State v. Richards

• Decision Date: 28 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2020-027,2020-027
• Citation: 2021 VT 40
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: State of Vermont v. Jonathan C. Richards

2021 VT 40

State of Vermont v. Jonathan C. Richards

No. 2020-027

Supreme Court of Vermont

January Term, 2021

May 28, 2021

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

On Appeal from Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Criminal Division

David R. Fenster, J.

Rosemary Kennedy, Rutland Count State's Attorney, and L. Raymond Sun, Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Valerio, Defender General, Rebecca Turner, Appellate Defender, and Lena Capps, Legal Intern, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ.

¶ 1. REIBER, C.J. Defendant Jonathan Richards appeals his jury conviction on one count of misdemeanor unlawful trespass under 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a). He argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime, contending that § 3705(a) should have an implied mental state requirement, or knowledge element. Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the probation condition that he not "engage in criminal behavior" because the condition is impermissibly vague. We conclude that the Vermont Legislature intentionally omitted a knowledge element in the misdemeanor unlawful trespass statute, and that the probation condition provides sufficient notice of proscribed conduct. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 2. The following facts were adduced at trial. Defendant and complainant began a relationship in December 2016. Shortly after complainant became pregnant, the couple broke up. After the baby was born, complainant wanted defendant to be a part of the baby's life, and in March 2018, the couple got back together. Defendant stayed at complainant's apartment for about a month as they tried to rekindle their relationship but did not stay there every night.

¶ 3. However, the reconciliation did not last. On April 27, 2018, the couple got into an altercation when complainant arrived home late from an evening out while defendant was watching their baby. Complainant testified that she and defendant began arguing, and defendant told her that he did not want to be in a relationship with her and wanted to leave. Complainant said that she was crying and alleged that defendant "was in my face" and then grabbed her by the throat and squeezed. She testified that after defendant let go, she told him to leave and he said, "make me."

¶ 4. The baby woke up during their altercation and began to cry, and complainant testified that she told defendant not to touch the baby. Complainant said that as she went to get the baby, she got knocked down and defendant kneed her in the face. Defendant picked up the baby and complainant said that she begged him to "just give [her the baby] and leave." Defendant refused and continued to hold the baby until he realized that police officers had arrived at the apartment.

¶ 5. Defendant denied strangling complainant or kneeing her in the face. He testified that after he broke up with complainant, he called a friend to come pick him up. When the baby began to cry, he said that complainant told him not to touch the baby and tried to shove past him, but defendant put his arm across the hallway to block her using a "stiff arm" and picked up the baby. He continued to hold the baby and push complainant away from him because he did not "know when . . . [he would] see [his] daughter" again and wanted to hold her until his friend arrived to pick him up. He gave complainant the baby once he saw that the officers had arrived.

¶ 6. Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, and misdemeanor unlawful trespass. See 13 V.S.A. §§ 1042, 1043(a)(1), 3705(a). The Rutland Criminal Division held a one-day jury trial on September 5, 2019. At the close of evidence, the court reviewed the jury instructions with counsel. Defendant objected to the unlawful trespass instructions, arguing that the court should instruct the jurors that to convict they must conclude defendant knew that he lacked authority or consent to remain in complainant's apartment under State v. Fanger, 164 Vt. 48, 52, 665 A.2d 36, 38 (1995) (holding that knowledge requirement in 13 V.S.A. § 3705(d) established subjective standard and it was "not sufficient for the State to show that defendant should have known he was not licensed or privileged to enter the dwelling").

¶ 7. The court declined to read a knowledge element into the statute and instructed the jury accordingly. It distinguished Fanger, where this Court held that the State must show a defendant subjectively knew that he or she lacked license or privilege to enter a home to be convicted of felony unlawful trespass under 13 V.S.A. § 3705(d). The court reasoned that the statutory language at issue in that case included the word "knowing." See 13 V.S.A. § 3705(d). The court also noted that Fanger explains that § 3705 is based on Model Penal Code § 221.2, which includes a knowledge element for both felony and misdemeanor unlawful trespass. However, the statute includes no knowledge element in § 3705(a) for the misdemeanor; it only includes a knowledge element in § 3705(d) for the felony. The court concluded that the omission of a similar knowledge element in subsection (a) was intentional.

¶ 8. The jury ultimately acquitted defendant of the assault charges but convicted him of unlawful trespass. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the court imposed a suspended sentence of one to three months and placed defendant on probation for one year. The court imposed special conditions and standard conditions, including condition A, which provided that "you [are] not [to] be convicted of another crime or engage in criminal behavior." Defendant objected to the latter part of this condition, arguing that the phrase "engage in criminal behavior" is vague and could subject him to criminal penalties under a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. The court decided to impose the condition, concluding that it was "reasonably necessary to ensure that the offender will lead a law-abiding life" under 28 V.S.A. § 252(a).

¶ 9. On appeal, defendant renews his objections to the jury instructions and probation condition. He argues that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury that the State must show that defendant knew he lacked consent or authority to remain in complainant's apartment. He also argues that the court abused its discretion by imposing the probation condition that prohibits defendant from engaging in criminal behavior. We discuss each issue in turn.

I. Jury Instructions

¶ 10. We first address defendant's challenge to the court's jury instructions. The party who contests a jury instruction bears the burden of showing that the instruction "was both erroneous and prejudicial." State v. Peatman, 2018 VT 28, ¶ 14, 207 Vt. 97, 185 A.3d 1257 (quotation omitted). "When reviewing jury instructions, this Court must read the charge as a whole, rather than piecemeal, and will uphold the instruction where it breathes the true spirit and doctrine of the law and does not mislead the jury." Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the jury instruction reflected the trial court's conclusion that the license element of the misdemeanor unlawful trespass statute, 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a), does not contain a knowledge element. This is a matter of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. State v. Richland, 2015 VT 126, ¶ 6, 200 Vt. 401, 132 A.3d 702.

¶ 11. Defendant challenges the trial court's construction of 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a), arguing that the court should have read a knowledge requirement into the license element. "When interpreting any statute our overriding goal is to effectuate the intent of the legislature." State v. Baron, 2004 VT 20, ¶ 6, 176 Vt. 314, 848 A.2d 275. To give full effect to the Legislature's intent, "we first look at the plain, ordinary meaning of the statutory language." Id. "If the plain language of the statute resolves the conflict without doing violence to the legislative scheme we are bound to follow it." Id. (quotation omitted). But if the plain language of the statute provides "insufficient guidance to ascertain legislative intent, we look beyond the language of a particular section standing alone to the whole statute, the subject matter, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law." State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 175, 807 A.2d 454, 458 (2002).

¶ 12. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the plain language of the statute. When construing the plain language, "we presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly" and that "the Legislature knows how to incorporate a scienter element." Richland, 2015 VT 126, ¶¶ 6, 8 (quotation omitted). The misdemeanor unlawful trespass statute reads in pertinent part:

A person shall be imprisoned for not more than three months or fined not more than $500.00, or both, if, without legal authority or the consent of the person in lawful possession, he or she enters or remains on any land or in any place as to which notice against trespass is given . . . .

13 V.S.A. § 3705(a)(1). The statute provides several options by which notice may be given, including by "actual communication by the person in lawful possession" or "signs or placards so designed and situated as to give reasonable notice." Id. § 3705(a)(1)(A)-(B). The plain language of the statute on its face thus does not contain a knowledge element. See State v. Kerr, 143 Vt. 597, 604-05, 470 A.2d 670, 674 (1983) (declining to read mental state requirement into 13 V.S.A. § 4005, which prohibits carrying weapon while...