State v. Richards, CX-91-1409

Decision Date31 December 1992
Docket NumberNo. CX-91-1409,CX-91-1409
Citation495 N.W.2d 187
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Leonard Joseph RICHARDS, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court properly controlled the presentation of evidence and maintained the decorum and security of the courtroom without depriving defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

2. Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to due process of law by sanctions precluding his presentation of evidence on the mental illness defense where he refused to cooperate with the psychiatrist appointed to assist him and chose not to comply with discovery rules.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Asst. State Public Defender, St. Paul, for appellant.

Leonard J. Richards, pro se.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atty., Lee W. Barry, Sr. Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

WAHL, Justice.

Defendant Leonard Joseph Richards appeals his conviction, by jury verdict, of premeditated first degree murder 1 in the death of attorney Robert Stratton. Defendant's previous conviction for Stratton's premeditated first degree murder was reversed by this court when defendant successfully argued that he had been denied his right of self-representation. State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260 (Minn.1990). At the second trial, defendant represented himself with the able assistance of appointed standby counsel and was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The primary issues raised on appeal are whether the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial by the trial court judge's restrictions on his right to testify, his right to present evidence, his right to cross-examine witnesses, and his right to represent himself effectively; and whether his constitutional right to due process of law was violated when the trial court denied him access to a defense psychiatrist for assistance in preparing and presenting his mental illness defense and precluded the introduction of any evidence in support of that defense. After a careful review of the law and the record, 2 we affirm the conviction.

On February 23, 1987, Barbara Lyke, Robert Stratton's receptionist, saw Stratton leave the office at about 1:15 p.m. with the defendant, Leonard Richards. Stratton told her that he and Richards were going to lunch and that he would be back later. Lyke never saw him again.

Although defendant maintained a residence at 3805 29th Avenue South in Minneapolis, he had lived at 1707 2nd Avenue North with Linda Winbush and two of her sons since November of 1986. Winbush testified that, in the days leading up to February 23, defendant instructed her to clean the basement in preparation for a client meeting he had scheduled for that day. Defendant covered the basement windows over with spray paint and contact paper and installed new latches on them. On February 23, defendant drove Winbush to a relative's home in Blaine where her children had spent the weekend. When he returned at about 11:00 p.m. to pick them up, Winbush noticed dark spots on his jeans which defendant said were paint. On the way home, defendant warned Winbush not to go into the basement because an electrician had been working down there. Once home, Winbush observed that the stairway to the second floor and the basement stairs were wet. She also noticed that a sheet that had been hung in the children's bedroom as a room divider was missing, as was the sheet from her bed.

The next morning, after her older son had gone to school, Winbush discovered blood spots in the children's bedroom. Taking care that defendant did not see her, Winbush blotted up some of the blood with a tissue which she then hid inside the lining of her coat. Later that morning, defendant drove Winbush and her other son to a Banks store and left them with a $100 bill and instructions to spend the day shopping. As soon as defendant drove away, Winbush contacted the Minneapolis police and told them she feared "something horrible" had happened at her house. After the police tested the tissue and confirmed that it contained blood, Winbush signed a consent form giving the police permission to search her home.

Upon arriving at 1707 2nd Avenue North, Winbush remained in the squad car while the police approached the house. After knocking for almost ten minutes, the officers spotted Richards through a window and forcibly entered the dwelling. Once defendant was restrained, one of the officers went down into the basement where he found Stratton's nude corpse wrapped in a bed sheet. Defendant was arrested and the police departed to obtain a search warrant for the premises.

During the execution of this search warrant, police officers seized a number of items which were later introduced as evidence at trial. Near the body in the basement, officers found a maul, an axe, a pair of sidecutters, and garbage bags filled with bloody paper towels and clothing. They found a brand new jigsaw with a sales receipt indicating it had been purchased at Target on the evening of February 23. Upstairs, officers discovered a stungun, a can of mace, a box of pistols, and an expended bullet. The officers found a calendar on which the date February 23 was highlighted in blue and yellow and contained the notation "Noon, have lunch." They also seized a number of papers, including a document purporting to be a signed, notarized affidavit of Robert Stratton. A trail of wetness was observed leading from an upstairs room, down the stairway and through the ground level of the house to the basement stairs. Behind the living room sofa, an officer found a pair of blood-spattered jeans which Linda Winbush identified as those worn by defendant when he picked her up in Blaine on the night of February 23.

An autopsy indicated that Stratton had died as a result of a close-range gun shot wound to the base of his skull and that his body had been dragged some distance after death. Forensic testing of various bloodstains found at 1707 2nd Avenue North showed them to be consistent with the blood of Robert Stratton. A ballistics expert determined that the expended bullet had been recently fired from one of the pistols found in the house.

At trial, the state advanced the theory that defendant had killed Stratton to prevent him from turning over documents to the IRS which would have implicated defendant in tax fraud. Stratton had been scheduled to meet with an IRS investigator on February 25, two days after he was killed. Testimony was offered showing that the "Stratton affidavit," which essentially exculpated defendant of any tax misconduct, had been written by defendant, not Stratton.

Defendant's second trial for the premeditated murder of Robert Stratton was bifurcated because defendant, following jury selection, had interposed a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency. At the close of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury found that the elements of first degree murder had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. At the mental illness phase, the trial court, pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 20.02, subd. 3, prohibited the defendant from introducing evidence of his mental condition. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree premeditated murder.

I.

Defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by unreasonable restrictions placed by the trial court on his right to testify, his right to present evidence, his right to cross-examine witnesses, and his right to effective representation. Under our system of jurisprudence, every criminal defendant has the right to be treated with fundamental fairness and "afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). The due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution require no less. Right to Testify.

Defendant claims first that the trial court prevented him from fully exercising his constitutional right to testify in his own defense because he was not allowed to introduce certain evidence through his own testimony. "[I]t cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). Defendant was not permitted to testify about everything he wished to address; however, as the examples which follow indicate, defendant was allowed to testify until his testimony ran afoul of the rules of evidence.

Contrary to his assertion that he was not allowed to introduce evidence of his theory that Robert Stratton was murdered, not by him, but by three other men, defendant was allowed to testify about the relationship between Gary and Jack Thomas and Robert Stratton. 3 Though defendant argues that he was not able to testify fully because the court cut him off, he was on the stand for more than 10 hours over the course of four days. The court only cut defendant off after warning him that he had thirty minutes left to testify and allowing him to make an offer of proof. Before his testimony was halted, defendant was allowed to testify as to who, in his view, killed Robert Stratton.

Defendant claims he was not allowed to testify in depth about his relationship to Peel Realty and the Alango Trust. However, the transcript contains 30 pages of his testimony regarding these entities.

The trial transcript likewise belies defendants claim that he was prevented from testifying that he never received notice of an IRS summons regarding Peel and Alango.

Q: Leonard, did you ever get any notice, either--well, first of all, did you ever get any notice from the IRS regarding the summons with respect to...

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