State v. Rhyne
| Citation | 33 S.E. 128,124 N.C. 847 |
| Parties | STATE v. RHYNE. |
| Decision Date | 09 May 1899 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Appeal from superior court, Gaston county; Coble, Judge.
Alphonso Rhyne was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed.
Accused and an employe of deceased were quarreling at deceased's gin, near his dwelling. Deceased, hearing the noise, went out. When he got there, the accused stopped and left the platform, going off several feet. It was dark. Deceased went to accused, and asked him if he had been quarreling. Accused made no answer, and deceased repeated the question, and, as he did so, laid his hand on prisoner's shoulder requesting him to come to the light, and tell him what the trouble was about. At that moment prisoner stabbed deceased jumped back, and said, "Hands off." Held insufficient to authorize a conviction of murder in the first degree, since there was no evidence of premeditation, made a prerequisite to murder in the first degree by Act 1893, c 85, dividing murder into two degrees.
D. W. Robinson, for appellant.
The Attorney General and Jones & Tillett, for the State.
The prisoner was indicted and convicted of murder in the first degree, and from the judgment of the court he appealed. There are some exceptions taken to the charge, but we have examined them with care, and do not think they can be sustained. The charge seems to be a full, clear, and correct enunciation of the law of murder in the first and second degrees, as it exists under the statute of 1893. The error, if there be error, is in submitting the question of murder in the first degree to the jury upon the evidence in the case. That Thomas Falls had been killed by the prisoner with a deadly weapon was clearly shown,--indeed, not denied. Under the law as it existed before the act of 1893, malice would have been presumed from these facts, and, nothing else appearing, the killing would have been murder. The same rule as to killing with a deadly weapon and the presumption of malice that existed before the act of 1893 still exists, but is only applicable to murder in the second degree; and the burden is still on the prisoner to show facts in extenuation, mitigation, or excuse, to reduce the grade of the crime below that of murder in the second degree, or to justify or excuse the killing. As the killing with a deadly weapon was proved (in fact, not denied), and the prisoner having offered no evidence in extenuation, excuse, or justification, the court would have been justified in telling the jury that, if they believed the evidence, the prisoner was guilty of murder in the second degree. But since Act 1893, c. 85, dividing murder into two degrees, these rules of the common law do not apply to murder in the first degree, or, speaking more accurately, it takes more than this to constitute murder in the first degree. Outside of the specified offense named in the statute, the killing must be "wilful, deliberate and premeditated," and this must be shown by the state beyond a reasonable doubt before it is justified in asking a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. As the case depends upon the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a verdict of murder in the first degree, we think it proper to give the evidence upon which it was found:
Mr. Grissom, an employé of the deceased, living and boarding with the deceased, who went with him from his house to the cotton gin, and who saw and heard the whole matter, testified: That as he went from the store to his supper he heard a fuss--a row--going on between Frank Parish, an employé of the deceased, and the prisoner, who had brought a load of cotton to the gin for a customer. After he got to the house he continued to hear the row going on, when a daughter of the deceased informed her father that a fuss was going on between some persons at the cotton gin. That deceased came out on the piazza, where the witness was, stopped a moment, and started towards the gin house. Witness went with him, and further testified: The witness was then cross-examined, and testified as follows: We have quoted the entire evidence of this witness, and, while there were some other witnesses examined, there was nothing new elicited; and the evidence of this witness may be said to be the evidence in the case. There was a witness who testified that, just after the homicide had taken, placee, some one ran by him, and he supposed it to be the prisoner (it was dark), saying he would kill him; that he would cut his guts out. And while such evidence might possibly be used to show malice, were that necessary, it is not seen how it can be evidence of premeditation and deliberation, which is the point upon which the case turns.
Probably one of the most difficult things that presents itself to a judge presiding at the trial of an important case--a capital felony--is to say whether there is such evidence of guilty in some cases, as should be submitted to the jury. And it is with reluctance that this court, after the court below has submitted the matter to the jury, and they have found a verdict of guilty, holds that there was no testimony, or no such testimony of the prisoner's guilty as should have been submitted to the jury. But we find that this court, in the discharge of its duty, has done so in a number of cases. Of the more recent cases, we may name State v. Miller, 112 N.C. 886, 17 S.E. 167; State v. Thomas, 118 N.C. 1121, 24 S.E. 928; and State v. Wilcox, 118 N.C. 1131, 23 S.E. 928; and State v. Gragg, 122 N.C. 1082, 30 S.E. 306. These were all convictions of murder in which new trials were granted upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty. The law is fixed by the statute, that the killing must be willful, and that it must be done upon...
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