State v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 14 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 37,043-KA.,37,043-KA. |
| Citation | 848 So.2d 642 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clifton R. ROBINSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, No. 01-F1361, D. Milton Moore, III, J Louisiana Appellate Project by: Paula Corley Marx, for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, Shirley M. Wilson, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS, STEWART and PEATROSS, JJ.
Defendant, Clifton R. Robinson, was charged with two counts of aggravated battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:34 for the multiple stabbing of William F. Smith. Defendant was convicted by a unanimous jury of two counts of second degree battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrent with each other. Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentences. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
On August 10, 2001, William F. Smith was sitting on the porch of a vacant house on Marx Street in Monroe with two friends, Candy Johnson and Ray Robinson.1 The vacant house was owned by a member of Mr. Smith's family and he had assumed the responsibility of maintaining the property and yard when the house was vacated.2 Mr. Smith owned and lived in a mobile home located on the adjacent lot. On this particular evening, Mr. Smith was shelling peas and the group was drinking alcohol.
Late in the evening, Defendant approached the porch of the vacant house where Mr. Smith and his friends were sitting and tried to sell Mr. Smith some tools, which, according to Ms. Johnson, were stolen. The record indicates that Mr. Smith had known Defendant for many years and that Defendant had spent nights in Mr. Smith's home. Mr. Smith told Defendant he was not interested in the tools and asked him to leave. Defendant and Ms. Johnson then left.
A short time later, Defendant returned with Ms. Johnson, again attempting to sell the tools. Mr. Smith again told Defendant that he had no use for the tools and told Defendant to leave the property. Mr. Smith testified that Defendant replied, "it ain't your house" and and began shouting profanity at Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith attempted, unsuccessfully, to remove Defendant from the porch.3 As this happened, Defendant pulled a pocket knife out of his back pocket. Mr. Smith, who testified that he did not see the knife, picked up a board that was beside the front door, and swung it at Defendant. The board missed Defendant, but hit the porch post and broke apart. At that point, Defendant stabbed Mr. Smith in the shoulder. Mr. Smith then attempted to flee from Defendant, falling over a chair and off of the porch into the yard. Defendant then straddled Mr. Smith in the yard and began hitting and stabbing him with the pocket knife.
As the altercation on the porch began, across the street Tony Hickman and his wife were getting into their car to leave after visiting Mr. Hickman's brother. Mr. Hickman heard the commotion on the porch and, specifically, heard Mr. Smith telling Defendant to get off the porch. Mr. Hickman testified that he heard Defendant respond, "it ain't your house." Mr. Hickman walked around his car and saw that the two men were then in the yard and saw Defendant straddling Mr. Smith and punching him. While Mr. Hickman did not see the pocket knife, he testified that he heard Mr. Smith say, "you stabbed me . ..." Mr. Smith and Ms. Johnson both testified that, as he was beating and stabbing Mr. Smith, Defendant stated, "I'll kill your ass."
Ms. Johnson began yelling at Defendant to stop and Defendant got off of Mr. Smith and fled the scene. Defendant had stabbed Mr. Smith in the shoulder and stomach and had punched him several times in the face and body. Although Mr. Smith was able to stand, his stomach had been cut open and his intestines were protruding from one of the wounds. Emergency assistance was summoned and Mr. Smith was taken to the hospital where he underwent surgery and treatment for stab wounds to the shoulder and stomach.
Defendant was arrested two months later. The original booking charges were two counts of attempted second degree murder, but the district attorney later filed a bill of information charging Defendant with two counts of aggravated battery. As previously stated, Defendant was tried by a jury, with witnesses testifying as described above. In addition to Mr. Smith, Ms. Johnson and Mr. Hickman, two detectives of the Monroe Police Department testified regarding the investigation and arrest. Specifically, Detective James Clark provided testimony regarding the arrest and the Defendant's post-arrest silence, as is discussed in more detail later in this opinion, about which Defendant now complains on appeal. Defendant presented no evidence. The jury found Defendant guilty of the responsive verdict of second degree battery on both counts.
The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report and Defendant was sentenced on August 5, 2002. The trial court noted that the pre-sentence investigation report found that Defendant was a fifth-felony offender, with felony convictions beginning in 1984. In addition, Defendant's record included numerous misdemeanor convictions, some of which involved crimes against persons, including at least three prior convictions for simple battery. The trial court found Defendant not to be eligible for probation or a suspended sentence. As previously stated, the trial court sentenced Defendant to the maximum sentence on each count of five years at hard labor, to be served concurrently with each other, with credit for time served.
The record shows that the State had filed a habitual offender bill of information on July 26, 2002, alleging Defendant to be a second-felony offender. During the sentencing, however, the State advised the court that, based on the sentences imposed, it was abandoning habitual offender proceedings against Defendant. No motion to reconsider the sentences was filed. This appeal ensued.
Defendant has assigned the following errors on appeal:
1. The evidence herein is legally insufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction.
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in imposing upon Appellant an excessive sentence.
3. The Honorable Trial Court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when comment was made on Appellant's post arrest silence.
Sufficiency of evidence
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second degree battery. While he does not dispute the fact that he hit and stabbed the victim or that the battery inflicted serious bodily injury, Defendant submits that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in disproving that he acted in self-defense. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the battery was in self-defense. We disagree.
A sufficiency of the evidence claim requires the reviewing court to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accord with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could reasonably conclude that all of the elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992); State v. Bosley, 29,253 (La. App.2d Cir.4/2/97), 691 So.2d 347, writ denied, 97-1203 (La.10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1333.
The court's authority to review questions of fact in a criminal case is limited to the sufficiency of the evidence evaluation under Jackson v. Virginia, supra, and does not extend to credibility determinations made by the trier of fact. La. Const. art. 5, § 10(B); State v. Williams, 448 So.2d 753 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984). A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Bosley, supra; State v. Rogers, 494 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 499 So.2d 83 (La.1987).
La. R.S. 14:34.1 provides:
Second degree battery is a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury. For purposes of this article, serious bodily injury means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.
Whoever commits the crime of second degree battery shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.
La. R.S. 14:19 provides:
The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable, when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession; provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense, and that this article shall not apply where the force or violence results in a homicide.
The standard of proof when a defendant claims self-defense in a non-homicide case is a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Freeman, 427 So.2d 1161 (La.1983); State v. Braswell, 605 So.2d 702 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992). The jurisprudence does not clearly define or allocate the burden of proving self-defense in a non-homicide case. State v. Braswell, supra. The jury in the case sub judice was charged with the more stringent standard, placing the burden of proof on the State. We will, therefore, review the evidence in light of this charge, requiring the State to negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Braswell, supra.
The issue of self-defense requires a...
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