State v. Ritchey

• Decision Date: 09 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1–15–80.,1–15–80.
• Citation: 64 N.E.3d 599
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Tyler D. RITCHEY, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

64 N.E.3d 599

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Tyler D. RITCHEY, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–15–80.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Allen County.

May 9, 2016.

Kenneth J. Rexford, Lima, for Appellant.

Terri L. Kohlrieser, for Appellee.

OPINION

ROGERS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant–Appellant, Tyler Ritchey, appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County convicting him of one count of sexual battery and sentencing him to 30 months in prison. On appeal, Ritchey argues that the trial court erred by declaring Ohio's sex offender registration statute constitutional as applied to the crime of sexual battery, specifically R.C. 2907.03(A)(2). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

{¶ 2} On June 16, 2015, a criminal complaint was filed in the Lima Municipal Court charging Ritchey with one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), a felony of the first degree. Ritchey's case was bound over to the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, and on July 16, 2015, the Allen County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment against Ritchey charging him with one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) and 2907.02(B), a felony of the first degree; and one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(5) and 2907.05(C)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. Ritchey entered pleas of not guilty to both charges on July 22, 2015.

{¶ 3} Plea negotiations ensued, and on October 28, 2015, Ritchey agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), a felony of the third degree, which was amended from the first count of rape. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the second count of the indictment. That same day, the court accepted Ritchey's guilty plea and dismissed count two of the indictment.

{¶ 4} Prior to sentencing, Ritchey filed a motion to declare Ohio's sex offender registration statutes unconstitutional. Specifically, Ritchey argued that the registration requirements, as applied to those convicted under R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), violated the separation of powers doctrine and due process.

{¶ 5} A sentencing hearing was held on December 14, 2015. Both sides were given an opportunity to present an argument regarding Ritchey's pending motion. After both parties presented their arguments, the trial court found that Ohio's sex offender registration statutes did not violate either the separation of powers doctrine or due process and found that the statutes were constitutional. Thus, Ritchey's motion was denied.

{¶ 6} The court sentenced Ritchey to 30 months in prison and classified Ritchey as a Tier III sex offender.

{¶ 7} An entry memorializing the court's denial of Ritchey's motion, as well as an entry memorializing Ritchey's sentence, was filed on December 14, 2015.

{¶ 8} Ritchey filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE OF SEXUAL BATTERY, SPECIFIC AS TO THE ELEMENT CHAIN IN R.C. § 2907.03(A)(2) (THE OFFENSE OF WHICH MR. RITCHEY WAS CONVICTED), AS A TIER III OFFENSE, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AS REQUIRED BY THE OHIO CONSTITUTION OR FOR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS FOR NOT BEING RATIONALLY RELATED TO THE STATED GOALS OF THE LEGISLATION.

{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Ritchey argues that the trial court erred by finding Ohio's sex offender registration statutes to be constitutional. Specifically, Ritchey argues that Ohio's sex offender registration statutes violate the separation of powers doctrine and due process as applied to people convicted of violating R.C. 2907.03(A)(2).¹ We disagree.

{¶ 10} It is well established that "[a] properly enacted statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality." Thompson v. Bagley, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11–04–12, 2005-Ohio-1921, 2005 WL 940872, ¶ 14, citing Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 352, 639 N.E.2d 31 (1994). "Therefore, it is incumbent upon the party challenging the statute to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a constitutional provision." Id. Moreover, "[W]here there is more than one possible interpretation of a statute, a court will construe the statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities." State v. Haskell, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13–03–45, 2004-Ohio-3345, 2004 WL 1433576, ¶ 21.

Ohio's History of Sex Offender Registration and Relevant Case Law

{¶ 11} In 1996, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 180, which came to be known as "Megan's Law." Megan's Law created three different categories of sex offenders: sexually oriented offenders, habitual sex offenders, and sexual predators. If a person was convicted of a sexually oriented offense, then he was subject to annual reporting requirements for a ten year period. If the sentencing court found that the offender had a previous conviction for a sexually oriented offense, then Megan's Law required the court to find that the offender was a habitual sex offender, which carried twenty years of reporting requirements. Finally, if an offender was labeled a sexual predator, then he must report every 90 days for the rest of his life, unless the court removed the sexual predator classification.

