State v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 13 December 1899
• Parties: THE STATE OF IOWA v. ALONZO ROBBINS, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

80 N.W. 1061

109 Iowa 650

THE STATE OF IOWA v. ALONZO ROBBINS, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 13, 1899

Appeal from Lee District Court.--HON. HENRY BANK, JR., Judge.

INDICTMENT for the crime of murder in the first degree. The verdict was guilty, and from the judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment the defendant appeals.

Reversed.

F. M Ballinger for appellant.

Milton Remley, Attorney General, and C. A. Van Vleck for the state.

WATERMAN J. GRANGER, J., not sitting.

OPINION

WATERMAN, J.

I.

During the argument of the case to the jury, the judge went into a room adjoining the court room and remained a short time. This fact and the misconduct of one Marshall, the attorney appointed to defend the accused, are made the first grounds of complaint. As we find a new trial must be had upon other grounds, and neither of these matters is likely to again occur, we need give them no further mention.

II. One defense interposed was insanity. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury, in substance, that unless they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the offense, they could not convict. And, in another paragraph asked, the rule was announced that it is not necessary that the insanity of the accused be established by a preponderance of evidence; that such defense is made out, if, upon the whole evidence, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to sanity. These instructions were refused, and the jury were told substantially, that if they found, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the killing was done through an insane impulse, they should acquit, otherwise they should convict; and in another instruction the court said that sanity was presumed, and the burden was upon defendant to establish insanity by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Counsel insist that the burden is upon the state to establish sanity, as it must every other ingredient of the crime. This proposition is ably discussed both in reason and upon authority. We hardly feel justified in following counsel, or going outside our own cases. We take the rule to be well established in this state, and it is in accord with the charge given. State v. Felter, 32 Iowa 49; State v. Geddis, 42 Iowa 264; State v. Bruce, 48 Iowa 530. In this last case, defendant asked an instruction similar in terms to the one asked in the case at bar, and it was refused. We approved the ruling. Formerly the rule was that, where the accused relied upon the defense of insanity, it was incumbent upon him to prove that condition beyond a reasonable doubt. The modification adopted in this state is in accord with reason and humanity, but the dictates of neither call for any further relaxation of the rule.

III. Complaint is made of the trial court's refusal to give two instructions asked by defendant in relation to the legal effect of a mental malady operated upon by intoxicating liquors taken. The jury was fully instructed as to the effect, in law, of defendant's insanity, upon his act. The subtle theory of these instructions would have tended to confuse rather than enlighten them. See State v. Donovan, 61 Iowa 369, 16 N.W. 206. Furthermore, we doubt whether the evidence warranted any such instructions.

IV. Defendant asked another instruction to the effect that insanity, once shown to exist, will be presumed to continue. This is a correct rule of law. 1 Greenleaf Evidence, section 42; State v. Jones, 64 Iowa 349 at 349-360, 17 N.W. 911. The court refused the instructions, and gave no equivalent in its charge. The state attempts to meet this point by saying that the evidence did not tend to show insanity during childhood. It is true that, in the instruction asked, a physical injury received by defendant in his infancy is recited as the probable cause of his mental disease; and, if the visible effects of this injury were alone to be considered in reaching a conclusion on this issue, there might be some support for the view taken by counsel for the prosecution. But there was other testimony before the jury. There was evidence going to show that defendant's mother was an epileptic; that one of her brothers was afflicted with the same disease, and another was insane; and that epilepsy may cause insanity. The evidence further tended to show that when defendant was about three years old he had a fall, in which a stick penetrated the roof of his mouth to such an extent that it had to be cut out. This wound did not heal for a long time. After this injury defendant was subject to moody and morose spells. When about ten years of age, he ran away from his home and never returned. Some years prior to the commission of the offense charged, he developed symptoms of epilepsy; had frequent pains in the head, and at such times acted in a manner so peculiar as to attract attention from observers. In time he married. After the birth of a child his wife left him, taking the child, going to her mother's home in Keokuk, and refused to again live with him. The evidence tends to show that this greatly affected defendant; that he professed sincere love for his wife and child. On the day of the killing, he borrowed a pistol from a friend, went to the house where his wife was working, and, after a brief interview, shot her dead. All of these facts were before the jury, and it was their duty to consider them. We do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion as to the weight to be given this evidence, when taken, as it should be, in connection with that introduced by the state. We only say that, on defendant's theory, there was sufficient foundation for giving to the jury the rule of law requested; for, if the evidence on defendant's part is to be believed, he manifested symptoms of insanity many years before the shooting occurred, and these continued to be shown at frequent intervals down to that time.

V. It is urged that the court...