State v. Riggins

• Decision Date: 06 March 1980
• Citation: 426 N.E.2d 504,68 Ohio App.2d 1
• Parties: , 22 O.O.3d 1 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. RIGGINS, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 1

68 Ohio App.2d 1

426 N.E.2d 504, 22 O.O.3d 1

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. RIGGINS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

March 6, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

1. By entering a plea of guilty a criminal defendant does not waive his objections to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.

2. A minor criminal defendant, by entering a plea of guilty, does not waive his objections to constitutional deficiencies in the hearing wherein the Juvenile Court relinquished jurisdiction to the Court of Common Pleas.

3. Where the state threatens harsh treatment or promises lenient treatment of a third person in order to persuade a defendant to plead guilty, the circumstances surrounding the plea will be closely scrutinized to determine the voluntariness of the plea.

4. A guilty plea will not be considered to be involuntary merely because it was given in response to a threat of harsh treatment or promise of lenient treatment of a third person; for a guilty plea to be involuntary, it must appear that the defendant's will was so overborne by the promise or threat that he or she was unable to rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., for appellee.

David Lawrence, Cleveland, for appellant.

JACKSON, Presiding Judge.

On February 5, 1976, defendant-appellant, Reginald Riggins, was indicted on one count of aggravated murder with specifications, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of possessing criminal tools. On March 1, 1976, appellant pled guilty to aggravated murder without specifications. The prosecution thereupon dismissed the remaining charges against appellant. ¹ Appellant was immediately sentenced to life in prison.

On October 8, 1978, appellant filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. This court granted appellant's motion on October 24, 1978. Appellant assigns two errors for review by this court.

Assignment of Error Number One:

"Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas did not have jurisdiction over the sixteen year old defendant."

Appellant asserts that the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County was without jurisdiction to try him as an adult because the Juvenile Court failed to properly relinquish jurisdiction over him. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time that the crime was committed. Under R.C. 2151.23 ² and 2151.25, ³ the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction over him until such time as it relinquished jurisdiction. The Juvenile Court, however, may relinquish jurisdiction over a juvenile to the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 2151.26, which provides:

"(A) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is delinquent by reason of having committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the court at a hearing may transfer the case for criminal prosecution to the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense, after making the following determinations:

"(1) The child was fifteen or more years of age at the time of the conduct charged;

"(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged;

"(3) After an investigation including a mental and physical examination of such child made by the Ohio youth commission, a public or private agency, or a person qualified to make such examination, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:

"(a) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children;

"(b) The safety of the community may require that he be placed under legal restraint, including, if necessary, for the period extending beyond his majority.

"(B) The child may waive such examination if the court finds such waiver competently and intelligently made. Refusal to submit to a mental and physical examination by the child constitutes waiver thereof.

"(C) Notice in writing of the time, place and purpose of such hearing shall be given to his parents, guardian, or other custodian and his counsel at least three days prior to the hearing.

"(D) No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age, shall be prosecuted as an adult for an offense committed prior to becoming eighteen unless the child has been transferred as provided in this section. Any prosecution that is had in a criminal court on the mistaken belief that the child was over eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense shall be deemed a nullity and the child shall not be considered to have been in jeopardy on the offense.

"(E) Upon such transfer the juvenile court shall state the reasons therefor and order such child to enter into a recognizance with good and sufficient surety for his appearance before the appropriate court for such disposition as such court is authorized to make for a like act committed by an adult. Such transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint." (Emphasis added.)

R.C. 2151.26(D) expressly provides that "(n)o child * * * shall be prosecuted as an adult * * * unless the child has been transferred as provided in this section." Failure to comply with the provisions of R.C. 2151.26, therefore, deprives the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant.

The state asserts that appellant waived any objections he might have had to the proceedings before the Juvenile Court by pleading guilty; specifically, the state claims that appellant waived his right to confrontation of witnesses, citing State v. Buchanan (1974), 43 Ohio App.2d 93, 334 N.E.2d 503. The first paragraph of the syllabus of that opinion states as follows:

"A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed certain constitutional rights which he may invoke or choose to waive and which are contained in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. These rights include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront witnesses against him, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. An accused's constitutional rights apply whether he is tried or enters a plea of guilty. When a defendant withdraws a plea of not guilty and/or enters a plea of guilty he waives the foregoing constitutional rights." See, also, id., at page 96, 334 N.E.2d 503.

Some errors are, however, not waived by a plea of guilty. Among these are errors which deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. This has been an established principle of Ohio criminal law since at least 1875.

"We suppose, notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the defendant may object to the jurisdiction of the court, or the grand jury, over the subject-matter, or that no offense was charged against him; but not for any defect of form or manner of stating the facts, if there was a substantial charge of an offense." Carper v. State (1875), 27 Ohio St. 572, 575.

The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that a plea of guilty does not preclude a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. State v. Wilson (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 388 N.E.2d 745, appeal dismissed (1979), 444 U.S. 804, 100 S.Ct. 25, 62 L.Ed.2d 17. Other Ohio courts have permitted defendants who have pled guilty to appeal their convictions because the offense was committed before the effective date of the statute, State v. Flynt (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 315, 338 N.E.2d 554, because the statute of limitations had run, Akron v. Akins (1968), 15 Ohio App.2d 168, 239 N.E.2d 430, and because the arresting officer had failed to file a proper affidavit, In re Van Hoose (1951), Ohio App., 103 N.E.2d 842, 61 Ohio Law Abst. 256 (writ of habeas corpus allowed). In each of the latter three cases the respective Court of Appeals held that the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to accept the defendant's guilty plea.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that:

" * * * a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established." (Emphasis in original.) Menna v. New York (1975), 423 U.S. 61, fn. 2, at pages 62-63, 96 S.Ct. 241, fn. 2, at page 242, 46 L.Ed.2d 195.

In Menna, the Supreme Court held that the defendant did not, by pleading guilty, waive a double jeopardy claim:

"We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute." Id., fn. 2, at page 63, 96 S.Ct. fn. 2, at page 242.

The claimed violation in the present case does not bear on the issue of factual guilt; rather, the violation goes to the power of the Court of Common Pleas to try appellant as an adult. Defects in the proceedings through which the Juvenile Court relinquished jurisdiction may affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas and may be asserted on appeal, even if no objection to the jurisdiction of the court was raised below. ⁴

The Supreme Court has further held that where a Juvenile Court is accorded original and exclusive jurisdiction over a defendant-minor, said minor is entitled to a hearing prior to relinquishment of jurisdiction to a criminal court. In Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, at page 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, at page 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, the court stated:

"It is clear beyond dispute that the...