State v. Robb
| Decision Date | 10 March 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 53381,53381,1 |
| Citation | 439 S.W.2d 510 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Francis Lee ROBB, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, F. Daley Abels, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, for respondent.
John B. Newberry, Springfield, for appellant.
HOUSER, Commissioner.
Charged with one prior conviction of a felony and burglary and stealing, francis Lee Robb was acquitted of burglary, convicted of stealing and committed to the custody of the department of corrections for five years under the Second Offender Act. On this appeal he takes exception to two instructions given the jury, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a provious conviction, and claims that the prosecuting attorney erred in mentioning another crime in his opening statement and erroneously commented in his final argument on appeallant's failure to take the witness stand.
The specific charge was burglary of 66 Auto Salvage in Greene County and theft therefrom of 125 auto radiators, worth more than $50. Instruction No. 3, briefly condensed, told the jury that if they found defendant not guilty of burglary they would find him guilty of stealing as charged in the information if they found that defendant on or about March 10, 1967 did steal 125 radiators of the value of more than $50, property of Marvin Jones, doing business as East 66 Auto Salvage, without the consent of the owner and with intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use thereof. Instruction No. 5 defined the words feloniously, wickedly, unlawfully, intentionally, burglariously, steal and intent. The definition of stealing was the standard, general instruction with reference to exercise of dominion over property of another in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner, and did not limit the definition to the exercise of such dominion at the time and place of the burglary.
Appellant complains that the instructions did not limit the stealing to the place mentioned in evidence but only to Greene County. The information charged that the offense occurred in Greene County. The instruction required the jury to find that the offense occurred in Greene County. There was no issue on the question of venue. It was uncontradicted that the 66 Auto Salvage from which the property disappeared was situated in Greene County. There is no requirement in a burglary and stealing case that the venue of the stealing charge be specifically limited in the instruction to the place of the burglary within the county. An instruction limiting the offense to one committed within the county is sufficient. See, generally, 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1196b.
Appellant complains that the instructions did not limit the taking to March 10, 1967 but allowed a finding of guilt if the stealing took place 'on or about' March 10, 1967. Where time is not an essential and material element of the offense an instruction is proper which submits that the offense was committed 'on or about' the time alleged. State v. Armstead, Mo.Sup., 283 S.W.2d 577; State v. Wilson, Mo.Sup., 286 S.W.2d 756; State v. Walker, 357 Mo. 394, 208 S.W.2d 233.
Appellant further contends that the instructions allowed the jury to convict appellant of stealing 'without finding that he had anything to do with the burglary or the connected larceny as charged in the information'; that there was no evidence connecting appellant with the commission of the burglary; that he is not shown to have had anything to do with the affair until four days later when he sold the radiators at a farm far removed from the scene of the burglary; that he was charged with a stealing connected with a burglary at a certain time and place but was convicted of another offense--a stealing not connected with the burglary and occurring at another time and place; that the jury 'could not possibly have believed that the appellant was innocent of the charge of burglary but guilty of stealing the radiators in question at the same time' and that the jury necessarily must have believed that appellant's connection with the stealing was at a time subsequent to the time of the burglary.
There was evidence that sometime during the night of March 10--11, 1967 the 66 Auto Salvage, belonging to Marvin Jones, was broken into and that approximately 125 radiators owned by him and an automobile truck were missing; that the value of the radiators was $5 each; that on March 15 appellant agreed with one Snider for the sale to Snider of some used car radiators for $3 each; that Snider directed appellant to deliver the radiators to his father's farm; that on March 15 appellant procured one Buddy Lee to rent a truck, appellant putting up the deposit therefor, and at night directed Buddy Lee to drive the truck out into the country, through a gate and field, with the lights out, to a gully in a field where the radiators were found and loaded into the truck, transported to a barn, unloaded from truck to barn, and covered with hay; that appellant brought these radiators to the Snider farm on March 15 and delivered to Snider's employee, who reported to Snider; that on March 16, after determining that the radiators had been so delivered, Snider paid appellant and another for the radiators; that at that time appellant told Snider that the radiators were from the East 66 Salvage; that the same radiators were removed from the Snider farm to the Dishman farm on the night of March 20, where they were found by the sheriff and brought to the courthouse on March 22, where they were identified by Marvin Jones as the same radiators missing from his place of business on the morning of March 11. Appellant did not take the stand and presented no explanation of his possession of the stolen property.
The evidence was sufficient to support the giving of Instructions Nos. 3 and 5. Evidence of burglary and of recent, exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen property is sufficient to submit a burglary and stealing case to the jury and to convict the accused of both offenses, State v. Worsham, Mo.Sup., 416 S.W.2d 940; State v. Kennedy, Mo.Sup., 396 S.W.2d 595; State v. Durham, Mo.Sup., 367 S.W.2d 619; State v. Oliver, 355 Mo. 173, 195 S.W.2d 484, or to convict him of the offense of stealing only, State v. Burrage, Mo.Sup., 418 S.W.2d 101; State v. Webb, Mo.Sup., 382 S.W.2d 601; State v. Jones, Mo.Sup., 358 S.W.2d 782; State v. Weaver, Mo.Sup., 56 S.W.2d 25; State v. Bates, 182 Mo. 70, 81 S.W. 408, and appellant may not complain that the jury chose to find him guilty of stealing only but not of burglary, because such a verdict is favorable to appellant. State v. Jones, Mo.Sup., 358 S.W.2d 782(6); State v. Willis, Mo.Sup., 328 S.W.2d 593, 594(3, 4).
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