State v. Richardson
| Citation | 963 So.2d 267 |
| Decision Date | 28 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D06-3590.,2D06-3590. |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ronald Eugene RICHARDSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
The State appeals an order granting Ronald Eugene Richardson's motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The order set aside Mr. Richardson's judgment and sentence for unlawful sexual activity with a minor and required a new trial based upon Mr. Richardson's allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Frye1 hearing to challenge the admissibility of certain statistical DNA evidence.2 Because there was unrebutted evidence establishing that counsel's decision to permit the admissibility of the evidence was a strategic one, and because we conclude that counsel's strategy was clearly reasonable under the circumstances, we reverse.
In 2001, Mr. Richardson was charged with unlawful sexual activity with a minor pursuant to section 794.05(1), Florida Statutes (2000), and contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child pursuant to section 827.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), for events occurring in April 2000. The State's evidence supporting the charges included DNA samples obtained from semen found on vaginal swabs from the victim. At Mr. Richardson's trial, the State presented the testimony of a biostatistician from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The biostatistician testified that in April 2001, she used an FDLE database to perform a statistical analysis of the DNA sample recovered from the victim and a DNA sample obtained from Mr. Richardson. Based upon that analysis she opined that only 1 in 2.56 quintillion3 humans of Caucasian descent, randomly selected, would be predicted to have DNA that matched the sample taken from the victim at all thirteen of the locations analyzed. Mr. Richardson's sample matched at all 13 locations.
Prior to trial, Mr. Richardson's counsel was informed of the substance of the biostatistician's testimony. As a result, trial counsel contacted an expert in molecular genetics to review the FDLE records to assist in determining an appropriate defense to this evidence. At some point in this process, counsel was informed that the database used by the FDLE had structural flaws that called into question the statistics derived from the use of that particular database. Indeed, the FDLE discontinued use of this database shortly after the statistical analysis was performed in Mr. Richardson's case. See, e.g., Bevil v. State, 875 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ().
At the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Richardson's motion for postconviction relief, the molecular geneticist and trial counsel testified that they had conferred with one another concerning the DNA evidence and the State's statistical analysis prior to trial in an effort to develop a defense to the evidence. According to trial counsel, he specifically asked the expert whether there would be a material change in the statistical evidence if the DNA evidence was analyzed with an appropriate and available database. The geneticist, although not an expert in statistical analysis, offered his opinion that any change in the statistical evidence would not materially alter the "astronomical" statistical probability that the DNA evidence taken from the victim matched Mr. Richardson's DNA. Notably, Mr. Richardson offered no evidence at the postconviction hearing to dispute the conclusion of the geneticist or trial counsel in this regard.
Because the FDLE could easily perform an appropriate analysis with the current and unflawed databases available prior to Mr. Richardson's trial, and because that analysis would not yield a significantly different probability, counsel reasoned that any attempt to challenge the statistical evidence prior to trial might only result in the State obtaining an appropriate analysis and thus strengthening its case against Mr. Richardson. As a result, counsel decided not to challenge the admissibility of the statistical evidence by objecting to the use of the flawed database. Instead, counsel performed a cross-examination of the State's expert at trial that revealed to the jury the use of the flawed database despite the availability of other appropriate databases. He then argued in closing argument that the State's use of a flawed database, among other things, provided a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Richardson's guilt.
Counsel was not entirely unsuccessful in his defense of Mr. Richardson. The jury convicted Mr. Richardson of unlawful sexual activity with a minor but acquitted him of contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor. The trial court adjudicated Mr. Richardson guilty of unlawful sexual activity with a minor and sentenced him to ten years in prison.
In his motion for postconviction relief and at the evidentiary hearing on that motion, Mr. Richardson argued that counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to request a Frye hearing regarding the statistical evidence and the use of the flawed database. Mr. Richardson posited that such a hearing would have resulted in the exclusion of any statistical analysis and his probable acquittal on the charge of unlawful sexual activity with a minor. We disagree.
A party seeking postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) counsel's specific acts or omissions were "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and (2) prejudice by "showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Armstrong v. State, 862 So.2d 705, 711 (Fla. 2003). "The...
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