State v. Rembert

• Decision Date: 12 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 9693,9693
• Citation: 26 Conn.App. 145,598 A.2d 1101
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Rodney REMBERT.

Page 1101

598 A.2d 1101

26 Conn.App. 145

STATE of Connecticut v. Rodney REMBERT.

No. 9693.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 27, 1991.

Decided Nov. 12, 1991.

Marjorie Allen Dauster, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., and Linda Howe, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant (state).

Joseph G. Bruckman, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee (defendant).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, NORCOTT and HEIMAN, JJ.

NORCOTT, Judge.

The state of Connecticut appeals, with the permission of the trial court, from the judgment of the court granting the defendant's motion for acquittal after he was convicted by a jury of evading responsibility in violation General Statutes § 14-224(a) and (d). ¹ The defendant also was convicted of one count of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1), one count of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(2), and one count of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63(a). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years, suspended after five, for a total effective sentence of five years imprisonment.

On appeal, the state offers a two-pronged attack on the trial court's judgment. The state claims that the trial court improperly construed the term "accident" in § 14-224 to encompass only unintentional conduct. In the alternative, the state urges that even if the term "accident" means only unintentional conduct, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find the defendant guilty and therefore the trial court should not have granted his motion for acquittal.

The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On June 3, 1989, at about 9:30 p.m., the defendant and his girl friend, Elizabeth Marrero, became involved in a violent encounter with a group of teenagers outside a market on a Bridgeport street. During the incident, the defendant was able to get into his car, whereupon he drove it onto the sidewalk toward the teenagers. The youths ran onto a nearby porch, and the defendant's car instead struck a five year old boy, Jason Marrero, and his mother, Emilia Rodriguez, who, along with Jason's father, Miguel Ramirez, and other family members, was returning from dinner at a local pizzeria. The defendant then drove forward again, striking Jason and his mother a second time. The defendant was able to drive away despite an attempt by Jason's father to prevent him from leaving. He did not stop to offer help, nor did he identify himself or report the incident to police.

The defendant testified that he had been stabbed and robbed by one of the teenagers before reaching his car. He testified that while inside the car he looked out and saw another youth pointing a gun at him, whereupon he ducked down and drove off to his mother's house. He also testified that he did not become aware he had struck anyone until his girl friend told him so at his mother's house. She persuaded him to go to a hospital for treatment, where he gave police a false identity and told them he had been robbed at a location other than the market.

As a result of the incident, Jason's mother suffered back and knee injuries, and needed a crutch to walk for one month afterward. Jason suffered multiple compound leg fractures and needed six weeks of hospital care and several surgeries.

The state claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for acquittal on the basis of its interpretation of § 14-224 as being applicable only to unintentional conduct. Because we agree with the state's alternative contention that, even under such an interpretation, sufficient evidence existed to find the defendant guilty, we need not engage in the exercise of defining the term "accident" within the meaning of the statute.

When reviewing claims of evidentiary sufficiency, this court employs a two part analysis. "First, we review the trial evidence, construing it in the most favorable manner reasonably possible to support the jury's verdict. Second, we ascertain whether any jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the established evidence, and the inferences reasonably drawn from those evidentiary facts, established guilt beyond a...