State v. Rice

• Decision Date: 02 November 1977
• Citation: 379 A.2d 140
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Clark William RICE, Jr.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 140

379 A.2d 140

STATE of Maine v. Clark William RICE, Jr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 2, 1977.

Michael D. Seitzinger, Charles K. Leadbetter, Arthur A. Stilphen, G. A. Brennan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Roberts, Shirley & Humphrey by Thomas E. Humphrey, James J. Shirley, Sanford, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

WERNICK, Justice.

In a consolidated trial upon three indictments returned in the Superior Court (York County) against defendant Clark William Rice, Jr., the jury, on January 10, 1976, found defendant guilty of (Simple) Assault and Battery (17 M.R.S.A. § 201), Armed Assault and Battery (17 M.R.S.A. § 201-A) and Armed Robbery (17 M.R.S.A. § 3401-A). Defendant has appealed from the judgments of conviction entered on the verdicts.

We sustain the appeals as to all three judgments of conviction.

At approximately 6:30 p. m. on April 12, 1975 defendant and his wife Brenda were married. Later that evening the events occurred which led to the convictions now under review.

For several months before their marriage defendant and his then fiancee, Brenda, had been living in a tent at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Eagle, Jr. Defendant worked for Mr. Eagle and the two couples were also social friends. The Rice wedding, a small family affair, was held in the Eagle home in North Berwick. A short reception of an hour or so followed the ceremony.

Some friends, among whom were Edwin Elton, David Hanscomb and Kevin Swett, arrived during the reception. Defendant had already been drinking hard liquor, and after the arrival of his friends, he began to drink more heavily. Sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 p. m. defendant and his wife, together with Hanscomb and Elton, decided to leave the Eagles' home. When they so informed Mr. Eagle, Eagle told defendant, who was already intoxicated, that he was going to sleep, and if defendant was "really high" when he returned, he should stay out of the house.

Defendant, his wife and friends then left in David Hanscomb's car for a drinking spot, known as the "quarter mile", situated in the woods a short distance from the Eagle home. They were there joined by Swett and Linwood Collins, another acquaintance. During the rest of the evening, defendant consumed both marijuana and beer. At one point, Hanscomb and Elton furnished defendant with a can of beer from Hanscomb's car and, along with Swett and Collins, they dared defendant to drink the whole can at once. Reluctant at first, defendant eventually drank it.

The group returned to the Eagle residence at approximately 10:30. Soon, the guests left the newlyweds alone. There is confusion about the condition of defendant thereafter as well as about subsequent events.

Apparently, defendant obtained a kitchen knife and cut Thomas Eagle slightly with it when Eagle tried to take a gun from defendant. Defendant's wife testified that defendant suddenly became a disoriented, violent person who did not recognize her. Mrs. Rice said that defendant's pupils were dilated and his movements shaky. Mr. Eagle described defendant as "confused." Defendant either asked or dared the others to call the police, and when they did not respond, defendant himself called the police.

It appears, too, that defendant went outside the house with the gun after phoning the police and that Elmer Hutchins and Charles Dubois, local police officers, arrived shortly thereafter. Although reluctant to involve the police and disinclined to press charges, the Eagles did tell Hutchins and Dubois something of what had happened. From his cruiser, with the lights on and the amplifier-address system activated, Hutchins attempted to coax defendant back into the house by assuring him there would be no punishment for his earlier acts. A shot was fired, but Hutchins continued to call to defendant over the loud speaker. A second shot seriously wounded Hutchins in the arm and chest. He and Dubois then drove off to seek medical assistance.

After the departure of Hutchins and Dubois, defendant rushed into the Eagle residence yelling that he had just shot Hutchins and had to leave. Threatening Mr. and Mrs. Eagle with the gun, defendant obtained the keys to the Eagles' red Javelin automobile and drove off. The next morning, a few miles away, defendant was arrested after having eluded several roadblocks.

Defendant himself recalled practically nothing about the events transpiring at the Eagle residence after defendant had returned from the "quarter mile" drinking spot.

