State v. Roble-Baker
Decision Date | 25 May 2006 |
Docket Number | (CC 001743FE; CA A118722; SC S51978). |
Citation | 340 Or. 631,136 P.3d 22 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Dawn Ellen ROBLE-BAKER, Petitioner on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Jennelle Meeks Barton, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With her on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem.
David Amesbury, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before CARSON, Chief Justice,** and GILLETTE, DURHAM, RIGGS, DE MUNIZ,*** BALMER, and KISTLER, Justices.
The issue in this case is whether the police violated defendant's state constitutional right against compelled self incrimination when they failed to advise her of her Miranda rights before she admitted to killing her husband.1 The trial court concluded that the officers had not violated defendant's rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. State v. Roble-Baker, 195 Or.App. 415, 99 P.3d 1239 (2004). We reach a different conclusion and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court judgment.
We state the facts consistently with the trial court's explicit and implicit factual findings. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). Skeletal remains were discovered on March 12, 2000, in the back yard of defendant's former rental home in Trail, Oregon. Before the police had identified the remains, defendant telephoned the police, claiming that her family members had told her that her husband's wallet and identification had been found near the remains and that police might be looking for her. Detective Newell returned defendant's call and asked about her husband's whereabouts in the preceding years. Defendant told Newell that her husband had left her three or four years earlier, that she believed he was living in Portland, but that she did not know how to get in touch with him. Defendant gave Newell her home and work telephone numbers and told him that he could contact her if he had any more questions.
The skeletal remains were positively identified as being those of defendant's husband on April 4, 2000. The next day, Newell and Detective Wright went to defendant's place of employment and asked her if they could interview her. Defendant agreed to talk with the detectives, but her supervisor asked that the detectives conduct the interview elsewhere. The detectives suggested that they conduct the interview at the Oregon State Police Headquarters, a 20- to 25-minute drive from defendant's office. They told defendant that they could drive her to the police headquarters and that they would bring her back to her office after the interview. She agreed.
Defendant and the two detectives arrived at police headquarters at about 10:00 a.m. They sat in the facility's interview room and discussed defendant's relationship with her husband and the circumstances of his disappearance. Newell explained:
Newell described the atmosphere during the interview as "relaxed," with defendant periodically taking breaks to use the bathroom or smoke cigarettes outside the building.
Throughout those initial discussions, defendant denied having any knowledge about her husband's death. Based upon that denial Newell suggested that defendant take a polygraph test. He explained:
Because defendant claimed to be concerned about the test's reliability and was reluctant to take it, Wright suggested that defendant discuss the test with Detective Phillips, a polygraph examiner for the Oregon State Police. Defendant agreed to do so and met with Phillips at approximately 12:25 p.m., almost two and one-half hours after she had first arrived at police headquarters.
According to Phillips, the purpose of his conversation with defendant was to "clear up any questions that she had about a polygraph exam." He gave her an "overview of what the exam [was] going to be like," and explained to her that, before the examination, she would be given Miranda warnings and that any participation on her part would be voluntary. During the course of the conversation, defendant agreed to take the test but asked Phillips if she could do so the following day. Phillips told her that, although he did not believe she would come back the next day, "she'd always been free to leave," and that "if she wanted to take the test [the next day], that would be fine." At 1:55 p.m., after talking with defendant for one and one-half hours, Phillips told defendant that they would check with Newell and Wright to see if they had any more questions for defendant and to confirm an appointment for a polygraph test the next day.
While Phillips was discussing the polygraph test with defendant, two detectives had gone to interview defendant's son at his elementary school to "get some background into the investigation." When Phillips and defendant returned to the interview room and Phillips informed the detectives that defendant wanted to go home, Wright told defendant that her son was being interviewed. Because school ended early that day, he told her that the detectives would bring her son back to police headquarters when they were done.
Concerned that defendant would not return the next day, Newell suggested that defendant listen to some additional facts regarding their investigation of her husband's death. He described that conversation as follows:
After Newell explained those additional facts, defendant suddenly stood up and said, "`Well, why don't you just take me out and hang me?'"2 She then walked outside to the smoking area, stating, "`I need a smoke.'"
Newell followed defendant outside to the smoking area, and Wright joined them shortly afterwards.3 As defendant smoked her cigarette, Newell told her to tell him why she had killed her husband. He testified:
Although there were long periods during which defendant did not respond to Newell, she told him that she would make a statement after speaking with her son. She said, ""
Because defendant was emotional, Newell was concerned that she would harm herself or her son. He told her, "`I'm afraid that you will hurt yourself and you could hurt yourself or your son both because of this whole thing coming to light.'" Defendant did not respond. He then suggested what he described as "a compromise," stating to defendant, "`Why don't we end this night-mare now, and then you can talk to your son * * *.'" Newell testified that the conversation was "taking place over some time" because "she was smoking cigarettes and she was pretty emotional." He stated that "[t]here was times when she would just be quiet, she wouldn't say anything." Eventually, Newell faced defendant and asked her, "`Did he deserve that?'" She responded "no," explaining that "`[w]e had some bad times, but he was a good man.'" At some time between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., approximately five to six hours after the detectives began questioning her, defendant said, "`I hope I'm doing the right thing,'" and then she confessed to killing her husband, claiming she had done so in self-defense.
Newell ended the interview, and Wright told defendant that her son was at police headquarters.4 As Newell and defendant walked back into police headquarters, Newell told defendant that she needed to make arrangements for her son. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., the detectives allowed defendant to spend time alone with her son. At about 6:00 p.m., after speaking with her son and eating dinner with the detectives, defendant agreed to give a taped interview. At the beginning of that interview, Newell read defendant her Miranda rights. On learning her rights, defendant...
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