State v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 19 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 53770,53770 |
| Citation | 183 N.W.2d 190 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Helen I. ROBINSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Ralph D. Beal, Davenport, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Richard N. Winders, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edward N. Wehr, County Atty., for appellee.
Helen I. Robinson, defendant herein, was found guilty of accepting money under false pretenses contrary to the provisions of section 239.14 of the 1966 Code, and was sentenced to a term of 90 days in the Scott County jail. She appeals. We affirm.
By county attorney information defendant was accused of defrauding the State by accepting A.D.C. payments while she was not eligible to accept them, and of concealing from the Social Welfare Department a material change of circumstances resulting from her employment, all in violation of the provisions of section 239.14 of the Code.
Section 239.14 provides: 'Whoever obtains, or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any person to obtain, by means of a willfully false statement or representation, or by impersonation, or any fraudulent device, any assistance under this chapter to which the recipient is not entitled, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punishable by fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than three months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.'
Appellant assigns as error (1) the trial court's failure to sustain her motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, and (2) the failure of the trial court to declare section 239.14 unconstitutional for the reason that it is too vague and indefinite.
I. From the record we learn that the defendant had been receiving payments under A.D.C. from 1952 until 1968 with the exception of a period in 1956 when she was not eligible for such aid, that she obtained employment at Mercy Hospital in Davenport, Scott County, Iowa, on September 12, 1967, and was so employed at the time of this trial. It also appears that until February 1968, when a social worker discovered her status change, she accepted and used A.D.C. payments based upon a determination made prior to her employment, and that she knew she was to immediately report to her case worker any change in her and her husband's income so an adjustment of her payments could be made. Her hospital pay each two weeks was $97.60, although it varied due to absences for illness, etc.
The principal dispute was as to whether defendant did inform the department of her employment or performed her obligation to advise the social service office in Davenport of her status change. Appellant and her husband testified that she made several telephone calls on the 25th or 26th of September to the department office to report her employment, but conceded she did not reach her case worker or write a letter to the case worker or the department advising of her employment. She testified she told the office receptionist she 'had gone to work' and asked her to tell the case worker 'so that if there was an adjustment to be made it could be made before * * * the end of the month.'
The State's testimony was to the effect that no one at the department in Davenport had received any word, written or otherwise, containing the information that appellant was employed and wished to have her eligibility status redetermined, that the office practice of the department was when such word was received while the case worker was out, a note was left to advise of the message, that no such communication was received by the case worker, and that the department was unaware of this status change until a case worker making a twice-a-year review discovered it in February 1968, almost six months after defendant started to work at the hospital. This review also revealed that one of appellant's sons had moved out of the home during this period and that her husband had changed jobs and was making more money than that shown on the last A.D.C. information sheet. None of these changes had been reported. The case worker further testified when she asked to see defendant's pay stubs only the husband's were produced. The case worker also recalled receiving a September letter from appellant asking for an additional school fee allowance, but stated there was no mention therein of her employment. She said, if she had received any word of a call regarding defendant's employment, pursuant to her practice she would have immediately checked to find out what defendant was making and what her expenses were in order to make a new adjustment of her A.D.C. payments.
II. We are well aware of section 787.3(6) which provides, where a verdict is contrary to the evidence the court should grant a new trial, and that under the authority so provided it is within the judicial power of the court to set aside the jury's verdict. Appellant contends this verdict is contrary to the evidence because 'there is no evidence in the record to rebut appellant's testimony that she informed (the department's) switchboard operator of her employment' and under these circumstances we should reverse the court's ruling on her motion to dismiss. We cannot agree.
It is true a trial court is vested with considerable discretion in passing on a motion for a new trial, but the prevailing well established rule is that a jury verdict will not be interfered with unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence or that there is such an utter lack of support for the findings as to require a reversal. State v. Sanders, 260 Iowa 327, 147 N.W.2d 159; State v. Carlson, 224 Iowa 1262, 276 N.W. 770; 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 19.
Although there is no direct testimony to refute appellant's testimony that she called the department office to report her employment, under the other circumstances shown the jury was not compelled to believe her. There is considerable evidence which, if believed, would establish that defendant deliberately avoided giving the department such notification and change of status. Appellant admitted she knew changes in her or her husband's income must be reported to the department and that, pursuant to a reported change in status, there would be a re-evaluation and new computation of aid to her. Of course, when one is bound to disclose facts relating to eligibility and status and fails to perform that duty, or when one relates certain facts pertaining to eligibility for aid and suppresses other relative and material facts or information as to status and thereby misleads as to the real facts, such conduct generally constitutes the offense of false pretenses. See 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 19.
Under this record there is considerable support for the jury finding of a willful false representation or fraudulent maneuver by appellant to retain assistance to which she was not entitled. When all the evidence and the fair inferences which arose therefrom are considered, it is clear the issue of notification was for the jury whose responsibility it was to weigh and give effect to that evidence. State v. Carlson, supra. Possessed with the knowledge that her changed status called for an adjustment of her A.D.C. aid, and that prior thereto she should not use such payments, it is difficult to find a valid excuse for her acceptance and use of the payments, and especially in the face of a warning by her husband that she should not do so. The jury evidently found appellant willfully did not advise the department of her status change and, under this record, we hold the jury could so find. This finding is not without support in the record and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial or set aside the verdict on these grounds.
III. In her second assignment appellant maintains that section 239.14 of the Code is unconstitutional and that her conviction thereunder was therefore null and void. Specifically, she contends the provisions of this section, which pertain...
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