State v. Riendeau
Decision Date | 20 May 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 2009–015.,2009–015. |
Citation | 999 A.2d 329,160 N.H. 288 |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Randy RIENDEAU. |
Michael A. Delaney, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief, and Lisa L. Wolford, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Randy Riendeau, was found guilty of one count of driving after certification as an habitual offender and one count of driving while intoxicated (DWI), following a jury trial in Superior Court (Arnold, J.). See RSA 262:23 (Supp.2009) ; RSA 265–A:2, I (Supp.2009). He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine and in its instructions to the jury. We affirm.
The record evidences the following facts. On August 31, 2007, the defendant accompanied his fiancée, Robyn Forward, to the Twin State Speedway in Claremont. Forward drove their vehicle, a rented 2007 Mustang, because she was a licensed driver, whereas the defendant was an habitual offender whose license had been revoked. Forward parked the Mustang in the parking lot, but subsequently permitted the defendant to drive it in a "spectator race," a race open to non-professional drivers. The defendant drove the car to the pit and onto the track, where he participated in the race. After the race, the defendant returned to the pit area, where he created a "smoke show" by spinning the tires to produce a smoke cloud. Because smoke shows are not permitted at the racetrack, the defendant's actions drew the attention of the racetrack staff and of a police officer patrolling the grounds.
Pit director Gary Baker approached the Mustang during the smoke show and asked the defendant to turn off the car and give him the keys. Baker noted that the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, that he appeared to slur his speech, and that he smelled of alcohol. When the defendant refused to get out of the car, Baker left to find a police officer. As Officer Shawn Hallock responded to the smoke show on foot, the defendant began to drive away from the pit and into the parking lot.
Officer Hallock pursued the car on foot for a short distance before radioing Captain Colby Casey for assistance. Baker and Hallock saw the car proceed through the parking lot area before they lost sight of it. Forward and the defendant then left the racetrack as they had come: Forward was driving and the defendant was her passenger.
Captain Casey, driving a cruiser, caught up with the Mustang and stopped it about a quarter mile from the racetrack. He noted that the passenger, the defendant, appeared intoxicated and smelled of alcohol. He arrested the defendant based upon the information provided by Officer Hallock and information regarding the defendant's habitual offender status provided by dispatch.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude all testimony of any witness's subjective belief as to whether the Speedway's parking lot constitutes a "way." The defendant objected, arguing that because the State must prove every element of the offense, it must establish the mens rea of "knowingly" as to the "way" element of the habitual offender charge. The trial court granted the State's motion in limine, concluding that the mens rea of "knowingly" applied only to the defendant's status as an habitual offender.
At trial, the defense stipulated to the defendant's status as an habitual offender, and to his knowledge of that status. The defense argued that the defendant had limited his driving to a staging area of the Speedway track, and, therefore, the surface he drove on was not a "way." The State contended that the defendant had driven in the Speedway parking lot, which falls within the legal definition of a "way." The court's jury instructions, consistent with its ruling on the motion in limine, stated in pertinent part:
We note that, although the defendant was charged with both driving after certification as an habitual offender and driving while intoxicated, the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine addressed "the mens rea argument as it relate[d] to the habitual offender charge only." The parties' briefs also focus exclusively on this issue. We therefore deem waived any argument regarding the defendant's mental state involved in the DWI charge. See, e.g., State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49, 816 A.2d 1014 (2003) ( ).
The defendant argues that the trial court erred, both in its ruling on the motion in limine and in its jury instructions, when it interpreted the habitual offender statute as not requiring the State to prove the defendant knew that the area he was driving on was a "way." He asserts that the State must prove the mens rea of "knowingly" as to the "way" element of the habitual offender charge for two reasons: first, because the "way" element is a material element of the offense to which a mens rea must apply; and second, because the policies and purposes underlying the habitual offender statute justify applying the mental state of "knowingly" to the "way" element.
The State responds that the only element of the habitual offender charge to which the mens rea of "knowingly" has been applied by this court is the defendant's status as an habitual offender. It argues that to apply the mens rea requirement to the "way" element would contravene the purpose of the statute because it would place the risk posed by habitual offenders upon those who travel the ways of the state.
We consider issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. McMillan, 158 N.H. 753, 757, 973 A.2d 287 (2009). We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute as a whole. Id. Id. (citations omitted).
RSA 262:23, I (Supp.2009) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to drive any motor vehicle on the ways of this state while an order of the director or the court prohibiting such driving remains in effect." The statute thus does not specify any mens rea requirement. "However, the failure of the legislature to provide for the specific culpable mental state required for a crime does not mean that the statute is necessarily unenforceable." State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457, 567 A.2d 986 (1989). To support conviction for a felony, New Hampshire law requires proof that a person acted either "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense." RSA 626:2, I (2007). However, "[n]either knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense ... is an element of such offense, unless the law so provides." RSA 626:2, V. "When the culpable state of mind has been omitted from a statute, the State must prove the existence of the mental state which is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question." Stratton, 132 N.H. at 457, 567 A.2d 986.
We first determine whether the "way" element is a "material element" of the habitual offender charge. See, e.g., State v. Demmons, 137 N.H. 716, 719, 634 A.2d 998 (1993) (). RSA 625:11, IV (2007) defines "material element of an offense" as "an...
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Farrelly v. City of Concord
...it is well established that ignorance of the law provides no excuse for those accused of violating it. See, e.g., State v. Riendeau, 160 N.H. 288, 297, 999 A.2d 329 (2010) (citing State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457, 567 A.2d 986 (1989)). It would seem ironic, at best, for ignorance of the......