State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 11 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2007-296-M.P.,No. 2008-116-M.P.,No. 2007-204-M.P.,No. 2007-198-M.P.,No. 2008-28-M.P.,No. 2007-197-M.P.,2007-197-M.P.,2007-198-M.P.,2007-204-M.P.,2007-296-M.P.,2008-28-M.P.,2008-116-M.P.
• Citation: 972 A.2d 150
• Parties: STATE v. David ROBINSON. State v. Robert Palmer, Jr. State v. Christine Cabral. State v. Marcos Garden. State v. John Barboza. State v. Armando Furlano.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

972 A.2d 150

STATE v. David ROBINSON.

State v. Robert Palmer, Jr.

State v. Christine Cabral.

State v. Marcos Garden.

State v. John Barboza.

State v. Armando Furlano.

No. 2007-197-M.P.

No. 2007-198-M.P.

No. 2007-204-M.P.

No. 2007-296-M.P.

No. 2008-28-M.P.

No. 2008-116-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 11, 2009.

John E. Sullivan, III, Department of Attorney General, for Plaintiff.

Richard S. Humphrey, Esq., Tiverton, Andrew Horwitz, Esq., Pawtucket, Steven G. Wright, Esq.; Russell Bramley, Esq., Warwick; B. Jean Rosiello, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: GOLDBERG, Acting C.J., FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and WILLIAMS, C.J. (ret.).

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

The facts before us are straightforward and uncomplicated. These companion cases are before the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari. The petitioners are six motorists who are seeking review of a District Court order. That order reversed a decision of the appeals panel of the Traffic Tribunal that had affirmed a magistrate judge's dismissal of charges for refusing to submit to a chemical test. This Court issued the writs and consolidated the cases for briefing and argument because of the parallel issues presented. The petitioners have diverse backgrounds, come from different communities across our state, are of various ages and ethnicities, and in all likelihood have never met each other.¹ They do, however, share certain common denominators; all six were suspected of operating motor vehicles while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, all six were advised of the penalties for refusing to submit to a chemical test save one—a $200 assessment fee to support the Department of Health's chemical testing programs—and, all six declined to have the test administered to them. What we are called upon to resolve is the impact of that single omission. Because we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the state's appeal from the decision of the appeals panel, we quash the order of the District Court.

I The Refusal Statute, G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1

General Laws 1956 § 31-27-2.1(a) provides that operators of motor vehicles within the state are presumed to have consented to chemical tests of their blood, breath, and/or urine to determine whether they are under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Section 31-27-2.1(b) empowers law-enforcement officers to prepare a sworn report and submit it to a judge of the Traffic Tribunal or District Court whenever a motorist, arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, refuses to submit to such a test. If the report satisfies the requirements set forth in subsection (b) of § 31-27-2.1,² the judge must immediately suspend the license of the driver to whom reference is made in the report. Thereafter, under subsection (c) of § 31-27-2.1, a hearing is available to determine whether a refusal charge should be sustained or dismissed. If the judge finds after the hearing that:

"(1) the law enforcement officer making the sworn report had reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person had been driving a motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, toluene, or any controlled substance, * * * (2) the person while under arrest refused to submit to the tests upon the request of a law enforcement officer; (3) the person had been informed of his or her rights in accordance with § 31-27-3; and (4) the person had been informed of the penalties incurred as a result of noncompliance with this section; the judge shall sustain the violation." Section 31-27-2.1(c) (emphasis added).

In such a case, the judge "shall then impose the penalties set forth in subsection (b)." Id. One such penalty is the $200 assessment of which petitioners were not informed and which is the focus of our attention in this case.³

II Facts and Travel

A Warwick police officer arrested Christine Cabral,⁴ on September 10, 2006, because he suspected that she was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. At the police station, an officer asked her to submit to a chemical test, and read to her from a form entitled "Rights for Use at the Station/Hospital." That form indicated that the motorist had the option to refuse the test and notified her about the penalties she would incur in the event she refused.⁵ The state concedes that the form used by law enforcement in Ms. Cabral's case, and in the cases of the other petitioners, did not include any information about the $200 assessment that recently had been enacted, and that the motorists were not informed of this penalty.⁶ Cabral refused to submit to the test, and, as a result, she was cited for her refusal pursuant to § 31-27-2.1.

