State v. Reynolds
Decision Date | 10 June 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-CA-98,87-CA-98 |
Citation | 550 N.E.2d 490,49 Ohio App.3d 27 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. REYNOLDS, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Lay testimony may be sufficient to permit a jury to infer that a defendant's reason was so impaired by disease or other defect of the mind at the time of the criminal act that he either did not know that such act was wrong or he did not have the ability to refrain from doing that act, the legal definition of "insanity" in Ohio.
2. A mistrial should not be ordered in a criminal case merely because some error or irregularity has intervened, unless the substantial rights of the accused or the prosecution are adversely affected; this determination is made at the discretion of the trial court.
Joseph Fodal, City Prosecutor, for appellee.
Arthur L. Sidell III, Asst. County Public Defender, for appellant.
Defendant-appellant, William R. Reynolds, appeals from his convictions and sentences for assault, abusing harmful intoxicants, and resisting arrest. Reynolds, who pled in the alternative not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, contends that the trial court erred when it withdrew the insanity issue from the province of the jury and refused to instruct the jury concerning the insanity defense. Reynolds also contends that the trial court erroneously permitted statements made by Reynolds in the course of a psychological examination pursuant to R.C. 2945.39 to be used against him on the issue of guilt.
We conclude that the particular statements made during the course of his psychological evaluation, to the introduction of evidence of which Reynolds objected, were relevant to the issue of whether he was legally insane at the time of the offense, so that they were properly admitted in evidence on that issue. However, we agree with Reynolds that there was enough evidence on the issue of his insanity defense to require that it be submitted to the jury with proper instructions. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and this cause will be remanded for a new trial.
One summer night in 1987, around 9:00 p.m., Reynolds was at the home of Nancy Drake. Drake had her eight- or nine-month-old baby boy with her. Drake's brother, Steven Watson, arrived at the home and detected, as soon as he opened the door, the strong smell of enamel spray paint. Upon inquiring, Watson was told by Reynolds that he and Drake were spray-painting a dresser.
A short while later, Watson, who was then in the kitchen, was joined by his sister and Reynolds. Watson told them that the baby should not be in the house because of the paint fumes. At this point, Watson noted that Reynolds was spraying the paint on a sock and putting it to his nose and sniffing it. Watson said that this happened four or five times. Watson testified that Reynolds exhibited all the characteristics of intoxication.
Watson then went across the street and called the police. When Officer Randy Loper responded to Watson's call, he, also, detected a paint odor that was so strong that it hurt his lungs. Loper also testified that Reynolds appeared to be intoxicated. Loper told Reynolds that he was under arrest for abusing harmful intoxicants, whereupon Reynolds told Loper "that he wasn't going to go to jail, that he had just got out of jail and was not going to go back, and that he had been fed up with the cops and he was not going to go to jail."
Loper and Watson both testified that after Loper's attempts to reason with Reynolds failed, Reynolds resisted arrest to the extent of kicking and struggling with Officer Loper. At some point, another police officer, Grover Songer, arrived to assist. Songer took Nancy Drake into custody, and like Loper, encountered violent resistance. The events surrounding the arrest were best described by Officer Loper, as follows:
Police Sgt. Gardner also testified. He testified that he had observed Reynolds on a number of occasions, and that Reynolds behaved in a reasonable way when he was not sniffing paint, but was a "wild man" when he was sniffing paint.
Dr. Jasmine Edwards, the licensed psychologist who examined Reynolds pursuant to R.C. 2945.39, testified that Reynolds had a long history of treatment in psychiatric treatment facilities and chemical dependency treatment facilities. Dr. Edwards testified that Reynolds is on two medications, Stelazine and Cogentin, both of which are antipsychotic drugs that are sometimes used with individuals who experience hallucinations or delusions. She testified that it was her understanding that Reynolds had been diagnosed as a schizophrenic, and that schizophrenia is a confused mental state in which the schizophrenic experiences difficulties in adjusting his perceptions of the world to what is actually going on around him. She also testified that schizophrenics experience those symptoms sporadically, "so it is not a condition that will constantly have symptoms appearing in the person."
Dr. Edwards, who was called by Reynolds, testified on cross-examination as follows:
Dr. Edwards testified that although she did not make a diagnosis, it was her belief that the chemicals...
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