State v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 30 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20120884.,20120884.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Daniel ROBERTS, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

345 P.3d 1226

2015 UT 24

STATE of Utah, Appellee

v.Daniel ROBERTS, Appellant.

No. 20120884.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 30, 2015.

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Marian Decker, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Sean P. Hullinger, Lehi, for appellant.

Justice PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice NEHRING, Justice DURHAM, and Justice LEE joined.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Daniel Roberts entered a conditional guilty plea to five charges of sexual exploitation of a minor arising from child pornography on his laptop computer. On appeal, Mr. Roberts challenges four of the district court's pretrial rulings. He first challenges the propriety of law enforcement's use of the Wyoming Toolkit, a computer program and database used to identify child pornography shared over the Internet through peer-to-peer file sharing networks. Mr. Roberts next challenges the district court's ruling that denied him discovery of the Wyoming Toolkit. He also brings a constitutional challenge to Utah's sexual exploitation of a minor statute (Sexual Exploitation Statute) under which he was charged, Utah Code section 76–5a–3 (2009) (renumbered as Utah Code section 76–5b–201 ). Finally, Mr. Roberts challenges the district court's denial of his motion in limine to exclude all evidence obtained by or related to the Wyoming Toolkit. We affirm the district court on all issues.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Utah's Internet Crimes Against Children task force (ICAC) works to prevent the online distribution of child pornography. The ICAC searches peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks for child pornography being shared among P2P users. Gnutella, one such P2P network, allows its users to share digital files directly over the Internet.¹ Gnutella uses what is called the secure hash algorithm (SHA–1) encryption method to assign a unique digital signature to each file shared over its network. Because each digital file has a different SHA–1 value, those values can be used to identify a file.

Through prior investigations, law enforcement has compiled a database of thousands of SHA–1 values that correspond to files containing child pornography. This database, along with software that searches Gnutella for the identified SHA–1 values, is known as the Wyoming Toolkit.

¶ 3 The ICAC uses the Wyoming Toolkit to monitor Gnutella for IP addresses sharing files with suspect SHA–1 values. Once the Toolkit flags an IP address sharing a file with an SHA–1 value that matches known child pornography files, officers confirm that the suspect file is indeed child pornography either by downloading and viewing the file directly or by comparing the identified file's SHA–1 value with SHA–1 values of known child pornography contained in databases like the National Child Victim Identification Program. Upon confirming that the identified file is child pornography, officers send an administrative subpoena to the applicable internet service provider to obtain the subscription information associated with the identified IP address.

¶ 4 During a 2009 investigation, the ICAC determined that an IP address in Emery County, Utah, had used Gnutella to share hundreds of “files with SHA–1 digital signatures identical to images of suspected child pornography” during a five month period. The ICAC submitted these findings to FBI Agent Sonja Nordstrom. Upon confirming the files contained child pornography,² Agent Nordstrom served a subpoena on Emery Telecom, the local internet service provider, which was able to identify Mr. Roberts as the owner of the suspect IP address. Based on this information, Agent Nordstrom obtained a search warrant for Mr. Roberts' home and computers.

¶ 5 Mr. Roberts was not home the day police officers executed the search warrant. Agent Nordstrom called Mr. Roberts on his cell phone to inform him of the search, but did not discuss the purpose of the investigation. Mr. Roberts told Agent Nordstrom that he was in Ogden, Utah, where his wife was in the hospital. Agent Nordstrom later spoke with Mr. Roberts' wife, who indicated that Mr. Roberts had his laptop computer with him in Ogden.

¶ 6 Agent Nordstrom traveled to Ogden to meet with Mr. Roberts. Mr. Roberts brought his laptop to the meeting, and Agent Nordstrom explained to Mr. Roberts that he was being investigated for possession of child pornography. After some questioning, Mr. Roberts admitted that he had been downloading child pornography for approximately a year and that he had been in the process of deleting the child pornography from his computer since Agent Nordstrom had called him. After Mr. Roberts made this admission, Agent Nordstrom asked if she could see his laptop. Mr. Roberts consented. Agent Nordstrom subsequently obtained a search warrant specifically for Mr. Roberts' laptop.

