State v. Riggins
| Decision Date | 16 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 987 S.W.2d 457 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James O. RIGGINS, Appellant. 54924. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Daniel John Ross, Kansas City, for appellant.
John Munson Morris, Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before Presiding Judge ALBERT A. RIEDERER, Judge HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN and Judge LAURA DENVIR STITH.
Defendant-Appellant James Riggins appeals his conviction of second-degree murder in violation of Section 565.021.1, 1 for which he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Defendant claims the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion for mistrial based on four unsolicited comments made by witnesses which, he alleges, made improper references to other uncharged crimes, and (2) in refusing to admit hearsay testimony which, he argues, was material to his defense that the victim was seen after the date of her alleged death.
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial because the answers alluding to other crimes were voluntary, isolated, and vague and because the court avoided undue prejudice by sustaining objections to the answers and immediately instructing the jury to disregard the witnesses' comments. We further find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence that a third party told the witness he had talked with the victim after the date she allegedly died because it was hearsay and no hearsay exception applied, and because defendant could have called the alleged declarant to testify about the statement, but failed to do so. The judgment is affirmed.
The sufficiency of the evidence of second-degree murder is not challenged. In March 1996, the Kansas City Police Department received information through the TIPS hotline that the body of Jackie Boydston, who had been missing for approximately one year, was located in a well at 14611 Prospect. The tip also mentioned that the victim may have been strangled and identified the defendant as a suspect.
The Kansas City Homicide Unit followed up on this information and on March 27, 1996, they found a body wrapped in plastic covers and a comforter located in a well on the property at 14611 Prospect. The body was transported to the Jackson County Medical Examiner's Office. Fingerprints taken from the hands of the corpse were identified to be those of Jackie Keefe Boydston. The autopsy report concluded that the cause of death was undetermined violence, as the decomposition of the body masked the exact process by which the violence occurred. Additional information obtained through the TIPS hotline and subsequent investigations led the police to charge defendant with the murder of Jackie Boydston.
Defendant was tried for second-degree murder before a jury on June 9, 1997. At trial, the State produced witnesses who testified that defendant was involved with Ms. Boydston off and on during 1994 and 1995, and that she visited defendant at his residence at 14611 Prospect during that time. Defendant's old roommate, Shannon LeHotta, testified that in May 1995, defendant was robbed at gun-point by three individuals who entered their residence. Mr. LeHotta also testified that defendant showed him a body wrapped up in a quilt and told him it was Ms. Boydston's body because she was the person who set them up to be robbed. Mr. LeHotta further testified that in June 1995 defendant told him Ms. Boydston admitted she set them up to be robbed before he choked her to death and dumped her body in the well at his house.
Two other witnesses, Lorna Henderson, defendant's old girlfriend, and Mark Edwards, another old roommate, also testified for the State. Both witnesses testified that defendant admitted to them that he strangled Ms. Boydston to death, and Mr. Edwards testified defendant told him he threw the victim's body into the well behind his residence after killing her. At the close of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder. After finding defendant to be a prior and persistent offender, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
We review the trial court's determination for prejudicial error, and will reverse only if we find an error, which was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Mo. banc 1998). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. We will reverse the admission of evidence only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Id.,citing, State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 178 (Mo. banc 1997).
Defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after several comments referring to other uncharged crimes were made at trial. Defendant asserts the following testimony amounts to evidence of other uncharged crimes: (1) Shannon LeHotta's statement that he met defendant while they were both in prison, (2) Shannon LeHotta's statement that defendant had given the victim a shot prior to her strangulation, (3) Lorna Henderson's statement that the victim had shorted defendant in a "deal," and (4) Detective Robert Delameter's statement that he interviewed defendant while he was in jail on another charge. Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial based on the above evidence of uncharged crimes resulted in "prejudicial injustice" because it made the jury more likely to convict him based on reputation rather than on the evidence presented of the crime charged.
Criminal defendants have a right to be tried only for the offense for which they are charged. State v. Hornbuckle, 769 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. banc 1989). If evidence is introduced showing that the defendant has committed, been accused of, been convicted of, or been definitely associated with another crime or crimes, a defendant's rights may have been violated and a new trial may be required. 2 Id. A mistrial is a drastic remedy, however, which should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances. State v. Johnson, 901 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo. banc 1995). Because the trial court is in a better position to observe the evidence and its impact, the granting of a mistrial largely rests within its sound discretion. Therefore, on appeal, we look only to determine whether the evidence of other crimes was so prejudicial that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. Id.
In analyzing the prejudicial effect of an uninvited reference to other crimes evidence, Missouri courts examine the following five factors:
1) Whether the statement was, in fact, voluntary and unresponsive [to the prosecutor's questioning if the prosecutor asked the question] ... or whether the prosecutor "deliberately attempted to elicit" the comments;
2) Whether the statement was singular and isolated, and whether it was emphasized or magnified by the prosecution;
3) Whether the remarks were vague and indefinite, or whether they made specific reference to crimes committed by the accused;
4) Whether the court promptly sustained defense counsel's objection to the statement, ... and instructed the jury to disregard the volunteered statement; and
5) Whether in view of the other evidence presented and the strength of the state's case, it appeared that the comment, "played a decisive role in the determination of guilt."
State v. Knowles, 946 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo.App.1997); State v. Silas, 885 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Mo.App.1994).
A. Statement Witness Knew Defendant "From The Penitentiary"
During the State's direct examination of witness Shannon LeHotta, the prosecutor asked him the following:
Q. And while you were here in Kansas City, did you know the defendant in this case, James Riggins?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And how did you know him?
A. I knew him from the penitentiary.
Q. Well let me ask you this: You met him in the past?
(emphasis added). At trial, defense counsel requested a mistrial based on the above reference to the penitentiary, but the trial court denied counsel's request. The court did, however, specifically strike the comment and instruct the jury to disregard it. Defendant asserts that this instruction could not cure the prejudice resulting from the comment that the witness knew defendant "from the penitentiary," and that a mistrial was required.
Application of the five-factor test set out above leads us to conclude to the contrary. First, there is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor intended to elicit this reference to defendant's previous incarceration. To the contrary, as the prosecutor noted to the court, the prosecutor had twice told the witness not to mention the fact that defendant had been in the penitentiary. Defense counsel affirmed that he had actually heard the prosecutor admonish the witness not to mention defendant's imprisonment. The witness' response was completely voluntary and unsolicited.
Second, the statement was singular and isolated. Mr. LeHotta was the only witness to voluntarily make reference to defendant being in the penitentiary. After Mr. LeHotta's response, the prosecutor made no further reference to the possibility that defendant had previously been incarcerated and did not magnify the comment in any way. In fact, after Mr. LeHotta made the comment, the prosecutor attempted to cut the witness off and lead him in another direction. The only other references to the comment were the court's instruction to the jury that the answer was stricken and that they were to disregard it.
Third, the witness' remarks about knowing defendant "from the penitentiary" were vague and indefinite as they did not show what crime defendant had been accused of, or that he was convicted of any other crime. When comments do not make specific reference to other crimes...
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