State v. Ricciardi
| Decision Date | 05 February 1924 |
| Citation | 123 A. 606 |
| Parties | STATE v. RICCIARDI et al. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Kivel, Judge.
Suit by the State against Guiseppi Ricciardi and others. Question transferred without ruling. Judgment for defendants.
Debt upon a recognizance. The defendant Guiseppi Ricciardi was arrested on a charge of statutory rape and arraigned before the municipal court of Milford. Upon his plea of not guilty, he was ordered to recognize in the sum of $1,000 for his appearance at the next term of the superior court. Bail was accordingly furnished by the respondent, with the other defendants as sureties. He did not appear, the bail was declared forfeited, and this suit was brought.
In the superior court Kivel, C. J., transferred without ruling the question whether the suit can be maintained.
Ferdinand Farleyr Co. Sol., of Manchester, and J. Blanche Newhall, of Concord, for the State.
Wason & Moran, of Nashua, and Timothy F. O'Connor and Myer Saidel, both of Manchester, for defendants.
PEASLEE, J. "Recognizances not authorized by law are void." State v. Eastman, 42 N. H. 265, 268. "Proceedings of tribunals, which have no jurisdiction of the subjectmatter, upon which they assume to act, are absolutely void, and there is no presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of inferior courts." Manning v. Cogan, 49 N. H. 331, 338, and cases cited.
The soundness of these propositions is not questioned by the state, but it is argued that the municipal court did not exceed its jurisdiction when it admitted Ricciardi to bail. The offense with which he was charged comes within the terms of Public Statutes, c. 252, g 13. It is punishable by imprisonment "not exceeding thirty years." P. S. c. 278, § 15; Laws 1897, c. 35, § 1.
The provision as to bail in such cases, just prior to the enactment of the Public Statutes, was that it could be granted by "the Supreme Court, or any justice thereof, and no other court or justice." G. L. c. 258, § 19. In the Public Statutes the words "and no other court or justice" are omitted. P. S. c. 252, § 13. Because of this omission and upon the authority of the statement in State v. Eastman. 42 N. H. 265, 270, that, "if one justice by his warrant can apprehend, he can bail." it is argued that the municipal court had jurisdiction to take the action in question. It is only necessary to examine the history of our law upon the subject to demonstrate that the claim is unfounded.
The statute limiting the power of magistrates and inferior courts to take bail is of comparatively recent origin. When State v. Eastman, supra, was decided (1860), the law was that—
"Any justice may cause to be apprehended and committed to jail, or bound over, with sufficient sureties, for trial by the court of common pleas in such county, all persons charged with offenses committed in such county, exceeding his jurisdiction to try." R. S. c. 222, § 3.
The statement above quoted from State v. Eastman related to the common law, as the case was one where the statute made no provision. In that case the principal had been committed for want of bail, and the recognizance in question was taken later by a justice who did not order the committal. As stated by the court:
"The present case then being one to which our statutes have no application, we have to resort to the common law for a solution of the questions involved in it." 42 N. H. 270.
But if the remark had related to cases coming within the statute, it would have been correct. As the law then stood, a justice could admit to bail in any case when he could commit to jail for appearance at the court of common pleas.
These facts also answer the suggestion that authority for the state's position is to be found in the implication in State v. Fowler, 28 N. H. 184, that a justice had authority to take bail in a case like this. Such was the provision of the statute when that case was decided (1854).
In the revision of 1867, radical changes were made as to bail. The commissioners reported two new sections, one that all persons charged with crime are bailable "except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great," and the other that "the Supreme Court or any justice thereof, and no other court or justice," could take bail when the offense was punishable by imprisonment "for twenty years or upward." Com'rs Rep. G. S. c. 241, §§ 18, 19. At the same time the section as to binding over was amended so that bail could be taken below only "if the offense is bailable by such police court or Justice." Id. § 6. If the offense was not so bailable, the only authority was to commit. Id. § 5. These various provisions were adopted by the Legislature. G. S. c. 240, §§ 5, 6, 18, 19. Although a new chapter, "Recognizances and Bail," was added at this time, these provisions were retained in the chapter on "Examinations and Appeals."
This arrangement was continued in the revision of 1878, and the provisions were re-enacted without change. G. L. cc. 258, 259. In the revision...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Castro
... Page 650 ... 464 N.Y.S.2d 650 ... 119 Misc.2d 787 ... The PEOPLE of the State of New York ... Jose CASTRO, Defendant, ... Tony Oquendo, Petitioner ... Supreme Court, Special Term, ... Kings County, Part 10K ... June ... Zangrillo, 56 A.D.2d 668, 391 N.Y.S.2d 913; State v. Swinburne, 121 Ariz. 404, 590 P.2d 943, 944; State v. Ricciardi, 81 N.H. 223, 123 A. 606; cf. People v. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co. 43 A.D.2d 961, 352 N.Y.S.2d 651). This exception to the Statute of ... ...
-
State v. Bowser
... ... Similar arguments have been rejected by the better considered decisions in other jurisdictions. State v. Ricciardi, 81 N.H. 223, 123 A. 606, 34 A.L.R. 609, and cases collected in the ensuing annotation ... Since the bail bond in suit ... ...
-
Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.
... ... The plaintiff' is an Ohio corporation, and the original cause of action arose and was litigated in that state. The defendant is an Illinois corporation doing business in Ohio and other states, including New Hampshire. It insured the plaintiff in Ohio. The ... ...
-
State v. Swinburne, A-25789
... ... It may be enforced as a common law obligation, nor may the sureties be estopped from asserting its validity. People v. Wirtschafter, 305 N.Y. 515, 114 N.E.2d 18 (1953); State v. Ricciardi, 81 N.H. 223, 123 A. 606, 34 A.L.R. 609 (1924), and cases cited in Annot. 34 A.L.R. 612 et seq.; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bail and Recognizance Sec. 173; 8 C.J.S. Bail § 43. State v. Ricciardi, supra, held that where the court taking a bail bond was without authority to act because the offense charged was ... ...