State v. Rife
| Citation | 943 P.2d 266,133 Wn.2d 140 |
| Decision Date | 09 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 64305-9,64305-9 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Travis Lee RIFE, Petitioner. |
Michael L. Mittlestat, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Brian M. McDonald, Deputy, Seattle, for Respondent.
Petitioner Travis Lee Rife seeks review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division I, which affirmed his conviction in the King County Superior Court for possession of heroin in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50.401(d). We granted review. We reverse.
The question presented in this case is whether a pedestrian who has been stopped by a police officer for a routine traffic infraction ("jaywalking") has been improperly seized when the police officer detains the pedestrian and conducts a warrant check and verification as a matter of course without reasonable suspicion the pedestrian has committed any other offense. 1
On February 19, 1994 in Seattle at approximately 10:42 p.m. Officer Jason Chittenden of the Seattle Police Department observed Petitioner Travis Lee Rife, a pedestrian, alight from a public transit bus and cross Aurora Avenue The officer testified the Seattle Police Department does not have a policy requiring officers to run a check for outstanding warrants for pedestrians or drivers stopped for traffic violations, but that he normally runs a check anyway. Petitioner was cooperative at all times after he was stopped by the officer.
near 85th Street 2 outside a crosswalk and against a traffic signal. 3 The officer stopped Petitioner, informed him he was stopping him for jaywalking, obtained identification from him, and made a radio check for outstanding warrants. The officer did not present a notice of infraction to Petitioner for his signature. Nor was any notice even issued
The warrant check lasted five to ten minutes, with verification taking an additional five to ten minutes. Petitioner was not free to leave during this period. The officer did not cite him for the traffic infraction ("jaywalking") for which he was stopped, but formally arrested him for two outstanding warrants determined in the warrant check.
At the police station, in a search incident to Petitioner's arrest under the outstanding warrants, Officer Chittenden discovered a bindle of heroin in Petitioner's pocket. Based upon this discovery, petitioner was charged by the King County Prosecuting Attorney in the King County Superior Court on February 24, 1994 with violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the Information reading:
That the defendant TRAVIS LEE RIFE in King County, Washington on or about February 19, 1994, unlawfully and feloniously did possess heroin, a controlled substance and narcotic drug Contrary to RCW 69.50.401(d), and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington. 4
At the CrR 3.6 hearing Petitioner moved to suppress the heroin, claiming the original pedestrian traffic stop was pretextual. His motion was denied. The case proceeded to trial upon stipulated facts. He was found "guilty" as charged. The trial court, the Honorable Janice Niemi, Judge Pro Tempore, concluded that because Petitioner committed the infraction of jaywalking, the officer had sufficient cause to stop him and request identification. 5 The court also concluded the warrant check was not intrusive; the officer properly arrested Petitioner under the outstanding warrants; the heroin was found during a search incident to arrest; Petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated by the officer; and the heroin found during the search was admissible at trial. The motion for suppression of evidence was denied. 6
Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing his detention following his stop for a pedestrian traffic infraction to allow the officer to run a warrant check constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution. On April 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's argument and affirmed the Petitioner filed in this Court a motion for discretionary review which was granted on November 13, 1996.
trial court. The court held "an officer may detain a person stopped for a routine traffic infraction for a reasonable period of time, in order to check for outstanding warrants, and upon receiving a positive response, for the additional time it takes to verify the warrants." 7 The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on May 21, 1996
Under Washington statutes, a pedestrian offense is "designated as a traffic infraction and may not be classified as a criminal offense" unless the violation falls into one of the exceptions provided by the statute. 8 The exceptions are not relevant to this case.
The duty to obey a police officer and the authority of the officer are expressed in RCW 46.61.021, which states:
(1) Any person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop.
(2) Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction.
(3) Any person requested to identify himself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself, give his current address, and sign an acknowledgment of receipt of the notice of infraction. 9
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Petitioner argues detention of a person stopped for a pedestrian traffic infraction for an additional purpose and to run a warrant check without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He further argues the warrant check expands the detention in scope and duration from what is necessary to address the traffic infraction and that it violates article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
Because of the decision we reach, we do not address the constitutional issues. Nor do we believe the circumstances of this case rise to constitutional magnitude.
STATE V. ROTHENBERGER
The parties were specifically requested by this court to address the question whether State v. Rothenberger 11 provides authority relevant to this case. In Rothenberger the defendants appealed their King County conviction for burglary. This Court affirmed the conviction.
While driving through the State of Oregon, Ronald Dean Rothenberger and Samuel Eugene Pernar were stopped for a "routine check to determine if the driver was properly licensed to drive a motor vehicle...." 12 The driver did not have a driver's license, and was issued a Respondent State argues in this case that, regardless of the validity of the seizure, the heroin should be admitted in evidence because it was found after the defendant was lawfully arrested on outstanding warrants. Respondent states that, based on the "independent source" test announced in State v. Warner, "if there are intervening independent factors in the chain of causation from the original illegality to the evidence in question, the evidence will not be suppressed," 15 the intervening independent factor in this case being the outstanding warrants found through the warrant check.
citation for driving without a license. However, the passenger and owner of the automobile, upon showing his driver's license and switching positions in the vehicle, was allowed to drive away. Shortly after they drove away, the police officer determined from the name on the driver's license that the driver was wanted on felony charges. The officer radioed ahead. A roadblock was set up and the driver was arrested. The automobile was then searched and items relating to a burglary in Seattle were found. The King County charge followed. Defendants claimed the driver's identity would not have been discovered if they had not been unlawfully stopped by the Oregon police. This Court concluded that even if the stop were unlawful, the officer "having discovered from an independent source that Rothenberger was wanted on a felony charge, not only had the right but the duty to pursue Rothenberger and arrest him, if that was practicable, or to get that information to officers who could intercept him." 13 The court did not suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the automobile. 14
Citing United States v. Leon, Respondent states "[t]he primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, not to provide a defendant with a sporting In State v. Boland 19 this Court stated the "primary objectives underlying the exclusionary rule" are:
chance to dispose of incriminating evidence." 16 Respondent argues the inquiry should be directed to the conduct of the police officer and not to what the defendant may have done with the illegal substance if there had not been an improper stop or arrest. 17 Respondent claims the officer was "acting in good faith." 18 But this Court has not adopted that formulation of the exclusionary rule.
[F]irst, and most important, to protect privacy interests of individuals against unreasonable governmental intrusions; second, to deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; and...
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