State v. Riley
| Decision Date | 11 October 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 51070,51070,1 |
| Citation | 394 S.W.2d 360 |
| Parties | STATE of Missoui, Respondent, v. Jack Leroy RILEY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Donald L. Randolph, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
John Grossman, St. Louis, for appellant.
Defendant, Jack Leroy Riley, was convicted of robbery by means of a deadly weapon under Sec. 560.120 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, and his punishment was assessed at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of ninety-nine years. Following rendition of judgment and imposition of sentence in accordance with the verdict, an appeal was perfected to this Court.
Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defendant to discharge his court-appointed attorney; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendant a continuance for the purpose of procuring the services of counsel of his choice.
The trial proceedings began in Division No. 10 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on June 15, 1964. Before the voir dire examination of the jury and out of the hearing of the jury panel the defendant advised the Court that he wished to discharge his court-appointed counsel, Mr. John Grossman. The Court refused his request. Defendant then asked leave to question Mr. Grossman. This request was granted and defendant inquired as to whether Mr. Grossman was in good standing. The Court answered that counsel 'is an attorney in good standing and a very able and competent attorney, and has been a member of this Bar for many, many years, and personally known to the Court.'
Defendant then questioned his court-appointed counsel, as follows:
Defendant then stated as follows:
'THE WITNESS: * * * I make a motion for a continuance, because in the duration of the summer my parents and relatives willl get me money to hire a good legal counsel; that is, a criminal lawyer.'
Defendant, on cross-examination, testified that he had no money and no expectancy of earning any; that he had been in the City Jail for eight months; that he expected his family, if given time, to come up with the money to hire a lawyer to represent him; that he knew eight months before, in November, that the charges against him were serious but had never requested aid from his family.
Thereafter, voir dire examination of the jury panel was conducted and the Court declared an adjournment to June 16, 1964. At 5:25 p. m. on June 15, 1964, the following occurred out of the presence of the jury but in the presence of defendant:
'I feel that I am not qualified to act as this man's attorney for the reason that in the last--I don't believe I have tried a criminal case in over thirty years. I have not been conversant with the rules of procedure, which have changed so drastically in the last few years, particularly with reference to criminal law; I have not followed the changes made with reference to the substantive law, and in addition to that, experience would be highly--which I regard would be highly necessary, in the defense of a crime ad serious as the one before the Court.
'I feel that the State would not be prejudiced by this continuance in allowing the defendant additional time within which to hire counsel of his own choosing.
I appreciate the fact that there has been some six or seven or eight months elapsed since the defendant was charged with this crime, but during that period of time he had been led to believe that his case would not be tried since it was his belief that the State was going to try Hanger first--or, at least try the murder charge first. The Defendant here has advised the Court that he is without funds, and that he hopes to raise the funds, if the case is passed over until September. That has been my suggestion, that the case be passed to September, and that the defendant be given an opportunity to retain counsel, and with the instructions to report back to this court by August 15th, on whether or not he has retained counsel. If, on August 15th, he has not retained counsel, and so advises the Court, then I would be very glad, as I am now, to defend the defendant.'
The motion for continuance was overruled and the case went to trial on June 16, 1964.
During the course of the trial, Mr. Grossman again asked to be relieved as counsel for defendant and was refused.
In State v. Glenn, Mo., 317 S.W.2d 403, 406, it is stated: ...
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...of counsel for an indigent accused is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Hamblin, 448 S.W.2d 603 (Mo.1970); State v. Riley, 394 S.W.2d 360 (Mo.1965). While an indigent accused is entitled to appointment of counsel, that right does not create the conclusion that such accused ......
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