State v. Baron, 2004 VT 20 (Vt. 2/27/2004)

• Decision Date: 27 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2003-098, September Term, 2003,2003-098, September Term, 2003
• Citation: 2004 VT 20
• Parties: State of Vermont v. Raymond Baron
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 1

2004 VT 20

State of Vermont v. Raymond Baron

No. 2003-098, September Term, 2003

Supreme Court of Vermont

February 27, 2004

On Appeal from District Court of Vermont, Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit. Edward J. Cashman, J.

Craig S. Nolan, Lamoille County Deputy State's Attorney, Hyde Park, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Frederick L. Woeckener, Hyde Park, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

DOOLEY, J.

¶ 1. The State appeals a Lamoille District Court decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss charges that he violated the domestic assault statute, 13 V.S.A. § 1042. The State argues that the trial court erroneously construed § 1042 to require serious bodily injury in cases of parent-on-child assaults. We reverse.

¶ 2. The trial court dismissed this case pursuant to defendant's V.R.Cr.P. 12(d) motion for lack of a prima facie case. In reviewing a Rule 12(d) motion, we consider whether the evidence, "taken in the light most favorable to the State, excluding modifying evidence, would fairly and reasonably tend to show defendant committed the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Millette, 173 Vt. 596, 596, 795 A.2d 1182, 1183 (2002) (mem.).

¶ 3. In light of this standard, the facts are as follows. On the evening of June 20, 2002, defendant Raymond F. Baron came home to find his sixteen year-old son, J.B., on the internet. Defendant wanted to use the telephone and asked his son to terminate the internet connection. J.B. responded with a few "smart words," and defendant went upstairs, presumably to use the telephone, and found that his son had not disconnected from the internet. Defendant went back down to the basement and asked his son a second time to terminate the internet connection. J.B. again "sassed back to him," and defendant then backed his son into a corner and struck him with the back of his hand. After defendant struck J.B., he walked away stating, "that was just a slap, next time I'll punch you." J.B.'s left eye was swollen, he had scratches on his nose, a scratch on his right eyebrow, and his glasses were bent as a result of the blow.

¶ 4. The following day, the State charged defendant under 13 V.S.A. § 1042, alleging that he had recklessly caused injury to his son. On September 23, 2002, defendant, with counsel, appeared in the Lamoille District Court to enter a guilty plea. Prior to the plea, the court advised that it did not find sufficient probable cause to support a charge under § 1042. Defendant then withdrew his plea and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 12(d).

¶ 5. The court granted defendant's motion, finding that 13 V.S.A. § 1042 must be read in concert-in pari materia- with the civil abuse prevention statute, 15 V.S.A. § 1101, and by reference in § 1101(1)(C), its attendant definitions in the child protection statute, 33 V.S.A. § 4912. See Wood v. Eddy, 2003 VT 67, at 10 (with respect to abuse to children, proper definition of abuse is that in 33 V.S.A. § 4912). The court held that the statutes must be read together because they both involve abuse to "family and household members," terms partly defined in the abuse prevention statutes, 15 V.S.A. § 1101(2). See 13 V.S.A. § 1041 (definition of "family or household members" in abuse prevention statute applies to subchapter containing § 1041). The court reasoned that since the domestic assault statute borrowed one definition from the abuse prevention statute, the legislative intent was that it borrow all definitions. Thus, the court ruled that the definition of "bodily injury" in § 1042 was repealed by implication with respect to an assault on a child and replaced with the abuse prevention definition of "abuse." Because of that ruling, the court concluded that § 1042 requires the State to prove a higher degree of injury for parent-on-child assaults than for assaults involving only adults, and that the State failed to meet that standard. In view of its decision that the proper definition of domestic assault allows a measure of physical parental discipline, the court did not address defendant's additional argument that § 1042 contains a parental corporal punishment defense.

