State v. Rice
| Decision Date | 01 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 28009-4-II.,28009-4-II. |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JEWELL DENNIS RICE, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County, Docket No: 00-1-03991-5, Judgment or order under review, Date filed: 09/28/2001.
Mary Katherine Young High Attorney at Law Tacoma, WA, Counsel for Appellant(s).
Alicia Marie Burton Pierce County Prosecutors Office Tacoma, WA, and John Christopher Hillman Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney Tacoma, WA, Counsel for Respondent(s).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Jewell Dennis Rice appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss for speedy trial rule violations, claiming that the State did not use due diligence to bring him before the court. We affirm.
On February 18, 1999, Rice was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and second degree driving with a suspended license (DWS). He refused a breath test and was released.
On March 1, 1999, the State charged Rice with DUI and second degree DWS. The same day, the district court mailed a summons to Rice's home, ordering him to appear for arraignment on March 16, 1999. Rice failed to appear as ordered, and a warrant was issued but not served until September 18, 1999. On September 22, 1999, Rice was finally arraigned. He asserted his right to speedy trial and asked for a constructive arraignment date. Trial was set for October 18, 1999, but then continued several times.
On July 25, 2000, Rice moved to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights. He claimed that he had not received the summons and that the State had not exercised due diligence to procure his attendance. He offered a certified copy of a police report that said mail had been stolen from his mailbox. His wife testified that their mail box had been 'robbed many times.'1 Although some of their mail had been recovered and returned, she did not know whether Rice had ever received the summons. The district court denied the motion because the summons mailed to Rice's house had never been returned. On July 27, 2000, a jury found Rice guilty, and on August 24, 2000, Rice appealed to superior court.
On September 28, 2001, the superior court found that 'the State acted in good faith and with due diligence when it sent the summons to defendant's correct address'2 and that the record was sufficient to support this finding. The superior court affirmed the district court, and Rice obtained discretionary review.
On appeal, Rice claims that the State did not exercise due diligence by '{s}imply mailing a summons{.}'3 As a result, he says, too much time elapsed between when he was charged (March 1, 1999) and when he was arraigned (September 22, 1999). He does not claim that too much time elapsed between arraignment and trial.
CrRLJ 3.3 provides that a defendant 'shall be arraigned not later than 15 days after that appearance in court which next follows the filing of the complaint or citation and notice.'4 It further provides that a defendant shall be tried within 60 days of arraignment if in jail, and within 90 days of arraignment if not in jail.5
State v. Greenwood,6 State v. Striker,7 and State v. Carpenter8 expand CrRLJ 3.3. They provide that a defendant is deemed to have been arraigned on the last day he or she could properly have been arraigned if a delay of more than 45 days occurs between charge and arraignment, the defendant was 'amenable to process' during that period, and the State failed to use due diligence to bring him before the court.9 The defendant bears the burden of proving amenability to process, for he 'knows what . . . he . . . was doing during the relevant period.'10 The State bears the burden of showing due diligence, because it knows what efforts it expended to bring the defendant before the court.11 Amenability requires that the defendant be 'liable or subject to law,'12 and due diligence 'requires the expenditure of at least a minimal amount of effort to bring a defendant before the court in a timely manner.'13
The first question here is whether Rice bore his burden of proving amenability to process. He lived at the same address in Puyallup throughout the time in question. His address and phone number were in the phone book. He was working the same job. He did not, as far as we can tell, give the officer an incorrect address. We hold that he bore his burden of showing amenability.
The next question is whether the State acted with due diligence. It obtained and mailed a summons to Rice's home. The notice was not returned, thus giving rise to a reasonable inference 'that the defendant has received the notice and the prosecution has therefore acted with due diligence.'14 When Rice failed to appear as ordered, the State promptly procured a warrant for his arrest.15 Although Rice now urges that his mail might have been stolen, the State had no reason to know that. Rice knew he had been arrested, so he also knew or should have known that charges were likely to be pending.16 We hold that the State met its burden of proving due diligence.
Rice relies on State v. Williams17 and State v. Wirth.18 In those cases, however, the State knew or should have known that its process had not reached the defendant.19 Moreover, the period of delay four years in Williams and 26 months in Wirth was much more unreasonable than the period of delay in issue here. Distinguishing Williams and Wirth, we hold that CrRLJ 3.3 was not violated, and that the courts below did not err.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
4. CrRLJ 3.3(c)(1).
5. CrRLJ 3.3(c)(3).
9. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d at 591, 599-600; Carpenter, 94 Wn.2d at 694; Striker, 87 Wn.2d at 875; State v. Jones, 100 Wn. App. 820, 824, 998 P.2d 921 (2000); State v. Roman, 94 Wn. App. 211, 216, 972 P.2d 511, review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1014 (1999).
10. Roman, 94 Wn. App. at 216; see also Jones, 100 Wn. App. at 825.
11. State v. Galbreath, 109 Wn. App. 664, 670, 37 P.3d 315 (2002) (citing Roman, 94 Wn. App. at 216).
14. State v. Hunsaker, 74 Wn. App. 209, 211, 873 P.2d 546, review denied, 125 Wn.2d...
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