Based on the above facts, the jury found defendant guilty of (1) Assault and Battery (Simple) on Thomas Eagle, Jr. in connection with the episode when defendant cut Eagle with the kitchen knife; (2) Armed Assault and Battery on Elmer Hutchins as a result of the shooting outdoors; and (3) Armed Robbery of Mrs. Eagle based on the subsequent taking of the car keys and red Javelin automobile.

Defendant maintains that all three convictions must be reversed because (1) particular remarks of the presiding Justice infringed defendant's rights under the 5th-14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and (2) the Justice's instruction to the jury erroneously placed upon the defendant the ultimate burden of proof concerning intoxication, not self-induced, as a basis for relieving defendant of criminal responsibility. By another contention, addressed only to his conviction of Armed Robbery, defendant asserts that it was reversible error for the presiding Justice to place upon defendant the ultimate burden of proving the existence and effect of his voluntary intoxication. ¹

We conclude that defendant is correct in his contention that there was error in the instructions on involuntary intoxication which requires reversal of all three convictions. We therefore reach none of the other issues raised.

I.

In his instructions, the presiding Justice expressly differentiated the obligations of proof raised by defendant's assertion that his conduct had resulted from intoxication, voluntary or involuntary, from the overall burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes charges. The Justice said:

"The burden never shifts; the State has to prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . However, sometimes a defense is offered which is called an affirmative defense. The State does not have to prove the negative of that. The one who offers such a defense, here the defendant, has the burden of proving the truth of that allegation."

The Justice further instructed that defendant's burden would be met with proof

"by the greater weight of the testimony, by a fair preponderance of all of the evidence the weighing of the scale, the tipping of the scale."

Although he failed to make appropriate objection to the above-described instruction as given, defendant had submitted to the presiding Justice a written request for instruction solely in regard to involuntary intoxication. The substance of the requested instruction was that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of involuntary intoxication as causatively related to defendant's allegedly criminal behavior. Defendant maintains that this written request was sufficient to save the involuntary intoxication issue for appellate cognizance in ordinary course. State v. Millett, Me., 273 A.2d 504, 505-506 (1971).

We agree with defendant's position and reject the State's contention that to save the issue defendant should also have objected after the close of the charge in order to comply with Rule 30(b) M.R.Crim.P.

The cases cited by the State in support of its claim State v. Thibodeau, Me., 353 A.2d 595 (1976); State v. Dyer, Me., 371 A.2d 1079 (1977); and State v. Thompson, Me., 370 A.2d 650 (1977) are distinguishable.

The type of error complained of in Thibodeau and Dyer sharply differentiates them from Millett and the case at bar. In Thibodeau defendant endeavored to assure that the presiding Justice had the same conceptions as did defendant concerning the law governing the constructive presence of a principal. The presiding Justice thereupon purported to instruct in accordance with defendant's wishes. Defendant never indicated until appeal that the presiding Justice had not done so. Similarly, in Dyer the trial Justice conducted an examination of prospective jurors using questions he believed satisfactory to defendant. Here, and in Millett, however, the Justice knew that what he told the jurors was diametrically opposed to the formulation urged by defendant in his written request and thus had opportunity to correct the error. It would have been futile for defendant here, as in Millett, to have renewed his obvious disagreement after completion of the charge.

State v. Thompson, supra, does not require a result contrary to that in Millett. Although in Thompson we adverted in general to the desirability of renewing objections following the charge in a context where, as here, the differences between the charge given and the charge requested were crystal clear, ² in Thompson defendant had actually attempted a renewal of objection. (370 A.2d at 653) Hence, not only did Thompson decide nothing as to cases in which, as here, no such renewal of objection was undertaken but also because of the particular characteristics of the renewal of objection in Thompson, we there reinforced the teaching of Millett that issues are ripe for review where the purpose of Rule 30(b) has been met. In Thompson the renewal failed to specify the portion of the charge to which objection was being made. Yet, citing State v. Boisvert, Me., 236 A.2d 419 (1967), we decided:

"The presiding Justice was fully aware of the defendant's requested instruction . . . . The defendant has complied with the underlying spirit of Rule 30(b) and has preserved his point for appellate review." (370 A.2d at 653)

Our decision here that defendant had...