State v. Riddell
| Decision Date | 19 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40026,40026 |
| Citation | 449 P.2d 97,75 Wn.2d 85 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Robert J. RIDDELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Callahan & Minium, Jess E. Minium, Jr., Kelso, for appellant.
Henry R. Dunn, Pros. Atty., Kelso, for respondent.
Found guilty by jury verdict of second degree assault, Robert Riddell was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years. The October 27, 1966 judgment and sentence entered on that verdict suspended the imposition of sentence and granted the defendant probation upon terms including, but not limited to the following That the defendant is placed under the active supervision of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles of the State of Washington for a period of three (3) years;
That the defendant shall reimburse the victim, William Lewis, for all medical expenses not paid by insurance, and shall reimburse William Lewis for any loss of wages suffered on account of the injuries sustained by the act of the defendant. Such reimbursement to be made within a reasonable time after the defendant is gainfully employed and upon the presentation of the Affidavit of William Lewis as to the amounts of reimbursement;
That the defendant shall reimburse Cowlitz County for for (sic) the cost of his Court Appointed Counsel, prior to his release from his probationary status;
Said sentence is further suspended on the condition that the defendant shall not violate any Laws of the State of Washington or any other law-making body in any manner whatsoever.
It was also provided that the court would retain jurisdiction over the defendant.
Approximately one year later, October 24, 1967, the Cowlitz County prosecutor asserted that Mr. Riddell had violated the terms of his probation and asked the trial court to order a bench warrant for his arrest. The warrant issued and Mr. Riddell was taken into custody.
On November 17, 1967 a court hearing was held on the prosecutor's motion to revoke the order of probation. Mr. Riddell's trial counsel represented him at that hearing. Testimony was taken of several state witnesses and of defendant Riddell and his wife. The court thereafter revoked the probationary status of Mr. Riddell and ordered the imposition and execution of sentence against him. He appeals.
During the course of the hearing much hearsay testimony was introduced by the state and admitted into evidence over defendant's objection. For that reason Mr. Riddell argues that he was denied a fair hearing and that he was therefore deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
We earlier said, and we now reiterate, that both the granting and the revocation of probationary status is a determination that rests almost exclusively with the trial judge. State v. Giraud, 68 Wash.2d 176, 412 P.2d 104 (1966). And see RCW 9.92.060, RCW 9.95.200 and RCW 9.95.220, which constitute the express legislative authority for both the granting and revocation of probation by the superior court judges of this state.
While it is true that the fundamental elements of fair play must be taken into account at the time of a revocation hearing, nonetheless
whether probation shall be granted rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. It comes as an act of judicial grace or lenience motivated by many judicial hopes, among which are that the offender will mend his ways, make restitution and avoid not only repetition of his offense but the appearance thereof. (Quoting from State ex rel. Woodhouse v. Dore, 69 Wash.2d 64, 69--70, 416 P.2d 670, 674 (1966).)
Nor is the hearing on a motion to revoke probation a criminal proceeding completely within the ambit of the Bill of Rights and the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution or of art. 1, § 22 of our state constitution. Woodhouse, supra; State v. Shannon, 60 Wash.2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962). The constitutional due process rights of a probationer are not the same as those of one accused of a crime, but who has neither pleaded guilty nor been tried. Because of his conviction, and the order of the court under which he is at liberty, the probationer's rights are something less. At a revocation hearing he is not entitled to a jury trial; the accused at his criminal trial is entitled to one. An accused is entitled to face his accusers (Const. art. 1, § 22); a probationer is not automatically entitled to such right. It is...
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State v. Townsend
...496, 501, 120 P.3d 559 (2005). During proceedings short of a criminal trial,4 the State often relies on hearsay. See State v. Riddell , 75 Wash.2d 85, 87, 449 P.2d 97 (1968). Unlike a hearing right itself, the right to confront a hearsay declarant at a hearing is a limited privilege and may......
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Blondheim v. State
...can be revoked in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Kuhn, 81 Wash.2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972); State v. Riddell, 75 Wash.2d 85, 449 P.2d 97 (1968); State v. Giraud, 68 Wash.2d 176, 412 P.2d 104 (1966). That being the case, petitioner stands to lose her liberty if the Juveni......
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Welfare of Ames, In re
...the decision to revoke a deferred sentence and probationary status rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Riddell, 75 Wash.2d 85, 449 P.2d 97 (1968); State v. Giraud, 68 Wash.2d 176, 412 P.2d 104 (1966). At the probation revocation hearing, the court need not be furnishe......
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State v. Haverty
...question he now asserts; and the order entered on the application would have been subject to review. See State v. Riddell, 75 Wash.2d 85, 449 P.2d 97 (1968) And Bailey v. Gallagher, 75 Wash.2d 260, 450 P.2d 802 (1969). Since there is no trial court action in the instant case which raises th......