State v. Rice, 29317

• Citation: 235 Ind. 423,134 N.E.2d 219
• Decision Date: 11 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 29317,29317
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Benjamin Victor RICE, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 219

134 N.E.2d 219

235 Ind. 423

STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Benjamin Victor RICE, Appellee.

No. 29317.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 11, 1956.

Patrick Brennan, Pros. Atty., Isadore D. Rosenfeld, Deputy Pros. Atty., South Bend, Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.

Joseph T. Helling, Crumpacker, May, Beamer, Levy & Searer, South Bend, for appellee.

EMMERT, Judge.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether § 4-2402, Burns' 1946 Replacement, Acts 1905, ch. 129, § 216, p. 219; 1921, ch. 70, § 1, p. 153; 1939, ch. 7, § 1, p. 12, deprives a Justice of the Peace of Center Township, St. Joseph County, Indiana, of jurisdiction of a violation of a highway traffic misdemeanor committed outside of the corporate limits of South Ben. The trial court held that it did, and the state appeals.

South Bend is a city of the second class, and no magistrate courts have been created for St. Joseph County. The material part of the statute concerning the jurisdiction of city courts is as follows:

'He shall have and exercise, within the county in which such city is located, the powers and jurisdiction now or hereafter conferred upon justices of the peace in all cases of crimes and misdemeanors, except as otherwise herein provided. He shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all violations of the ordinances of such city. In all cities of the first and second and third class he shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the trial of all misdemeanors constituting violation of highway traffic ordinances of such city, and of violations of the highway traffic laws of the state of Indiana; * * *.' (Italics supplied.) Section 4-2402, Burns' 1946 Replacement.

The appellee would have us construe the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court as if the clause concerning highway traffic laws of the State of Indiana had added to it the words 'within the county in which such city is located.' Admittedly, this clause as it stands is ambiguous, but, as was stated by this court in State ex rel. 1625 East Washington Realty Co. v. Markey, 1937, 212 Ind. 59, 63, 7 N.E.2d 989, 991, 'It is our duty, however, to construe the act and determine, if we can, its meaning. As said in the case of State ex inf. Crow v. [West Side] Street Ry. Co., 1898, 146 Mo. 155 , 47 S.W. 959, 961: 'A statute cannot be held void for uncertainty, if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language. Mere difficulty in ascertaining its meaning, or the fact that it is susceptible of different interpretations, will not render it nugatory. Doubts as to its construction will not justify us in disregarding it. It is the bounden duty of the courts to endeavor, by every rule of construction, to ascertain the meaning of, and to give full force and effect to, every enactment of the general assembly not obnoxious to constitutional prohibitions.''

'Every statute is to be construed with reference to its intended scope and to the purpose of the Legislature in enacting it, and where language is used which is ambiguous, or admits of more than one meaning, it is to be taken in such a sense as will conform to the scope of the act and carry out the purpose of the statute. State ex rel. v. Bartholomew, 1911, 176 Ind. 182, 191, 95 N.W 417, Ann.Cas.1914B, 91; Storms v. Stevens, 1885, 104 Ind. 46, 50, 3 N.E. 401; Maxwell v. Collins, 1856, 8 Ind. 38, 40.' J. Wooley Coal Co. v. Tevault, 1918, 187 Ind. 171, 182, 118 N.E. 921, 924, 119 N.E. 485.

'Statutes will be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit to prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice; to favor public convenience; and to oppose all prejudice to public interests. ...