State v. Ringo, Jr.

Decision Date31 October 2000
Citation30 S.W.3d 811
Parties(Mo.banc 2000) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Earl Ringo, Jr., Appellant. Case Number: SC81892 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date:
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Boone County, Hon. Ellen Roper

Counsel for Appellant: Janet M. Thompson

Counsel for Respondent: Catherine Chatman

Opinion Summary:

While robbing the Ruby Tuesday restaurant in Columbia in July 1998, Earl Ringo, Jr., shot a delivery person and encouraged his accomplice to shoot the manager in training. Ringo was convicted of two first-degree murders, and the jury recommended death sentences, which the court imposed. He appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Court en banc holds:

1. An African-American potential juror's self-contradictory answers on her ability to judge another person supported the state and court removing her for cause; the strike did not indicate racial motive.

2. When the jury asked how the sentences would be carried out and whether its verdict could be changed, the court responded (with the attorneys' assent) that it could give no further instructions. The court did not err. Where a jury is properly instructed on the law, speculation on the jury's reason for asking will not be a basis for plain error.

3. Claims that Ringo was improperly denied access to grand juror depositions and personally identifiable information about people on the grand juror lists lack merit. Ringo received information and discovery opportunities (jury procedures manual, transcript of part of the proceeding, interrogation of the prosecutor about the proceedings) but failed to take advantage of opportunities to develop a claim of race or gender bias in grand jury selection. In any event, Ringo could not establish systematic exclusion by the disclosure he requested; even if a single panel fails to mirror the community's make-up, systematic exclusion has not been established. Ringo was not tried under the indictment but, rather, by substitute information. Neither statute nor constitution mandate transcribing grand jury proceedings.

4. The state's argument characterizing life in prison as a reward is permissible, as is comparing the strife endured by the defendant with that of the victims' families. In other challenges, the prosecutor made no statement of law or fact not inferable from the evidence.

5. The state's statements about a co-conspirator's plea agreement being for "truthful testimony" did not constitute improper vouching. The state did not imply that the co-conspirator complied with the agreement or that the state independently verified his testimony. Even if mildly vouching, the statements were not so direct and pervasive as to shake confidence in the fairness of Ringo's trial and warrant reversal.

6. The court did not err in submitting the "reasonable doubt" instruction or including the word "encourage" in the accomplice liability verdict director, as repeatedly decided by this Court.

7. The Court again rejects the claim that the statute's aggravators are duplicative and insufficiently narrow the class of offenders subject to the death penalty. Here, ample evidence supports each aggravator.

8. The court properly admitted Ringo's statements to police. Although Ringo was not told that an attorney appeared at the police station for him, Ringo never requested an attorney. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that events outside and unknown to the defendant cannot bear on his capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. Ringo was informed of his Miranda rights, waived them--in writing, and confessed. The record discloses no coercion. At worst, the court's failure to elaborate its basis for ruling beyond finding the confession voluntary and not coerced is harmless error.

9. The sentence passes the Court's independent statutory review.

Opinion Author: John C. Holstein, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.

Opinion:

Defendant Earl Ringo, Jr., appeals from two first-degree murder convictions resulting in two death sentences. He raises nine points of error. This Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const., art. V, sec. 3. The judgment of the Boone County Circuit Court is affirmed.

FACTS

This Court reviews the facts in a light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Mo. banc 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1986 (2000). On July 3, 1998, defendant and a friend, Quentin Jones, were traveling to Columbia, Missouri, in a rented U-Haul truck. Defendant rented the truck to move his belongings from Columbia to Jeffersonville, Indiana. During the trip, defendant concocted a plan to commit an early morning robbery of the Ruby Tuesday restaurant in Columbia where he had formerly been employed. From that employment, defendant recalled the early morning routine. He explained the two men could wear Ruby Tuesday T-shirts, go to the back door at an early hour, and trick the manager into letting them inside. At that time of day, the manager would be the only person in the building. Defendant believed that the cash proceeds from the previous day's operation would be left in a safe and that their take could amount to several thousand dollars.

