State v. Reinhold
| Decision Date | 31 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 4526,4526 |
| Citation | 597 P.2d 532,123 Ariz. 50 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Darold Duane REINHOLD, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
John A. LaSota, Jr., former Atty. Gen., Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., by William J. Schafer, III, Gregory A. McCarthy, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
William J. Friedl, Phoenix, for appellant.
This is an appeal by Darold Duane Reinhold from his convictions for kidnapping, first degree rape and lewd and lascivious acts. Judgments affirmed.
On September 30, 1977, the prosecuting witness, victim of the criminal offenses charged, drove her car into the parking lot of her apartment complex. When she opened the car door, she was met by Reinhold, who struck her in the face and forced his way into the car. Thereafter he forced her to engage in acts of sexual intercourse as well as lewd sexual acts. Eventually Reinhold compelled her to go to her apartment, where he fell asleep. She then called her father, who called the police. Reinhold was arrested when the police went to the victim's apartment.
At a voluntariness hearing held on June 12, 1978, a police officer testified:
"Q. Did you say anything to the defendant as you entered the room and observed him lying on the bed (in the victim's apartment)?
A. We entered the room. Officer Gary Branz stood on the door side of the bed, I walked around to the other side of the bed where I could see the subject's hands and the fact that he did appear to be sleeping I woke him.
Q. How did you wake him?
A. I believe I shook him by the shoulder.
Q. Did he say anything at that time or did you say anything?
A. He looked up and I said, 'What's your name?'
And, he said, 'Darold.'
Q. Did he appear to be sleeping at that time?
A. No. From when I shook him and he looked up he appeared to be fully awake.
Q. Did you pause for any period of time to make sure that he was awake?
A. Yes, I shook him. I said, 'What's your name?'
He said, 'Darold.' He looked at me. He looked across the bed at the other officer and he asked me, he said, 'What's going on?'
Q. What did you say?
A. I asked I said, 'Do you know the girl that lives here?'
And, he said, 'Yes.'
Q. Any further conversation?
A. Yes. I said, 'What's her name?'
And, he didn't respond.
Q. And any further conversation?
A. At this time I told the subject that we were there because the girl that lived there had claimed that he had raped her and that I wanted to question him about this matter, but before I did so I wanted him to understand what the charges were against him.
Q. What did you do at that time?
A. At that time I read him his rights from a standard Miranda rights card. I asked him the two questions, you know, 'Will you voluntarily answer my questions?'
He replied, 'Yeah.'
I asked him if he understood his rights yeah, I'm sorry will you voluntarily answer my questions, and he said, 'Sure.'
Q. Did you have a further conversation with him after you informed him of his Miranda rights?
A. Yes, after the rights. And I asked him again, I said, I said, 'Do you know the girl that lives here?'
And he said, 'Yes.' And, I asked again, 'What is her name?' At which time he didn't respond. I asked him, 'Have you had sex with her?'
He stated, 'Yes.' "
The trial court suppressed the statements made by appellant before the Miranda 1 warnings were given but permitted the officer to testify to the conversation he had with appellant after the warnings were given.
Appellant urges the entire conversation should have been suppressed, arguing that when the officer testified that Reinhold did not respond to his question concerning the victim's name, it was an improper comment on his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
It is a general rule that the State may not place before the jury testimony that a defendant has exercised his right to remain silent after arrest. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Ward, 112 Ariz. 391, 542 P.2d 816 (1975). But it is clear here from the quoted testimony that appellant did not invoke his right to remain silent. He answered all questions posed by the police officer except one; he refused to tell the officers the victim's name. See State v. Tuzon, 118 Ariz. 205, 575 P.2d 1231 (1978).
Appellant argues that the answers obtained before the giving of the Miranda warnings tainted the admissions made after the warnings were given, and, therefore, those admissions should have been suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous tree." 2
The facts in this case establish that the police officers were met on the street by the victim who was "excited" and "talking fast." She told the officers of the events of the night, and claimed the man was still in her apartment. The officers entered the apartment and found appellant asleep in the victim's bed. The questions asked by the officer, whether appellant knew the complainant and her name, were not accusatory in nature and were merely in furtherance of a preliminary investigation. The questions asked prior to the Miranda warnings were proper given the unusual fact situation presented by this case. Cf. State v. Landrum, 112 Ariz. 555, 544 P.2d 664 (1976); State v. Starr, 119 Ariz. 472, 581 P.2d 706 (App.1978); State v. Kennedy, 116 Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d 508 (App.1977). Because the questions and answers given prior to the Miranda warnings were admissible at trial, appellant's claim of error that his statements were tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree" has no legal basis.
During cross-examination of the victim, the defense attempted to obtain an admission from her that she had a prior sexual relationship with one Pete Morales. Morales was called as a defense witness and was questioned about his relationship with the victim. The trial court, pursuant to our decision in State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976), refused to allow this testimony. Appellant claims that the possible prejudicial effect of this testimony was outweighed by its probative value, and that he was denied a fair trial since he was denied the opportunity to show that the victim claimed she was raped "to get back at Pete Morales through" appellant.
The victim testified that she worked under Morales' supervision at St. Luke's Hospital for seven years, during which time they developed "a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship." Morales' wife was unaware of their relationship, even though at one time the victim lived next door to Morales in a duplex owned by Morales. The victim also testified that she saw Morales near her apartment just before she was abducted, that Morales called her later that night, and that she told the police she wanted both Morales and appellant prosecuted.
When Morales was called to the stand, he testified that his relationship with the victim had developed into a sexual one. The prosecutor objected. The trial court, after admonishing appellant's counsel, sustained the objection, ordered the answer stricken, and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Morales later testified that he terminated the victim's employment, but was forced to rehire her after "she threatened to expose" him "at work and at home."
It is apparent from the record that the relationship between Morales and the prosecutrix was clearly presented, and that any exploration of the sexual relations between the two would have little further probative value. Moreover, appellant failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites of Pope. 3 We hold that it was within the trial court's discretion to exclude further evidence of the victim's relationship with Morales.
The victim also testified:
"A. He had asked me if I had any money and I told him I did and if he wouldn't hurt me he could take it.
Q. What did he say?
A. He laughed and said that he was I can't answer that way.
Q. You say that he made a reaction?
Appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming that the victim's reference to appellant as a robber improperly brought before the jury appellant's prior criminal record.
The prosecuting attorney explained to the court other circumstances which had occurred:
The following colloquy then took place:
"THE COURT: Mr. Friedl, I think even if it is the defendant's own statement, if he states that he has been previously found guilty of a crime or in fact did commit a previous crime, it should not come in. I am not sure I understand what this statement means in light of the other evidence, 'He laughed and said that he was a robber.'
Did he mean by that that he was then and there being a robber, in that he intended at that moment to take her money?
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