State v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 22 November 1961
• Citation: 229 Or. 167,366 P.2d 524
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Roy Van Lear REYNOLDS, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 524

366 P.2d 524

229 Or. 167

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Roy Van Lear REYNOLDS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 10, 1961.

Decided Nov. 22, 1961.

Brice L. Smith, Portland, argued the cause and submitted the brief for appellant.

Donald B. Bowerman, Deputy Dist. Atty., Clackamas County, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William E. Schumaker, Dist. Atty., Clackamas County, Oregon City.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and ROSSMAN, PERRY, GOODWIN and LUSK, JJ.

ROSSMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment, based upon a verdict which the Circuit Court for Clackamas County entered against him. The indictment upon which the judgment is based charged the defendant with a violation of ORS 483.602.

The sole assignment of error states:

'The court erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the indictment.'

The demurrer was predicated upon a contention that the 'indictment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime.'

The indictment reads:

'The said Roy Van Lear Reynolds on or about the 8th day of September, A.D., 1960, in the said County of Clackamas and State of Oregon then and there being and then and there being engaged in driving, moving and operating a certain motor vehicle, to-wit: an automobile, upon a certain street and highway of the State of Oregon, to-wit: Highway No. 213, within said county and state, did then and there, upon said street and highway, become involved in an accident resulting in injury to one, Richard Lewis Reichmann, and did then and there unlawfully and feloniously fail to immediately stop such motor vehicle at the scene of such accident, or as close thereto as possible, and failed to remain at the scene of such accident and render reasonable aid and assistance, said act of defendant being contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon.'

ORS 483.602 provides:

'(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident which results in injury or death to any person or causes damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person, immediately shall stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (2) of this section. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

'(2) The drivers of any vehicles involved in any accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to any such vehicle shall:

'(a) Give to the other driver or surviving passenger, or any person not a passenger injured as a result of such accident, his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle which he is driving, and the name and address of any other occupants of such vehicle.

'(b) Upon request and if available, exhibit and give the number of his operator's or chauffeur's license to the persons injured, or to the occupant of or person attending any vehicle damaged.

'(c) Render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the conveying or the making of arrangements for the conveying of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment, if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such conveying is requested by any injured person.'

The defendant's attack upon the indictment contends that it is insufficient because (1) the indictment did not charge violation of subsections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 483.602; that is, failure of the defendant to have (a) given his name, address and the registration number of his vehicle to the driver of the other car and (b) exhibited upon request his operator's license and (2) it did not charge the defendant with knowledge that he had injured or killed some one or had damaged a vehicle. Defendant therefore contends that the indictment failed to state facts sufficient to constitute the crime described in ORS 483.602.

We will first consider defendant's contention that the indictment must fail because it did not specifically charge the defendant with failure to conform with subsections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 483.602.

An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the crime so as to inform adequately the defendant of the charge he must answer. Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or. 46, 298 P.2d 986, 309 P.2d 192; State v. Chapin, 74 Or. 346, 144 P. 1187; ORS 132.540; 27 Am.Jur., Indictments and Informations, § 98. The Chapin decision declares, at page 351:

'* * * If the elements of the crime are set forth in the indictment sufficiently to inform the defendant of the charge he is called upon to answer, that is all that is required: State v. Ross, 55 Or. 450 (104 Pac. 596, 106 Pac. 1022, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 601, 613); State v. Dougherty, 4 Or. 200, 205. * * *'

It is explained in 27 Am.Jur., Indictments and Informations, § 98, page 658, that:

'* * * it is not necessary that an indictment contain all the language of the statute on the subject; all that must be alleged is that which is requisite to charge the offense or that which constitutes the essential ingredients of the offense as denounced by statute. Words may be omitted if they are necessarily implied from those contained in the charge. * * *'

The above principles render it evident that the indictment before us was not called upon to charge the defendant with violation of subsections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 483.602. The latter requires that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident which results in injury to a person must do the following:

1. Immediately stop his vehicle; and

2. Remain at the scene of the accident and fulfill the following requirements:

(a) Give his name, address, etc. to the persons mentioned in the act.

(b) Exhibit, if requested, the number of his operator's license to the person injured; and

(c) Render to the injured reasonable assistance.

When it is charged in an indictment, as was done in the present case, that the defendant was involved in an accident resulting in injury to another and that he failed to stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident and render assistance, it...