On arrival in Columbia, the two went to defendant's former residence and began packing his possessions in the truck. During the process, defendant opened a backpack inside the truck, revealing a bulletproof vest and some gloves. He also displayed two ski masks, two Ruby Tuesday T-shirts, and some jeans that Jones could wear to look more like an employee. After loading the truck, Jones went to sleep. However, defendant did not sleep. He remained awake, cleaning a 9 millimeter pistol. At about 4:30 a.m. on July 4, defendant woke Jones. They then drove to a Radio Shack store within walking distance of the restaurant. At that point, Jones expressed reluctance to go inside the restaurant. Defendant responded by chastising Jones, telling him to "Stop being a bitch and come on." The two then walked toward the restaurant, defendant carrying the backpack.

Once there, the men, already wearing the T-shirts supplied by defendant, approached the restaurant from the rear and walked through an unlocked gateway guarding the back of the restaurant. Defendant closed the gates behind him. Since they had seen no vehicles in the parking lot, they remained within the gated area, waiting for a manager or another employee to arrive. Defendant indicated to Jones that when another employee arrived, they would knock on the back door in the hope of being let inside.

At 5:55 a.m., a delivery truck driven by Dennis Poyser arrived. Jones panicked and attempted to flee by climbing the wall, but defendant instructed him to hide. Jones complied and located a hiding place between a trash dumpster and a "grease pit." The two put on the ski masks. Next, Joanna Baysinger, a manager in training, opened the rear door of the building, and Poyser opened the outer gates. Baysinger came out to the gateway and spoke with Poyser. Then, Baysinger returned to the building along with Poyser. Carrying his pistol, defendant ran in after them.

Once inside, defendant shot Poyser in the face from a distance of about six inches. Poyser fell to the floor. Hearing the gunshot, Jones entered the building and found Poyser on the floor and Baysinger screaming. She had blood on her hand and ankle. Then defendant grabbed Baysinger, forced her into the restaurant office, and demanded that she open the safe. While in the office with Baysinger, defendant directed Jones to go to the front of the restaurant and make sure no one else had arrived. Jones did so and, seeing no one else, returned to the office. When Jones returned, he found defendant and Baysinger next to the safe. Defendant filled the backpack with cash from the petty cash and cash drawers located in the top part of the safe as Baysinger tried to open the bottom part containing the cash proceeds from the previous day's business. Defendant told Jones to make certain the back door was closed. Jones closed the door and returned to see Baysinger struggling with the bottom part of the safe while defendant became increasingly frustrated with her. He demanded that Baysinger "hurry up" as Jones knocked the telephone to the floor in order to scare her.

Suddenly, another employee arrived and knocked on the back door. Defendant responded by handing Jones the gun and his right glove. Defendant said, "If she moves, shoot her." He left Jones in charge of controlling Baysinger, and despite the employee knocking on the door, dragged Poyser's body into the walk-in cooler by the legs. Meanwhile, the employee became discouraged and left the restaurant in order to try calling from a nearby McDonald's restaurant.

Baysinger continued having difficulty in opening the lower part of the safe, and finally asked Jones if he would try. Jones refused. Then he became uncomfortable holding the gun used to kill Poyser, so he set it on the floor. Defendant returned to the office, no longer wearing the ski mask, and asked Jones why the gun was on the floor. Jones picked up the gun and handed it back to defendant, who promptly fired a shot at the floor beside Baysinger to hasten her. Baysinger stood, covered her ears with her hands and screamed. After collecting herself, she again tried unsuccessfully to open the lower portion of the safe. At one point, defendant also tried. As before, this final attempt to open the lower part failed, and defendant gave up.

Frustrated, defendant asked Baysinger how much money she had, seized her purse, and emptied it onto a table. Then, he instructed her to find a piece of paper and write a note saying "I'm sorry." As she wrote, defendant took Jones aside and asked him if he wanted to kill Baysinger. Jones shrugged his shoulders and shook his head but took the gun from defendant nevertheless. Baysinger announced sh...

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