State v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 13 December 1904 |
| Citation | 101 N.W. 634,126 Iowa 69 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA v. THOMAS C. ROBINSON, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Howard District Court.--HON. A. N. HOBSON, Judge.
DEFENDANT appeals from a conviction and sentence to imprisonment for life for murder in the first degree, committed by administering poison to an unnamed female infant, four days old.
Affirmed.
P. H McHugh and Tom H. Milner, for appellant.
Chas W. Mullan, Attorney-General, and Lawrence De Graff, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
I. The indictment alleges that defendant, "in the county aforesaid, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with malice aforethought, administer to and cause to be taken into the stomach of a certain girl baby, then and there being, aged about four days [and otherwise specifically described], a deadly quantity of a certain deadly poison called 'strychnine,' he, the said defendant, then and there well knowing the same to be in quantity and kind, as was administered and taken, a deadly poison, by the means of the taking of which deadly poison into the stomach and body of the said girl baby, she became then and there mortally sick and of which said mortal sickness on or about [the date named], at and within the county of Howard and State of Iowa she died," etc. It is contended that this indictment is fatally defective because it does not allege a specific intent to kill, but this objection is, we think, entirely without merit. The allegation of a specific intent to kill may be important where the acts themselves, as alleged, do not necessarily involve such an intent--as, for instance, in case of an assault with a deadly weapon, where, as it has been held, the allegation of intent to kill is essential, although, as a matter of evidence, such intent might be inferred from the act charged. State v. McCormick, 27 Iowa 402. But killing by means of the willful, unlawful, and felonious administration of poison is murder, and murder in the first degree. Code, section 4728. A homicide thus committed cannot constitute murder in the second degree or manslaughter, and therefore the specific intent to kill is not an essential allegation in the indictment. State v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa 6, 72 N.W. 497; State v. Wells, 61 Iowa 629, 17 N.W. 90. The indictment follows the form given in Bishop's Directions & Forms, section 533, and we have not the slightest doubt as to its sufficiency. Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539 (1 N.E. 491).
II. For the purpose of showing that the symptoms attending the illness and death of the infant indicated poisoning by strychnine, expert witnesses introduced for the prosecution were asked as to whether certain hypothetical facts would, in their judgment, show that death occurred from that cause. The objection interposed by the defendant to the hypothetical questions was that some of the symptoms assumed therein were not shown by the evidence to have existed. Without setting out at length the questions or the evidence on which they were predicated, it is sufficient to say that the principal objection was to the inclusion in the question of the throwing back of the head, as a characteristic symptom of convulsions due to strychnine poisoning, while it is contended that there was no evidence that the infant in question did throw back its head during its illness. It can hardly be said, however, that there was no evidence of such fact. One witness who was present said, "I just seen that it jerked that way, and held its head up that way, and rolled its eyes," and again that the infant, while being held, As this testimony was evidently accompanied with gestures indicating the motion of the infant's head, we are not justified in saying that this evidence, as it went to the jury, did not indicate that the head was thrown backward. However this may be, two of the expert witnesses were afterwards recalled, and a hypothetical question propounded, from which the throwing back of the head was eliminated as a symptom accompanying the illness, and they still testified that the symptoms described in the revised question indicated strychnine poisoning.
The only other expert witness called by the prosecution to whom the hypothetical question was put was the chemist, who had examined the stomach and intestines of the deceased infant for traces of strychnine, and who testified that no such traces had been found. To him the hypothetical question was put, not with reference to whether the symptoms described indicated strychnine poisoning, but with reference to whether in a case of that character he would probably succeed in detecting strychnine by his examination if strychnine poison had been administered and caused the death. Now, while it might have been error to allow the hypothetical question to be propounded if it should be conceded that the symptoms of jerking the head backward had not been shown to have been observed, yet, as bearing upon the ability of the chemist to discover strychnine in the examination of the stomach and intestines, the error was wholly without prejudice. The real question asked and answered was as to the probability of the discovery of strychnine on such examination as was made, provided the death was due to strychnine poisoning. With reference to the inclusion in the hypothetical question of the jerking of the infant's head, it was plainly of no significance. No prejudicial error was committed by the court, therefore, in overruling defendant's objections to the hypothetical questions on this ground. There was much controversy during the trial as to whether certain other symptoms included in the hypothetical questions were indicated by the testimony, but it is sufficient to say that there was some evidence as to all the other symptoms relied upon.
III. It is contended that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to treat the witnesses introduced by...
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