State v. Rinehart, 20967.

• Decision Date: 18 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 20967.,20967.
• Citation: 617 N.W.2d 842,2000 SD 135
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam Paul RINEHART, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

617 N.W.2d 842

2000 SD 135

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam Paul RINEHART, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20967.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs October 21, 1999.

Decided October 18, 2000.

Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Michele K. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Timothy W. Bjorkman and Mike C. Fink of Bjorkman Law Offices, Bridgewater, for defendant and appellant.

MILLER, Chief Justice

[¶ 1.] Following a court trial, Adam Paul Rinehart was found guilty of DUI and third offense DUI. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] At 1:05 a.m. on July 3, 1998, Officer DeBoer saw Rinehart driving south on Sertoma Avenue near its intersection with 26th Street in southwest Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour.

[¶ 3.] DeBoer followed Rinehart's car and paced its speed for six blocks. He estimated that Rinehart's speed was between 20 and 25 miles per hour. DeBoer did not observe any traffic violations.

[¶ 4.] DeBoer activated his red lights and stopped Rinehart's vehicle. The slow speed of Rinehart's vehicle raised concerns for DeBoer that the driver might have a medical problem such as a stroke. "My whole intention," DeBoer testified, "was to stop him and see if he was all right." Of secondary concern was the fact that in DeBoer's experience, driving under the speed limit "could" be an indicator of a possible drunk driver.

[¶ 5.] When DeBoer approached Rinehart he detected the odor of alcohol and noted his bloodshot, watery eyes. Following field sobriety tests, DeBoer arrested Rinehart for driving under the influence, a violation of SDCL 32-23-1.

ISSUE

[¶ 6.] Did the trial court err when it denied Rinehart's motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the stop of Rinehart's vehicle?

[¶ 7.] In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 715 (1973) the United States Supreme Court observed that local police officers "frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Consequently "[u]nder appropriate circumstances a law enforcement officer may be justified in stopping a vehicle to provide assistance, without needing any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity." State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D.1993). If a police officer has a demonstrable reason to believe that a driver may be unfit to drive for medical or other reasons, a temporary stop is justified for the limited purpose of investigating the person's well-being. McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988).

[¶ 8.] In this case the trial court did not err in denying Rinehart's suppression motion. Before stopping Rinehart, DeBoer observed his excessively slow speed at 1:09 a.m. which raised, in his experience and knowledge, concerns over the driver's medical condition. As the court in State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 739 A.2d 1016, 1019 (N.J.Super.A.D.1999) noted:

A police officer's observation of a person operating a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates something may be wrong with the vehicle or its driver is one recognized circumstance in which the police may take appropriate action in the performance of their community caretaking responsibilities. For example, in State v. Martinez, 260 N.J.Super. 75, 78, 615 A.2d 279 (App.Div.1992) we stated that a police officer's observations of a motor vehicle being driven at less than 10 m.p.h. "suggest[ed] a number of objectively reasonable concerns," including that "something might be wrong with the car ... [or] its driver." Consequently, we held that these concerns justified "the minimal intrusion involved in a simple inquiry stop." Id. Similarly, in State v. Goetaski, 209 N.J.Super. 362, 507 A.2d 751 (App.Div.1986), we upheld the validity under the community caretaking doctrine of a stop of a person who was driving slowly on the shoulder of a state highway with his left turn directional signal flashing. We concluded that observations of such unusual operation of a vehicle provided a reasonable basis for the police officer to believe that there was something wrong with the vehicle or its driver. Id. at 366, 507 A.2d 751.

[¶ 9.] Here, Rinehart was traveling 20-25 miles per hour late at night on a deserted street with a posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour. There were no extraneous factors such as other traffic or adverse weather conditions attributing to his slow pace in any way. Under these circumstances, Officer DeBoer was justified in assuming that something else, such as a medical emergency or an automotive malfunction, may be occurring. In fact, he indicated that he was initially more concerned that Rinehart might have a possible medical problem, rather than having a suspicion that he might be intoxicated. DeBoer stated that his whole intention in stopping Rinehart was to see if he was all right.

[¶ 10.] We recognize that "[t]he `community caretaking' exception should be cautiously and narrowly applied in order to minimize the risk that it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting an investigatory search for criminal evidence." Com. v. Waters, 20 Va.App. 285, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1995). In this case, however, the trial court did not find fault with DeBoer's motives and was able to judge the officer's credibility as he testified. See Geraets v. Halter, 1999 SD 11, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d 231, 234 (stating "the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the conflicting evidence and observe the witnesses and evidence first hand.")

[¶ 11.] Based on the circumstances presented, DeBoer, as part of his role in community caretaking, was justified in stopping Rinehart to make sure everything was all right. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Rinehart's motion to suppress.

[¶ 12.] The judgment is affirmed.

[¶ 13.] KONENKAMP, and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.

[¶ 14.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, Justices, dissent.

SABERS, Justice (dissenting).

[¶ 15.] Although officers may stop a vehicle while exercising their "community caretaking function," the facts do not justify applying that concept here. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 714-15 (1973); see also State v. Catlette, 88 S.D. 406, 221 N.W.2d 25, 28 n. 3 (1974). An officer's subjective explanation for stopping or detaining a driver does not control Fourth Amendment analysis. Courts are required to "make an objective assessment of the officer's actions" when determining if a stop was reasonable. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177 (1978)).

[¶ 16.] Applying the community caretaking exception to the facts of this case ignores the requirement of objective reasonableness when assessing an officer's actions. Id. Officer DeBoer's stated "primary justification" for stopping Rinehart, his health, is not sufficiently borne out in the record. DeBoer's subjective motives, no matter how honestly held, do not affect Fourth Amendment protections. It is vital to recognize that "[t]he `community caretaking' exception should be cautiously and narrowly applied to minimize the risk that it will be abused or used as pretext for conducting an investigatory search for criminal evidence." Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va.App. 285, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1995).

[¶ 17.] Given the absence of support in the record to justify the community caretaking exception, we must determine the validity of this stop under our traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is "not to eliminate all contact between police and the citizenry, but `to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference' by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980). There must be a balancing of the intrusion on a person's Fourth Amendment rights against legitimate governmental interests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979). To balance these interests, law enforcement must have a reasonable suspicion of a violation to make a brief traffic stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31-32, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1888, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968); State v. Cuny, 534 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1995). An officer must support a stop with an articulable suspicion of a violation. State v. Herrboldt, 1999 SD 55, ¶ 7, 593 N.W.2d 805, 808. DeBoer's stop of Rinehart's vehicle is not supported by an articulable suspicion of a violation and was unjustified as a matter of law.

[¶ 18.] I also join Justice AMUNDSON'S dissent.

AMUNDSON, Justice (dissenting).

[¶ 19.] The majority is now adopting a new exception to the Fourth Amendment—the community caretaking exception. Under the facts of this case, this exception should not be embraced. The majority relies on three cases: State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69 (N.D.1993); State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 739 A.2d 1016 (1999); and State v. Goetaski, 209 N.J.Super. 362, 507 A.2d 751 (1986), which are neither dispositive nor persuasive.¹ In fact, in reviewing these cases, it becomes evident that they are clearly distinguishable.

[¶ 20.] In Garbin police were dispatched to defendant's residence because smoke was emanating from the defendant's garage area. Believing there to be a fire, the police entered the garage to find defendant inside his car spinning the tires. Defendant was noticeably drunk and was arrested for DUI. The standard employed by the court in determining the applicability of the community caretaking exception was whether the officer had a "reasonable basis...