{¶ 12} Under Megan's Law, sex offenders had to register with the sheriff in the county where they resided or were domiciled for more than seven days, provide a current residential address, provide the name and address of an employer, a current photograph, and any other information required by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. Finally, all sex offenders had to provide the license plate number of any motor vehicle that was owned by the offender and registered in his name.

{¶ 13} Megan's Law was challenged several times over the years. One such case challenged the constitutionality of Megan's Law under the separation of powers doctrine. See State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001). In Thompson, the defendant, Thompson, was convicted of rape, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault. Id. at 585, 752 N.E.2d 276. In addition to his prison sentence, Thompson was found to be a sexual predator. Id. Thompson appealed this decision to the Second District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's classification of Thompson as a sexual predator and found that Megan's Law violated the separation of powers doctrine "by usurping the trial court's fact-finding role because it prescribes what evidence trial courts must consider in determining whether a sexual offender is likely to reoffend." Id.

{¶ 14} The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed and reversed the Second District's decision. Id. at 588, 752 N.E.2d 276. In doing so, the court found that the factors provided by Megan's Law were mere guidelines and that the trial court retained discretion to classify the offender as a sexual predator. Id. at 587–588, 752 N.E.2d 276. Because the General Assembly's enactment of Megan's Law [did] not "encroach upon the trial court in its fact-finding authority, it did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine." Id. at 588, 752 N.E.2d 276.

{¶ 15} In 2003, Megan's Law was amended by the enactment of S.B. 5. Megan's Law now required a sex offender to register with the sheriff of the county where they resided or were temporarily domiciled for at least five days, attended school, and/or worked for a period of more than 14 days or for a total of 30 days or more in a calendar year. The amendments also removed a sexual predator's ability to petition the court to remove his designation. Finally, the act made all information given by sex offenders public and directed the attorney general's office to establish an Internet database that could be viewed by the public.

{¶ 16} In response to Congress's enactment of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act ("Adam Walsh Act"), Pub.L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587, which established the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 42 U.S.C. 16902 et seq., the General Assembly enacted S.B. 10 in 2007. S.B. 10 was enacted with the "intent to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of [Ohio]" and "as a means of assuring public protection." R.C. 2950.02(B).

{¶ 17} In accordance with the Adam Walsh Act and SORNA, Ohio's prior sex offender classification system was replaced by a three-tiered scheme, which came to be referred to as Ohio's Adam Walsh Act ("the Act"). Further, offenders were classified strictly based on the offense of conviction. The lowest level of offenders was classified as Tier I, which required Tier I offenders to register annually for a 15 year period. R.C. 2950.01(E) ; 2950.06(B)(1); 2950.07(B)(3). The next level was classified as Tier II, which required Tier II offenders to register every 180 days for a period of 25 years. R.C. 2950.01(F) ; 2950.06(B)(2); 2950.07(B)(2). The highest level of offenders was categorized as Tier III, which required all Tier III offenders to register every 90 days for the rest of their lives. R.C. 2950.01(G) ; 2950.06(B)(3); 2950.07(B)(1).

{¶ 18} Like its predecessor, the Act has faced many challenges. Two of those challenges were in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, and State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.

{¶ 19} In Bodyke, three sex offenders challenged the constitutionality of the Act as violating the separation of powers doctrine. 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, at ¶ 29–31. Under the Act at the time, the attorney general's office was charged with reclassifying sex offenders originally classified under Megan's Law, with no involvement by the court system. Id. at ¶ 22. "As a result, the trial court [was] stripped of any power to engage in independent fact-finding * * *." Id.

{¶ 20} The Supreme Court of Ohio found that this power granted to the executive branch violated the separation of powers...