On September 22, 2006, Cabral appeared pro se in the Traffic Tribunal and denied the charge. A judge then issued a preliminary suspension of her driver's license and scheduled a trial. On October 19, 2006, however, a magistrate judge of the Traffic Tribunal dismissed the refusal charge after he found that Cabral had not been fully apprised of the penalties that she would incur as a consequence of her refusal to submit to the chemical test.

The state appealed the magistrate judge's decision to the appeals panel of the Traffic Tribunal. On January 29, 2007, the panel issued a consolidated decision that affirmed the magistrate's decision to dismiss the charges against Cabral and the other motorists. It found that the $200 assessment was a penalty within the meaning of the refusal statute and that the imposition of this penalty was mandatory. The panel said that it lacked the statutory authority to impose some of the mandatory penalties, but not others, and that if it decided "to avoid the $200 statutory penalty and impose the other sanctions, [its] action would be void ab initio." The panel concluded that:

"Appellees were not informed of all the penalties under Sec. 31-27-2.1 before refusing to submit to a chemical test, and the failure to inform them of a mandatory penalty is a violation of the statute. Without knowledge of all mandatory penalties before them, this motorist could not knowingly refuse within the meaning of Sec. 31-27-2.1. This Panel finds that the failure to inform motorists of a mandatory assessment effectively repudiates the validity of the motorists' refusal."

On February 7, 2007, the state filed a document entitled "Complaint" in the Traffic Tribunal that purported to give notice that it was seeking review of the appeals panel's decision in the District Court. Noticeably absent from that document was any reference to statutory authority providing the District Court with jurisdiction to hear the state's appeal. In Cabral's answer to the state's complaint, she contended that the District Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because G.L. 1956 § 31-41.1-9(a) only authorizes "[a] person who is aggrieved" by a decision of the appeals panel to appeal to the District Court. She asserted that the state is not a "person" within the definition of the statute. In a consolidated decision issued on May 23, 2007, a District Court judge reversed the decision of the appeals panel. He did not specifically rule on the jurisdictional issue, but simply cited § 31-41.1-9 as the vehicle for the state's appeal and as the basis for the court's jurisdiction. The judge reviewed the refusal statute and relied on this Court's decision in Levesque v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation, 626 A.2d 1286 (R.I.1993), to reach his decision.

In Levesque, 626 A.2d at 1288, the police arrested a motorist and charged him with refusing to submit to a chemical test after he was suspected of driving while intoxicated. Consequently, the Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD) of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (DOT) issued an order suspending both his license and automobile registrations. Id. An AAD judge sustained the violation, and the motorist appealed to the AAD appeals board, which denied his appeal.⁷ Id. Levesque appealed to the District Court. Id. After a hearing, the District Court judge dismissed the violation against the motorist, finding that the suspension of his registration was a penalty about which the motorist must be informed pursuant to § 31-27-2.1. Levesque, 626 A.2d at 1288. We granted the DOT's petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. Before this Court, the motorist contended that he had not been warned that his registrations might be suspended before he refused to take the test. Id. at 1288-89. We held that "the police are required to inform motorists who have been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances of all the penalties they could incur if they refuse to submit to breathalyzer tests * * *." Id. at 1290. The Court went on to say that although the suspension of the motorist's registration without first providing him the opportunity for a hearing was a denial of his due process rights, vacating the violation was too broad a remedy. Id. at 1290-91. The Court reasoned that the "District Court was correct in voiding the registration suspension because it is a consequence of which Levesque was not informed." Id. at 1291. "But since the driver was adequately informed of the other penalties he could incur because of his failure to submit to the breathalyzer test, those penalties and the violation should have been affirmed." Id.

The District Court judge in the instant matter found that Levesque controlled the outcome of this case. He concluded that, similar to the motorist in Levesque, petitioners' "statutory right to be notified of all refusal penalties was violated." The judge, however, did not agree with the appeals panel's decision that the violation must be dismissed. Instead, he said that:

"[T]he panel's concern that to eliminate the $200 assessment would run afoul of the mandatory penalty provision is fundamentally misguided. The panel's decision has the following anomalous result: concluding that one penalty...