State v. Robert M.

• Decision Date: 12 November 2015
• Citation: 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08178,19 N.Y.S.3d 82,133 A.D.3d 670
• Parties: In the Matter of STATE of New York, respondent, v. ROBERT M. (Anonymous), appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

133 A.D.3d 670

19 N.Y.S.3d 82

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08178

In the Matter of STATE of New York, respondent,

v.ROBERT M. (Anonymous), appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Nov. 12, 2015.

Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, N.Y. (Arza Feldmanof counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Claude S. Plattonand Philip V. Tisneof counsel), for respondent.

Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 for the civil management of Robert M., a sex offender allegedly requiring civil management, Robert M. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garnett, J.), dated March 1, 2012, which, upon, inter alia, a finding, made after a jury trial, that he suffers from a mental abnormality as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i), and a determination, made after a dispositional hearing, that he is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring civil confinement, granted the petition and directed that he be committed to a secure treatment facility for care and treatment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The State of New York commenced this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10, also known as the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (hereinafter SOMTA) for the civil management of the appellant, an alleged sex offender requiring civil management. The Supreme Court conducted a jury trial, and the jury found that the appellant, established to be a “detained sex offender” under SOMTA, suffers from a “mental abnormality” as that phrase is defined in SOMTA (seeMental Hygiene Law § 10.07[c], [d]; see alsoMental Hygiene Law § 10.03[g], [i]).

Subsequently, the Supreme Court conducted a dispositional hearing, after which it found that the appellant suffers from a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that he is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if he is not confined to a secure treatment facility (seeMental Hygiene Law § 10.07[f]). Based on that finding, the Supreme Court made the requisite dispositional finding that the appellant is a dangerous sex offender requiring civil confinement, granted the petition, and directed that he be committed to a secure treatment facility for care and treatment (see id.).

Contrary to the appellant's contention, the jury verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence, since there was a valid line of reasoning by which the jury could conclude that the appellant suffered from a mental abnormality as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i), and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, as it was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Matter of State of New York v. Ian I.,127 A.D.3d 766, 767–768, 7 N.Y.S.3d 199; Matter of State of New York v. David M.,

120 A.D.3d 1423, 1424, 992 N.Y.S.2d 582; Matter of State of New York v. Robert F.,101 A.D.3d 1133, 1137, 958 N.Y.S.2d 156; Matter of State of New York v. Gierszewski,81 A.D.3d 1473, 1473–1474, 916 N.Y.S.2d 729; Matter of State of New York v. Derrick B.,68 A.D.3d 1124, 1126–1127, 892 N.Y.S.2d 140).

The appellant's contention that the Supreme Court erred and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by allowing into evidence, through the State's expert witness, certain hearsay evidence, is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see Matter of State of New York v. CarlS., 125 A.D.3d 670, 671, 6 N.Y.S.3d 63) and, in any event, without merit (see Matter of State of New York v. Floyd Y.,22 N.Y.3d 95, 103–104, 109, 979 N.Y.S.2d 240, 2 N.E.3d 204; see also Matter of State of New York v. John S.,23 N.Y.3d 326, 345–346, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532, 15 N.E.3d 287). Similarly, the appellant's contention that the Supreme Court erred and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by precluding his expert witness from testifying regarding certain post-evaluation meetings...