testify without the presentation of any outside evidence concerning any threat, any bribe, any attempted threat or bribe, or any improprieties of any officer of the court. His affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying will not be received for these purposes." (Emphasis added.)

The rule is intended to preserve the integrity of the jury process and the privacy of deliberations, to protect the finality of the verdict, and to insulate jurors from harassment by dissatisfied or defeated parties by prohibiting a court from questioning a juror about what occurred during deliberations, or about anything else that may have affected the juror's mind or emotions in the deliberations process once a final verdict is rendered. State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 75, 564 N.E.2d 54, 61; State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. at 427, 25 O.O. at 572, 48 N.E.2d at 863. However, if there is a foundation of outside evidence of extraneous prejudicial information, or of any threat, bribe, or improper conduct by an officer of the court, the rule permits a court to ask a juror about that outside evidence.

The trial court determined that Rolf Sandberg's affidavit was not competent evidence to attack the jury's verdict under Evid.R. 606(B). The court reasoned that the intent of Evid.R. 606(B), to prevent an attack by a disgruntled juror, should likewise apply to an alternate juror.

The court of appeals reversed on the basis of State v. Rudge (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 429, 624 N.E.2d 1069. The Rudge court considered an alternate juror to be outside the regular jury panel because an alternate does not participate in deliberations or in reaching the final verdict. Id.,89 Ohio App.3d at 437,624 N.E.2d at 1074. In Rudge, after the trial was over, an alternate juror informed the bailiff that on two occasions he had overheard other jurors make statements about the defendant prior to opening statements and during the trial. The trial court conducted an in camera examination of the alternate juror, followed by an examination of the remaining jurors. The court granted a mistrial on the basis that one of the statements was prejudicial. The court of appeals noted that, as a nondeliberating juror, an alternate may not be viewed as a member of the jury, so that the alternate's testimony may constitute aliunde evidence for purposes of Evid.R. 606(B). However, the Rudge court concluded that Evid.R. 606(B) was not applicable, because the trial court's inquiry did not threaten or reveal discussion during deliberations. The Rudge court considered it proper to inquire into the partiality of jurors to determine if the defendant had received a fair trial before an impartial jury, but not to inquire into deliberations. Id.,89 Ohio App.3d at 439,624 N.E.2d at 1076. Based upon Rudge, the court of appeals held that Rolf Sandberg's affidavit was sufficient outside evidence for the court to have inquired of the jurors about the alleged misconduct that occurred during the trial.

It is apparent from the language of Evid.R. 606(B) that the rule becomes applicable only when the validity of a verdict is questioned. Although Evid.R. 606(B) protects the deliberations process, the language of the rule does not limit its application to the examination of improper conduct or communications only during deliberations. The rule also prohibits inquiry into "the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict * * * or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith." This may involve inquiry into improper conduct that occurred throughout the trial, during the presentation of evidence, or among jurors during the course of the trial that may influence a juror's mind, emotions, or mental processes during deliberations. Events that occur during the trial may also have an effect upon the jurors' deliberations.

Alternate jurors are selected at the same time and in the same manner as the entire jury panel. An alternate juror participates as a regular member of the jury panel and is subject to the same jury admonitions and rules until discharged. The alternate juror sees and hears the entire trial and is prepared to deliberate. An alternate juror may become a member of the deliberating panel. State v. Hutton (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 36, 45, 559 N.E.2d 432, 443.

Here, Rolf Sandberg was an alternate juror who claimed that he violated jury rules during the trial. However, he waited until after the verdict before notifying defense counsel about his conduct in an effort to challenge the finality of the verdict. When questioned by the trial judge, Rolf Sandberg admitted that he was frustrated that he had not been able to deliberate and that he was upset with the guilty verdict. Although the defense claimed that Rolf Sandberg's misconduct affected the deliberations process and tainted the verdict, the defendant presented no outside evidence of the improper conduct. This is precisely the situation that the aliunde rule was intended to prevent—a disgruntled juror attacking the verdict.

Had the trial judge been notified of this conduct during the trial, the judge would have had an opportunity to inquire of the jurors about any misconduct or violation of the jury rules because the aliunde rule was not yet applicable. See State v. Taylor (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 827, 598 N.E.2d 818. Although Rolf Sandberg did not deliberate, he was privy to the jury process up to the actual deliberations. His alleged misconduct during the trial had nothing to do with his status as an alternate juror and could just as likely have been committed by a regular juror. The defense sought to attack the final verdict based upon Rolf Sandberg's conduct during the trial prior to his discharge. Therefore, for purposes of the aliunde rule, one's status as an alternate juror should not preclude application of the rule. Therefore, we disapprove of the decision in State v....