¶ 7 Mr. Roberts' laptop was taken to a computer forensic lab, where an examiner found video and still images of child pornography. Mr. Roberts was charged with thirty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a second degree felony. Utah Code § 76–5a–3 (2009).³ Before trial, Mr. Roberts made four motions that are the subject of this appeal. First, he moved to suppress the evidence of child pornography found on his laptop. Relying on the United States Supreme Court case Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), Mr. Roberts argued that the Wyoming Toolkit, like the thermal image scanning at issue in Kyllo, constituted a search, and therefore use of the Toolkit without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Roberts further argued that he had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his computer and that by accessing those contents through the Wyoming Toolkit, the State violated his expectation of privacy through an unlawful search. The district court denied Mr. Roberts' motion, reasoning that the Wyoming Toolkit did not have “the same intrusiveness as thermal imaging” and that “peer-to-peer file sharing is not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.”

¶ 8 Second, Mr. Roberts moved to compel discovery of the Wyoming Toolkit and its methodologies. He also moved to compel discovery of “any and all associated program documentation, instruction manuals, technical support materials, training materials, and purchase documents ... to verify that the images [he] is alleged to have possessed are in fact[ ] illegal images.” The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It held that Mr. Roberts was entitled to discovery of “whatever information the State has in regards to this case,” including “any information the State has” regarding the SHA–1 values associated with the files found on Mr. Roberts' laptop. But it denied Mr. Roberts' motion to compel discovery of every SHA–1 value in the Wyoming Toolkit database and “the search algorithm process and methodology utilized” in the Toolkit. It reasoned that discovery of the Toolkit was unnecessary for the purpose Mr. Roberts alleged because Agent Nordstrom had personally verified that the files Mr. Roberts had shared on Gnutella were indeed child pornography and because “disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures would interfere with law enforcement efforts.”

¶ 9 Third, Mr. Roberts moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Utah's Sexual Exploitation Statute is unconstitutional. Mr. Roberts argued that the statute violates the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision of the Utah Constitution on its face because it unconstitutionally distinguishes between (1) individuals who illegally possess child pornography and (2) individuals who may legally possess child pornography such as law enforcement officers acting within the scope of a criminal investigation and employees or agents of entities that report and prevent child pornography when they are acting in good faith and within the scope of their employment.⁴ Mr. Roberts also argued that, as applied, the statute discriminates between prosecuting attorneys and defense attorneys who may come into possession of child pornography during their representation or prosecution of a defendant charged under the Sexual Exploitation Statute. Mr. Roberts asserted that defense attorneys, but not prosecuting attorneys, who come into possession of child pornography would be in violation of the statute.

¶ 10 The district court denied Mr. Roberts' motion to dismiss, holding that the Sexual Exploitation Statute was not unconstitutional. Although the statute creates distinct classifications between those who may and may not legally possess child pornography, the district court reasoned that those classifications do not “impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated.” See State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, 254 P.3d 183.

¶ 11 The district court also rejected Mr. Roberts' as-applied challenge to the statute. While it acknowledged that defense attorneys and prosecutors are similarly situated and that the statute discriminates between them, it concluded that the distinction is justified by a legitimate government interest in eliminating the market for child pornography. It also observed that law enforcement allows defense attorneys to view evidence of child pornography as part of their representation, if they do so at the Regional Computer Forensics Lab (RCFL). It therefore held that although prosecutors and defense attorneys are treated differently under the statute, the restriction on defense attorneys is not overly burdensome, is reasonable, and is justified by the State's interest in eliminating the dissemination of child pornography.

¶ 12 Finally, Mr. Roberts filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from offering expert testimony on the Wyoming Toolkit. He argued that the admission of evidence regarding “the technical elements of the Wyoming Toolkit, the scientific principles that underlie the technology, or the reliability of the inputs required by the system” would be...