State v. Roberson
| Decision Date | 07 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,CA-CR,2 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David Wayne ROBERSON, Appellant. 1230. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Appellant was convicted by the court, sitting without a jury, of four counts of burglary and one count of grand theft. Imposition of sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of five years. He was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $600 and furthermore, as a condition of probation he was ordered confined in the Pima County Jail for a period of not more than six months. On July 28, 1976, Continental School in Continental, Arizona suffered extensive vandalism and was burglarized. As a result of the investigation by the Pima County Sheriff's Department, six juveniles were arrested, including appellant who was at that time 17 years of age. Appellant was arrested in the early hours of July 31, 1976 and transported to the juvenile detention center. Since his 18th birthday would fall on August 8, 1976, appellant was released from the juvenile detention facility on August 2, 1976. No delinquency petition was ever filed in the juvenile court.
On November 4, 1976, appellant was indicted by the Pima County Grand Jury and a summons was issued. He appeared for his initial appearance and arraignment on November 12, 1976. On January 31, 1977, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of Rule 8.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and a motion to suppress his confession. Both motions were denied. On February 22, 1977, the trial court denied appellant's motion for rehearing on the motion to dismiss. After it was denied, appellant filed a petition for special action in this court claiming the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the indictment because of failure to adhere to the time limits set forth in Rule 8.2(a). Upon dismissal of his special action, appellant proceeded to trial which commenced May 2, 1977.
Appellant contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the indictment, (2) refusing to take judicial notice of its own records and file and (3) denying the motion to suppress his confession.
Rule 8.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
"Every person against whom an indictment, information or complaint is filed shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense within 150 days of the arrest or service of summons under Rule 3.1 except for those excluded periods set forth in Rule 8.4 below."
Rule 3.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, states:
Pointing to Rule 8.2(a) appellant contends that the 150 days commenced on July 31, when he was arrested. He contends that the above rule was amended in 1975 to comply with federal requirements of speedy trial as recognized by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Brannin, 109 Ariz. 525, 514 P.2d 446 (1973). We do not agree. Prior to its amendment in 1975, Rule 8.2(a) stated:
"Every person against whom an indictment, information or complaint is filed shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense within 150 days of the issuance of a warrant or summons under Rule 3.1 except for those excluded periods set forth in Rule 8.4 below." (Emphasis added)
The difference between the old and the new rule is that computation of the 150 days under the new rule commences when the defendant is actually arrested or served with the summons, whereas, under the old rule the 150-day period was computed from the date of issuance of a warrant or summons. It is abundantly clear, however, that under both rules the 150-day period does not commence until the defendant has become an "accused", by virtue of the presentment of an indictment or the filing or a complaint. See Rule 3.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. We believe that appellant's reliance on State v. Brannin, supra, is misplaced. Although the court in Brannin did hold that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial commences when a person is arrested, it is clear that the court arrived at this conclusion through an erroneous reading of United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). We note that the Arizona Supreme Court has impliedly corrected the error in Brannin in two later cases, State v. Lee, 110 Ariz. 357, 519 P.2d 56 (1974) and State v. Myers, 116 Ariz. 453, 569 P.2d 1351 (1977). As United States v Marion, supra, states, the right to a speedy trial does not commence until a person in some way becomes an "accused". This does not occur in the federal system until an indictment or information has...
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State v. Acinelli
...plainly states that a defendant must be tried within 150 days of the arrest or service of summons. See State v. Roberson, 118 Ariz. 343, 344, 576 P.2d 531, 532 (App.1978) ("The difference between the old and the new rule is that computation of the 150 days under the new rule commences when ......
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McCutcheon v. Superior Court of State In and For Pima County
...defendant has become 'accused', by virtue of the presentment of an indictment or the filing o[f] a complaint." State v. Roberson, 118 Ariz. 343, 344, 576 P.2d 531, 532 (App.1978). However, Roberson can be distinguished in that in Roberson the defendant was arrested as a juvenile and release......
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State v. Medina
...a justice of the peace). Our research discloses a case that might introduce some confusion on the point. In State v. Roberson, 118 Ariz. 343, 344-45, 576 P.2d 531, 532-33 (App.1978), in rejecting an argument that the right to a speedy trial attached when a person was arrested, Division Two ......