State v. Riggs
| Decision Date | 15 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | CR-96-0342-PR,Nos. CR-96-0351-P,s. CR-96-0351-P |
| Citation | 942 P.2d 1159,189 Ariz. 327 |
| Parties | , 247 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Donald Martin RIGGS, Appellant. STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Darren Allen TAGGART, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
In State v. Taggart, 186 Ariz. 569, 925 P.2d 710 (App.1996), a panel of Division One of the Court of Appeals held, in an opinion authored by Judge Kleinschmidt, that a criminal defendant is always permitted to bring out at trial a victim's refusal of a pretrial interview with the defendant. In State v. Riggs, 186 Ariz. 573, 925 P.2d 714 (App.1996), a different panel of Division One held, with Judge Kleinschmidt dissenting, that a criminal defendant is never permitted to bring out at trial a victim's refusal of a pretrial interview with the defendant when the victim's sole reason for refusing the interview is that the victim had a constitutional right to do so.
Both panels relied in part on A.R.S. § 13-4433(E), which provides:
E. If the defendant or the defendant's attorney comments at trial on the victim's refusal to be interviewed, the court shall instruct the jury that the victim has the right to refuse an interview under the Arizona constitution.
We granted review in both cases and consolidated them to resolve the conflict and to provide guidance for future cases.
In June 1993, defendant Donald Martin Riggs 1 and his business partner, Timothy Enos, started a dating service: "Personal Gay Matching Service" ("PGMS"). In December 1993, Riggs tried to cash a PGMS check made payable to him and purportedly signed by Enos. The police found that Riggs possessed five additional checks that also were payable to him and purportedly were signed by Enos. Riggs was indicted on six counts of forgery.
At trial, Enos testified that he had neither signed nor authorized Riggs to sign his name to any of the checks that were in Riggs' possession. On cross-examination, defendant asked Enos if he had refused a pretrial interview. The state objected on relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. Accordingly, Enos did not answer defendant's question. Later, outside the jury's presence, defendant questioned Enos further. Enos vaguely recalled being told that defendant had asked for a pretrial interview and that he was glad he did not have to comply with the request. After hearing Enos' testimony, the trial judge found that the interview request had been appropriately conveyed to him. In the jury instructions, the judge informed the jury that the victim, Enos, had a constitutional right to refuse to grant a pretrial interview.
The jury convicted Riggs on all counts. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's findings holding, inter alia, that the "defendant's inquiry into the victim's exercise of the right to decline a pretrial interview was improper." State v. Riggs, 186 Ariz. 573, 578, 925 P.2d 714, 719 (App.1996).
On March 8, 1994, defendant Darren Allen Taggart confronted Juan Rivera and Octavio Patino who were riding their bicycles home from the restaurant where they worked. Rivera and Patino claimed that Taggart shined a flashlight in their faces, brandished a knife, and demanded that they "give [him] all [they] got."
Taggart was charged with two counts of aggravated assault. During Taggart's trial, defense counsel attempted to ask Rivera if he had refused to grant a pretrial interview. Before he could finish the question, the state objected, 2 prompting discussion off the record and out of the hearing of the jury. Later, again outside the presence of the jury, but on the record, defense counsel argued that the victim's refusal to grant a pretrial interview was relevant because it showed bias. She explained that "a person who has allegedly been assaulted at knife point would be willing to come in and grant a thirty-minute interview because it would be significant enough of an event in their life to participate." The trial judge disagreed and found that the victim's exercise of his constitutional right to refuse the pretrial interview did not show that the victim was biased against the defendant. Consequently, the judge determined that the victim's refusal was irrelevant. The judge did not inform the jury that the victim had a constitutional right to refuse to grant a pretrial interview. The jury found Taggart guilty of the two offenses.
On appeal, the court of appeals found that the trial court's limitation of defendant's cross-examination of the victim violated defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses. State v. Taggart, 186 Ariz. 569, 571, 925 P.2d 710, 712 (App.1996). The court of appeals nevertheless found the error to be harmless and affirmed the convictions. We granted review in both cases pursuant to Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.19. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(3) and Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 12-120.24.
The state argues that the Victim's Bill of Rights implicitly provides victims a constitutional right not to be cross-examined on their refusal to grant a pretrial interview. According to the state, a victim's right to refuse an interview is analogous to a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. U.S. Const. amend. V (). The United States Supreme Court has broadened the scope of the defendant's right to remain silent to include the right not to be questioned about the exercise of that right. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The Court explained that Miranda warnings do not explicitly assure a criminal defendant that the defendant's post-arrest silence will carry no penalty. Id. However, because the defendant's silence immediately after arrest is "insolubly ambiguous," impeaching a defendant with such silence violates a defendant's right to remain silent and consequently, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245.
Likewise, according to the state, crime victims are informed of their state constitutional right to refuse a pretrial interview. The Victim's Bill of Rights does not inform the victim that exercising such rights may penalize the victim. The state argues, however, that implicit within the Victim's Bill of Rights is an assurance that the victim's refusal to grant an interview will not be used to create an undesirable inference against the victim. Thus, the state claims, the victim has a constitutional right never to be cross-examined on the victim's refusal of a pretrial interview. We disagree.
The right to refuse a pretrial interview is not analogous to a defendant's right to remain silent because the rights derive from two different purposes. As the court of appeals in Taggart noted,
A defendant's right to remain silent springs from the constitutional safeguard against self-incrimination. It is rooted in the "distrust of self-deprecatory statements" and the desire to avoid putting a defendant in the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."
Taggart, 186 Ariz. at 572, 925 P.2d at 713 (citations omitted). A victim's right to refuse a pretrial interview, however, stems from "the desire to protect a victim's privacy and minimize contact with the defendant" prior to trial. Id. This distinction is especially relevant when one attempts to discern whether the differing purposes are furthered by the limitation on questioning.
Unlike a defendant's right to remain silent, the purpose underlying a victim's right to refuse pretrial interviews is not advanced by precluding comments on the victim's refusal. Commenting on a criminal defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent diminishes the benefit of that right by suggesting to the jury that the defendant is culpable. In contrast, the benefits of the victim's right to refuse a pretrial interview--protection of privacy and minimizing contact with the defendant prior to trial--are not diminished by the defendant's comments. Because the Victim's Bill of Rights does not, and could not, allow the victim to refuse to testify at trial, contact with the defendant is not completely avoidable. S.A. v. Superior Ct., 171 Ariz. 529, 531, 831 P.2d 1297, 1299 (App.1992). Thus, asking the victim at trial about his or her refusal to grant a pretrial interview does not result in any greater breach of the victim's privacy, or greater contact with the defendant, than is already necessary.
Moreover, if, in a given case, the victim's state constitutional rights conflict with a defendant's federal constitutional rights to due process and effective cross-examination, the victim's rights must yield. State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Ct., 172 Ariz. 232, 236 836 P.2d 445, 449 (App.1992.) The Supremacy Clause requires that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevail over state constitutional provisions. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (); Romley, 172 Ariz. at 236, 836 P.2d at 449. As a result, the victim has no blanket constitutional right to be free from questioning at trial about the victim's refusal...
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