¶ 6. The State appeals the trial court's decision, arguing that the court's construction of the domestic assault statute, 13 V.S.A. § 1042, was erroneous. When interpreting a statute our overriding goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. State v. Dixon, 169 Vt. 15, 17, 725 A.2d 920, 922 (1999) (citations omitted). To effectuate the Legislature's intent we first look at the plain, ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Id. (citations omitted). If the plain language of the statute "resolves the conflict without doing violence to the legislative scheme" we are bound to follow it. Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 49, 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986); see also In re Weeks, 167 Vt. 551, 554, 712 A.2d 907, 909 (1998). We conclude that the plain language of § 1042 does not require a higher degree of harm when the offense involves parent-on-child assaults.

¶ 7. Section 1042 is a criminal domestic assault statute found in chapter 19 of Title 13. The statute reads,

Any person who attempts to cause or willfully or recklessly causes bodily injury to a family or household member, or wilfully causes a family or household member to fear imminent serious bodily injury shall be imprisoned not more than one year or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both.

13 V.S.A. § 1042 (emphasis added). Section 1021, also in chapter 19, defines "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" as follows:

For the purpose of this chapter:

(1) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition;

(2) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or substantial impairment of health, or substantial disfigurement; . . . .

13 V.S.A. § 1021 (emphasis added).

¶ 8. In contrast, the standard in 33 V.S.A. § 4912, incorporated by reference in 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(C), see Wood, 2003 VT 67, at 10, is that of an abused child whose "physical health, psychological growth and development or welfare is harmed or is at substantial risk of harm" by the acts of the parent. Harm can occur by physical injury, which means "death, or permanent or temporary disfigurement or impairment by any bodily organ or function by other than accidental means." 33 V.S.A. § 4912(6). This standard is applicable only to abuse on children. The abuse prevention act generally defines abuse as "attempting to cause or causing physical harm." 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A).

¶ 9. Unlike the abuse protection act, neither § 1042 nor § 1021 distinguishes between parent-on-child assaults and other assaults on family or household members. When a statute internally defines a term, we must use that definition, not a definition contained in a different statute in a different chapter. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) ("When a statute includes an explicit definition we must follow that definition"); Dynamic Sports Fitness Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Cmty. YMCA of E. Delaware County, 768 A.2d 375, 381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) ("[I]f a statute provides an internal definition for a term, then the statute must be construed according to that definition, not by a prior definition arising from common law or a prior statute."). It is presumed that "[a] definition which declares what a term means excludes any meaning that is not stated." 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 47.07, at 152 (5th ed. 1992); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (quoting same). Thus, in construing § 1042 we are bound to use the definitions in § 1021 that the Legislature stated applies. If the Legislature had intended different family or household relationships to be treated differently under § 1042, it would have stated so. See State v. DeRosa, 161 Vt. 78, 80, 633 A.2d 277, 278 (1993) ("[W]e presume the Legislature used the language [in the statute] advisedly,"); State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 213, 591 A.2d 53, 56 (1991) (same).

¶ 10. We cannot conclude that the plain meaning of § 1042 was changed by the theory of implied repeal adopted by the district court. The district court held that the definitions of "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" were impliedly repealed with respect to child victims and replaced by the definition of "abuse" contained in the abuse prevention act, 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(C). When interpreting statutes we presume that there has been no repeal by implication. Vt. Tenants, Inc. v. Vt. Hous. Fin. Agency, 170 Vt. 77, 83, 742 A.2d 745, 749 (1999). We will conclude that a statute, or a provision in a statute, has been repealed by implication by another act only if "(a) the acts are so far repugnant that they cannot stand together, or (b) are not so repugnant, but the later act covers the whole subject of the former and plainly shows it was intended as a substitute therefore." Id.

¶ 11. The most obvious reason that the abuse prevention act did not impliedly repeal the bodily injury definitions for the domestic assault statute is that the domestic assault statute is later in time. The domestic assault statute was enacted in 1993. See 1993, No. 95, § 2. The abuse prevention statute was enacted in 1979, see 1979, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; the current definition of abuse, with the separate definition for child victims was enacted in 1981, see 1981, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 2. An earlier statute cannot repeal a later statute by implication. See State v. Foley, 140 Vt. 643, 645, 443 A.2d 452, 453 (1982) (question is whether "subsequent enactment impliedly repeals a statute").

¶ 12. Even if the timing of the enactments supported repeal by implication, we could not conclude that the elements are present here. These statutes are not repugnant...