State v. Taylor
Decision Date | 11 January 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 30757.,30757. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Christopher TAYLOR. |
126 Conn.App. 52
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Christopher TAYLOR.
No. 30757.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued Sept. 8, 2010.
Decided Jan. 11, 2011.
Erika L. Amarante, special public defender, with whom was Laura D. Kirby, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on
HARPER, ROBINSON and BEAR, Js.
HARPER, J.
The defendant, Christopher Taylor, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224(b) and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222(a). The defendant claims (1) that because the term "accident," in § 14-224(b), does not encompass intentional conduct, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for evading responsibility and (2) there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the road on which he was driving was within the scope of § 14-222(a). For these reasons the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to both charges. We reject the first claim and agree with the second claim. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction under § 14-224(b) and reverse the judgment of conviction under § 14-222(a).
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 23, 2007, the defendant struck the victim, Luigi Legorano, with his motor vehicle while driving on Whittier Avenue in Waterbury. Whittier Avenue is a residential street that runs south to east, perpendicular to Clematis Avenue on the south end and Eastern Avenue on the east end. The portion of Whittier Avenue between the last house on the street and Eastern Avenue is one way, running in an easterly direction. The remainder of Whittier Avenue is a two-way street. Thus, in compliance with posted signage, vehicles may enter
The victim was living at his brother's home, which was located on the end of Whittier Avenue immediately before the one-way portion of the street. On the day of the incident, the victim was playing catch with his nephews and a friend in the street in front of his brother's home. The victim was positioned with his back facing Eastern Avenue. The defendant, who was operating his automobile in a southerly direction on Eastern Avenue, turned onto Whittier Avenue and began traveling the wrong way down the one-way portion of Whittier Avenue. The victim's nephew, who was positioned facing Eastern Avenue, spotted the defendant's automobile and shouted to the victim to alert him that a vehicle was traveling toward him down the one-way portion of Whittier Avenue. The victim then turned around, raised his hands and shouted to the defendant to stop his vehicle. The defendant brought his vehicle to a stop approximately five feet in front of the victim. The victim informed the defendant that he was driving the wrong way down a one-way street and instructed the defendant to turn his vehicle around. The defendant and the victim exchanged words, and the defendant ultimately struck the victim with his vehicle, knocking him to the ground. After striking the victim with his vehicle, the defendant put the vehicle in reverse, backed down the one-way portion of Whittier Avenue onto Eastern Avenue and left the scene.
The police arrived shortly after the incident and interviewed witnesses. The victim's sister-in-law, who had observed a portion of the incident, provided police with the license plate number of the vehicle that had struck the victim. Police determined that the license plate number
Responding to Addona's tip, Raymond Rose, an officer with the Waterbury police department, went to Sunset Avenue and confirmed that the defendant's vehicle was parked in front of a home on Sunset Avenue. Rose knocked on the door and the defendant answered. The defendant admitted to Rose that he had struck the victim with his vehicle on Whittier Avenue. The defendant was arrested and charged in a three count information with: (1) evading responsibility in violation of § 14-224(b); reckless driving in violation of § 14-222(a); and operating a vehicle the wrong direction on a one-way street in violation of General Statutes § 14-239(a). The first two counts were tried to the jury, and the third count was tried to the court. On September 24, 2008, the defendant was convicted of all three counts.1 On grounds materially similar to those raised in this appeal, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the conviction of evading responsibility and reckless driving. The court denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal as to both counts. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of evading responsibility and reckless driving, the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We begin by setting forth the general principles
I
The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his
This court addressed a similar claim in State v. Rembert, 26 Conn.App. 145, 598 A.2d 1101 (1991). In Rembert, the defendant intentionally drove his vehicle at a group of teenagers but instead struck a young boy and the boy's mother, who were standing nearby. Id., at 147, 598 A.2d 1101. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of evading responsibility in violation of § 14-224, reasoning that the statute did not apply to intentional conduct. Id., at 146, 598 A.2d 1101. The state appealed, arguing that the court improperly concluded that the term "accident" as used in § 14-224 did not apply to intentional conduct, and, in the alternative, that even if the statute did not apply to intentional conduct, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. Id., at 146-47, 598 A.2d 1101. This court reversed the judgment of acquittal. Id., at 149, 598 A.2d 1101. We did not, however, "engage in the exercise of defining the term 'accident' within the meaning of [§ 14-224]." Id., at 148, 598 A.2d 1101. Rather, we held that "ample evidence existed permitting the jury to find that the defendant drove his car at the teenagers, intending to injure them, and that he instead unintentionally struck [the victim].... [S]ince the defendant actually intended to strike the teenagers with the car,
In the present case, we are presented with a situation similar to that in Rembert. As was true in Rembert, we see no reason to define the term "accident" in § 14-224, as there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict...
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State v. Taylor
...establish that the street on which the defendant was driving was a public highway, as required under § 14–222(a).3State v. Taylor, 126 Conn.App. 52, 63–65, 10 A.3d 1062 (2011). We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Cou......