State v. Riggs
Decision Date | 01 May 2017 |
Docket Number | S16G1166 |
Citation | 799 S.E.2d 770 |
Parties | The STATE v. RIGGS. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Lyndsey Hurst Rudder, Deputy D.A., FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 136 Pryor Street, 4th Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30306, Christine Sieger Barker, A.D.A., Margaret Ellen Heap, District Attorney, OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY EASTERN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, P.O. Box 2309, Savannah, Georgia 31402, for Appellant.
Darren David Riggs, GDC# 967762, WARE STATE PRISON, 3620 N. Harris Rd., Waycross, Georgia 31503, for Appellee.
Brandon Alexander Bullard, GEORGIA PUBLIC DEFENDER COUNCIL, 104 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 400, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Amicus Appellee.
Under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b), a defendant convicted of a sexual offense must receive a split sentence: that is, a sentence that includes a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment followed by an additional probated sentence of at least one year. When a defendant is convicted of only one sexual offense, the application of this statute is simple. This case presents the more complicated question of how the statute applies when a defendant is convicted of multiple sexual offenses: Does the split-sentence requirement apply to each of the multiple sexual offenses of which a defendant is convicted or, as the State argues, only to the aggregate sentence? Considering the plain language of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) in the context of the well-established principle that each count receives a discrete sentence, we conclude that the statute requires a split sentence on each sexual offense. Because the Court of Appeals correctly vacated those sentences that failed to meet this requirement, we affirm.
The record shows that Darren Riggs entered into a non-negotiated guilty plea to multiple charges, including several sexual offenses. He was sentenced to a total sentence of 50 years with 30 to serve. Pertinent to this appeal, Riggs was sentenced on the sexual offenses as follows:
Riggs filed a motion to reduce his sentence,1 which the trial court denied. Riggs appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals, relying on its own precedent,2 agreed with Riggs that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) by failing to impose split sentences on each of the child molestation offenses in Counts 4 and 7-11 and the statutory rape offense in Count 15.3 See Riggs v. State , 336 Ga. App. XXIII (March 4, 2016) (unpublished). The Court of Appeals concluded that the sentences on Counts 4, 7-11, and 15 were void and vacated the sentences on these counts, as well as on Counts 5 and 17, which did meet the split-sentence requirement. We granted the State's petition for certiorari to consider the meaning of the split-sentence requirement under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b).
The State argues that a plain reading of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) shows that the split-sentence requirement applies only to the overall sentence, not each conviction for a sexual offense. We disagree.
State v. Randle , 298 Ga. 375, 376-377, 781 S.E.2d 781 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).
OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) provides in relevant part as follows:
A "sexual offense" is defined to include the sexual crimes committed by Riggs, including child molestation, statutory rape, and enticing a child for indecent purposes. See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (a).
Before considering the specific requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b), it is important to understand a trial court's general sentencing obligations. When a court sentences a defendant for a particular offense, it must consider the statutory range for that crime. See OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) ( ). A trial court must do this whether a defendant is convicted of one offense or many, resulting in a discrete sentence for each offense. See Evans v. State , 300 Ga. 271, 276, 794 S.E.2d 40 (2016) (). When a trial court fails to impose separate sentences for each count of which a defendant was found guilty, it has not entered a proper judgment. See, e.g., Keller v. State , 275 Ga. 680, 681, 571 S.E.2d 806 (2002) ()4 ; Dilas v. State , 159 Ga.App. 39, 40 (1), 282 S.E.2d 690 (1981) ( ).
The specific provisions of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) apply consistent with these general principles. Subsection (b) requires that "any person convicted of a sexual offense shall be sentenced to a split sentence which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense ... [and] an additional probated sentence of at least one year." This requirement necessarily must apply to each count of conviction; there may be a different "minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense" for each offense. The statute speaks solely in the singular: "a sexual offense," "a split sentence," "the Code section," and "the offense." There is no language that even hints at the State's proposed aggregate approach; indeed, there is no single "Code section applicable to" Riggs's various crimes. Similarly, the final clause of the subsection imposing the probation requirement ("such sentence shall include, in addition to the mandatory imprisonment, an additional probated sentence of at least one year") also uses only singular language: "such sentence," and "an additional probated sentence." Based on this language, the only reasonable construction is that the split-sentence requirement applies to each sexual offense.
Our construction is supported by our previous interpretation of another provision of OCGA § 17-10-6.2. In Evans , we considered subsection (c) of the statute, which allows a trial court to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence of the split-sentence requirement. Evans , 300 Ga. at 272-273, 794 S.E.2d 40. There, we held that one sexual offense count could be a "relevant similar transaction," as that phrase is used in the statute, as to another sexual offense count in the same indictment for purposes of sentencing, because "when a trial court considers the appropriate sentence for [one count] of an indictment, it is the only criminal charge at issue, and not any other counts in the indictment." Id. at 276, 794 S.E.2d 40.5
Because the downward deviation analysis under subsection (c) must be applied for each sexual offense, it would be incongruous to handle the split-sentence requirement any differently, for this requirement mandates the minimum term of imprisonment from which a deviation would apply. We therefore construe the two subsections as requiring the court to consider each sexual offense separately when fashioning a sentence for that particular offense, including whether to apply a downward deviation for a sentence on that count.
The State nevertheless argues that OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) does not apply to each sexual offense, but only to the "final offense." The State does not explain what it means by "final offense," but presumably it refers to the last conviction for which the court imposes a sentence. The State's argument fails for several reasons. First, it ignores the general requirement that the trial court impose a discrete sentence for each offense. Second, subsection (b) contains no reference to "final offense," or any language permitting the trial court to ignore the provision's dictates for some sentences when a defendant has been convicted of multiple sexual offenses. The separation of powers prohibits us from "add[ing] a line to [a] law [enacted by the legislature]." Turner v. Ga. River Network , 297 Ga. 306, 308-309, 773 S.E.2d 706 (2015).
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