State v. Del Rio, 2D02-3786.
| Decision Date | 25 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D02-3786.,2D02-3786. |
| Citation | 854 So.2d 692 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Richard DEL RIO, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Randall O. Reder of Randall O. Reder, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
The State charged Richard Del Rio with vehicular homicide, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Thereafter, the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal, concluding that the unfortunate accident from which this charge arose was the result of negligence and careless driving but that Mr. Del Rio's actions did not meet the level of recklessness required to convict him of vehicular homicide. The State appeals this judgment. We affirm.
On November 28, 2000, at approximately 1 p.m., Richard Del Rio was driving home from high school on Whispering Hollow Drive. Whispering Hollow Drive ends with a stop sign at a T-intersection with Branch Mooring Drive. The evidence at trial was conflicting as to whether Mr. Del Rio stopped at this intersection. Nevertheless, Mr. Del Rio turned left onto Branch Mooring Drive and proceeded approximately 47 feet before the front of his car hit a woman who was pushing her baby in a stroller. The woman was in the street approximately six feet from the curb. Although the baby was unharmed, the woman died from head injuries she sustained when she hit her head first on Mr. Del Rio's windshield and then again on the pavement as she fell off the vehicle.
There were no witnesses to this accident. Mr. Del Rio called 911 and reported the accident. He told police that he stopped at the intersection prior to turning. He claimed that he struck the woman because his vision was obstructed by a white van and a large bush.
Accident reconstruction experts testified that Mr. Del Rio was driving his car between 17 and 26 miles per hour. The posted speed limit in this residential neighborhood was 25 miles per hour. The State's expert opined that Mr. Del Rio had not stopped at the intersection prior to turning onto Branch Mooring Drive but instead had cut through the intersection.
Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted Mr. Del Rio of vehicular homicide. Mr. Del Rio then moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had not proven a prima facie case because his actions were not reckless as required to support such a conviction. The trial judge agreed and granted the motion.
The vehicular homicide statute states:
"Vehicular homicide" is the killing of a human being, or the killing of a viable fetus by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.
§ 782.071, Fla. Stat. (2000); see also W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Rushton v. State, 395 So.2d 610, 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Section 782.071 has remained substantially unchanged since it first entered Florida law in 1975. See ch. 74-383, § 16, Laws of Fla.
Vehicular homicide cannot be proven without also proving the elements of reckless driving. Chikitus v. Shands, 373 So.2d 904, 905 (Fla.1979). Thus, the State must necessarily adduce evidence showing conduct at least sufficient to constitute reckless driving which is defined as involving a "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." See § 316.192, Fla. Stat. (2000). Merely proving careless driving, see § 316.1925, Fla. Stat. (2000), is insufficient to sustain a conviction. In McCreary v. State, 371 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1979), the supreme court described the level of culpability required for vehicular homicide as one that falls short of culpable negligence but that is more than a mere failure to use ordinary care. Id. at 1026.
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State v. Gensler
...House was driving at the time he collided with [the victim] is that he was speeding.") (citation omitted); see also State v. Del Rio, 854 So.2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Esposito, 642 So.2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). There is nothing but pure speculation to support the conclusion that t......
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Santisteban v. State
...reckless driving, which requires proof of a “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” See State v. Del Rio, 854 So.2d 692, 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); § 316.192(1), Fla. Stat. In determining whether a defendant was driving recklessly, the essential inquiry is whether ......
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McCullough v. State
..."wanton disregard" language is synonymous with section 782.071(1)'s "reckless operation" language. See State v. Del Rio, 854 So.2d 692, 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). ...
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Luzardo v. State
...See State v. Lebron, 954 So.2d 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; see also D.E. v. State, 904 So.2d 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ; State v. Del Rio, 854 So.2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Reckless driving, in turn, is defined as driving “... in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property ......