State v. Robinette, 18313
| Decision Date | 28 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 18313,18313 |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia v. John D. ROBINETTE. . Rehearing Denied |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. This rule, recognized in our law prior to the adoption of our Rules of Evidence, permits such evidence to be utilized against a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
2. Evidence of other crimes or wrongs admissible under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is subject to the provisions of Rule 403, which provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." This balancing test existed in our prior law.
3. Syllabus Point 1, State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. 517, 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
4. Syllabus Point 4, State v. Phillips, 176 W.Va. 244, 342 S.E.2d 210 (1986).
Brenda Craig Ellis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellant.
Frank C. Mascara, Fairmont, for John D. Robinette.
This is an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Barbour County, dated April 7, 1987, which sentenced the defendant below, John D. Robinette, to a term of life imprisonment in the penitentiary following his conviction, by a jury, of the offense of murder of the first degree. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of false statements he made on his employment application and that there was insufficient evidence of guilt to support the conviction. We find no error warranting reversal of the conviction, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On December 15, 1985, Leanna Ruth Robinette, the defendant's wife of eleven months, drowned in the Tygart Valley River near Moats Falls in Barbour County. According to a statement the defendant gave to the police, he and his wife had driven to the area and walked to a large rock along the river to observe the effects of recent flooding. The defendant stated that he had returned to the car alone to retrieve his cigarettes, when he turned and saw his wife chasing her hat along the rock. The defendant stated that when he began walking down the path to the rock, he heard his wife yell out his name. When he looked up, he saw only her arm and head in the swiftly moving water. The defendant stated that he attempted to intercept his wife downstream, but was unsuccessful. The defendant then drove to a nearby tavern where he called for assistance. Mrs. Robinette's body was recovered from the headwaters of Tygart Lake on February 6, 1986.
Upon investigating the incident, the police uncovered several suspicious circumstances. At the scene, officers discovered that they could barely communicate over the roar of the receding waters and that someone shouting from the rock where Mrs. Robinette was last seen could not be heard at any distance, much less from the place where the defendant claimed to have heard her call out his name. The defendant subsequently gave other statements containing inconsistencies about where he was standing when he heard his wife cry out.
The police then learned that in November, 1985, the defendant, an insurance agent, had purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy on his wife. The policy contained a double-indemnity clause in the event of accidental death and named the defendant as the sole beneficiary. A comparison of known handwriting samples revealed that the defendant had signed his wife's name to the policy application, the initial premium check, and a withdrawal draft authorizing automatic payment of future premiums from the couple's joint checking account.
In May, 1986, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with murder of the first degree in the death of his wife. At his trial in March, 1987, Mrs. Robinette's teen-aged daughter by a former marriage testified that her mother had discovered several incomplete insurance policy applications on the defendant's desk in November, 1985, and had seemed concerned and upset by the discovery. Mrs. Robinette's daughter also testified that her mother was terrified of water and that on the morning of her mother's death, the defendant had uncharacteristically refused to allow her to accompany them on their expedition. Finally, Mrs. Robinette's daughter stated that the version of the incident that the defendant related to her on the evening of her mother's death varied in several respects from the statements he gave the police. 1
The defendant's testimony at trial also differed from the statements he gave the police with respect to where he was standing when he saw his wife chasing her hat and heard "someone" yell out his name. The defendant testified that he refused to allow his stepdaughter to accompany him and his wife that morning because they intended to pick up her Christmas present. The defendant also testified that he had purchased the life insurance policy in order to fulfill a required quota at work, and it was uncontested that he had never filed a claim against the policy.
The defendant admitted that he had signed his wife's name to the policy application, the premium check, and the automatic withdrawal card. The defendant further testified that his wife was aware of the policy and had not appeared to object to it at the time. The defendant stated that he was aware the policy had a contestability clause, which allowed the insurance company to contest the policy if death occurred within two years of its issuance. He also stated that he knew the policy was invalid because he had signed his wife's name to the application.
On March 27, 1987, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of first-degree murder with a recommendation of mercy. The defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled, and, by order dated April 17, 1987, the circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence that he had falsely declared on his job application that he was a graduate of Pennsylvania State University and had taught school in Pennsylvania for several years. On the first day of trial, the court granted a defense motion to suppress this evidence unless the State showed that it was relevant or the defendant put his character and reputation in issue. During the prosecution's cross-examination of the defendant, however, the court ruled that because the credibility of a witness is always an issue and since the defendant had testified as to his employment by the insurance company, his answers to the questions on his job application were admissible. The defendant then admitted on the stand that he had given false answers. 2
The defendant does not complain of the admission of the forged documents surrounding his procurement of the life insurance policy naming him as the sole beneficiary. This evidence obviously was admissible to supply the defendant's motive for killing his wife. Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 3 This rule was recognized in our law prior to the adoption of our Rules of Evidence. E.g., State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). 4 Nor can it be disputed that such evidence can be utilized against a defendant. 5 E.g., State v. Headley, 168 W.Va. 138, 282 S.E.2d 872 (1981); State v. Messer, 166 W.Va. 806, 277 S.E.2d 634 (1981); State v. Harris, 166 W.Va. 72, 272 S.E.2d 471 (1980); State v. Haverty, 165 W.Va. 164, 267 S.E.2d 727 (1980); State v. Bush, 163 W.Va. 168, 255 S.E.2d 539 (1979). Although we have recognized that other crimes, wrongs, or acts must have occurred reasonably close in time to the present offense, 6 the defendant's forgery of his wife's name occurred less than one month before her death.
We also note that the defendant's employment with the insurance company began only several months before his wife's death. Conceivably, this was the first step that led to Mrs. Robinette's death. By securing employment as an insurance agent, the defendant was in a much more favorable position to obtain beneficiary status on the policy. The making of false statements as to his credentials on his employment application was necessary to secure a position for which he might not otherwise have been hired.
We believe the State could properly introduce this evidence as an integral part of the development of the facts surrounding his motive for killing his wife. We have in a variety of cases permitted evidence of other wrongdoing to provide an explanation of the defendant's motive. State v. Gum, ...
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